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detect spores.















Edited by Stephen A. Morse
Contributors
Xue-Jie Yu, Ross Sparks, Sarah Bolt, Chris Okugami, Stuart Farquharson, Rickard Knutsson, Martha Hale, Leonard A. 
Smith, Virginia Roxas-Duncan, Robert Webb, Luisa W. W. Cheng, D.N. Rao, Riyasat Ali
© The Editor(s) and the Author(s) 2012
The moral rights of the and the author(s) have been asserted.
All rights to the book as a whole are reserved by INTECH. The book as a whole (compilation) cannot be reproduced, 
distributed or used for commercial or non-commercial purposes without INTECH’s written permission.  
Enquiries concerning the use of the book should be directed to INTECH rights and permissions department 
(permissions@intechopen.com).
Violations are liable to prosecution under the governing Copyright Law.
Individual chapters of this publication are distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 
Unported License which permits commercial use, distribution and reproduction of the individual chapters, provided 
the original author(s) and source publication are appropriately acknowledged. If so indicated, certain images may not 
be included under the Creative Commons license. In such cases users will need to obtain permission from the license 
holder to reproduce the material. More details and guidelines concerning content reuse and adaptation can be 
foundat http://www.intechopen.com/copyright-policy.html.
Notice
Statements and opinions expressed in the chapters are these of the individual contributors and not necessarily those 
of the editors or publisher. No responsibility is accepted for the accuracy of information contained in the published 
chapters. The publisher assumes no responsibility for any damage or injury to persons or property arising out of the 
use of any materials, instructions, methods or ideas contained in the book.
First published in Croatia, 2012 by INTECH d.o.o.
eBook (PDF) Published by  IN TECH d.o.o.
Place and year of publication of eBook (PDF): Rijeka, 2019.
IntechOpen is the global imprint of IN TECH d.o.o.
Printed in Croatia
Legal deposit, Croatia: National and University Library in Zagreb
Additional hard and PDF copies can be obtained from orders@intechopen.com
Bioterrorism
Edited by Stephen A. Morse
p. cm.
ISBN 978-953-51-0205-2
eBook (PDF) ISBN 978-953-51-6867-6
Selection of our books indexed in the Book Citation Index 
in Web of Science™ Core Collection (BKCI)
Interested in publishing with us? 
Contact book.department@intechopen.com
Numbers displayed above are based on latest data collected. 
For more information visit www.intechopen.com
4,100+ 




Contributors from top 500 universities








the world’s leading publisher of 
Open Access books




Dr Stephen A. Morse received his M.S.P.H. in envi-
ronmental chemistry and biology in 1966, and a PhD 
in microbiology in 1969 from the University of North 
Carolina at Chapel Hill. He has developed his academic 
career at: Harvard School of Public Health and Harvard 
Medical School, 1971-74; Oregon Health Sciences Uni-
versity, 1974-84; Centers for Disease Control and Preven-
tion (CDC): Director, Sexually Transmitted Diseases Research Program, 
1984-95;  Associate Director for Science, Division of Bioterrorism Prepared-
ness and Response, 1999-2008; Associate Director for Environmental Mi-
crobiology, 2008 - present. He has published over 290 articles, books and 
chapters and has received numerous awards, including: the McLaughlin 
Award from the University of Texas Medical School at Galveston; the Har-
riet Hylton Barr Outstanding Alumnus Award from the School of Public 
Health of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; and the Joseph 
E. McDade Citation for Lifetime Scientific Achievement, CDC. Currently, 
he works as Adjunct Professor at Emory University School of Medicine. He 
is a past member of the Board of Governors of the American Academy of 
Microbiology and the FBI Scientific Working Group for the forensic analy-











Chapter 1 Current Methods for Detecting  
the Presence of Botulinum Neurotoxins  
in Food and Other Biological Samples 1 
Luisa W. Cheng, Kirkwood M. Land and Larry H. Stanker 
Chapter 2 Detection of Bacillus Spores  
by Surface-Enhanced Raman Spectroscopy 17 
Stuart Farquharson, Chetan Shende, Alan Gift and Frank Inscore 
Chapter 3 Staphylococcal Enterotoxins,  
Stayphylococcal Enterotoxin B and Bioterrorism 41 
Martha L. Hale 
Chapter 4 Diagnostic Bioterrorism Response Strategies 65 
Rickard Knutsson 
Chapter 5 Recent Advancement in the Development of Vaccines 
Against Y. pestis – A Potential Agent of Bioterrorism 83 
Riyasat Ali and D.N. Rao 
Chapter 6 Botulinum Neurotoxins 107 
Robert P. Webb, Virginia I. Roxas-Duncan and Leonard A. Smith 
Chapter 7 Ricin Perspective in Bioterrorism 133 
Virginia I. Roxas-Duncan and Leonard A. Smith 
Chapter 8 Spatio-Temporal Disease Surveillance 159 
Ross Sparks, Sarah Bolt and Chris Okugami 
Chapter 9 Rickettsia and Rickettsial Diseases 179 
Xue-jie Yu and David H. Walker 
Contents 
Preface XI
Chapter 1 Current Methods for Detecting 
the Presence of Botulinum Neurotoxins  
in Food and Other Biological Samples 1 
Luisa W. Cheng, Kirkwood M. Land and Larry H. Stanker 
Chapter 2 Detection of Bacillus Spores 
by Surface-Enhanced Raman Spectroscopy 17 
Stuart Farquharson, Chetan Shende, Alan Gift and Frank Inscore 
Chapter 3 Staphylococcal Enterotoxins, 
Stayphylococcal Enterotoxin B and Bioterrorism 41 
Martha L. Hale 
Chapter 4 Diagnostic Bioterrorism Response Strategies 65 
Rickard Knutsson 
Chapter 5 Recent Advancement in the Development of Vaccines 
Against Y. pestis – A Potential Agent of Bioterrorism 83 
Riyasat Ali and D.N. Rao 
Chapter 6 Botulinum Neurotoxins 107 
Robert P. Webb, Virginia I. Roxas-Duncan and Leonard A. Smith 
Chapter 7 Ricin Perspective in Bioterrorism 133 
Virginia I. Roxas-Duncan and Leonard A. Smith 
Chapter 8 Spatio-Temporal Disease Surveillance 159 
Ross Sparks, Sarah Bolt and Chris Okugami 
Chapter 9 Rickettsia and Rickettsial Diseases 179 
Xue-jie Yu and David H. Walker 
Preface 
Pathogenic microorganisms and their toxins have always posed a significant threat to
humans, animals, and plants that become exposed and infected naturally. But now
there is a newly recognized threat – the deliberate use of pathogenic microorganisms 
and toxins as weapons in acts of bioterrorism or in the commission of biocrimes. Long 
before the germ theory of disease was understood, man knew that pathogenic 
microorganisms and toxins were useful as weapons. However, as the twentieth 
century came to a close, the perceived difficulties in production, weaponization, and
deployment of these biological weapons as well as a belief that moral restraints would 
preclude the use of these weapons gave many a false sense of security. Recently, a
number of events have served to focus attention on the threat of terrorism and the
potential for the use of biological weapons against the military, civilian populations, or 
agriculture for the purpose of causing illness, death, or economic loss. This threat is a 
significant concern in the United States as well as internationally. 
Bioterrorist attacks occur as one of two scenarios: overt and covert. In either scenario, 
biologic agents could be introduced into populations by several routes, including
aerosol; contamination of food, water, or medical products; fomites; or the release of
infected arthropod vectors. The deliberate nature of such dissemination will often be
obvious, as in the case of multiple mailed letters containing anthrax spores (ie overt). 
Because we currently lack the ability to conduct extensive real-time monitoring for the
release of a biologic agent, a covert release of a microorganism of toxin in a population 
would be likely to go unnoticed for some time, with individuals exposed leaving the 
attack area before the act of terrorism became evident. Because of the incubation
period, the first signs that a microorganism or toxin has been released may not become 
apparent until hours or weeks later, when individuals become ill and seek medical
care.
Bioterrorism presents many challenges, particularly when compared to chemical, 
radiological, or nuclear terrorism. These challenges reflect the dual-use nature of many 
technologies that can be used for either beneficial purposes or bioterrorism; intentional 
threats that can coexist with similar and naturally occurring threats; the complexity of 
the interaction of the threat with the environment, the human immune system, the 
society/social structure; and rapid advances in biotechnology. Preparing for and
responding to bioterrorism in the twenty-first century has brought together diverse
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disciplines with different backgrounds and cultures, for example intelligence agencies, 
public health and medical professionals, law enforcement officers, scientists, and the 
commercial sector. It remains a learning process. 
Many biological agents can cause illness in humans, but not all are capable of affecting 
public health and medical infrastructures on a large scale. As part of an effort to focus 
public health preparedness efforts, the United States Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC) developed a prioritized list of biological agents taking into 
consideration criteria such as high morbidity and mortality; potential for person-to-
person transmission, directly or by vector; low infectious dose and high infectivity by 
aerosol, with a commensurate ability to cause large outbreaks; ability to contaminate 
food or water supplies; lack of a specific diagnostic test and/or effective treatment; lack 
of a safe and effective vaccine; potential to cause anxiety in the general public and in 
healthcare workers; and potential for weaponization. The final category assignments 
(A, B, or C) of agents for public health preparedness were based on an overall 
evaluation of the ratings the agents received in the aforementioned criteria. Agents 
placed in Category A (eg Yersinia pestis, botulinum neurotoxins) were considered to 
have a moderate to high potential for large-scale dissemination, the greatest potential 
for adverse public health impact with mass casualties, and a requirement for broad-
based public health preparedness efforts. Agents placed in Category B (eg rickettsia, 
ricin, staphylococcal enterotoxins) also have some potential for large-scale 
dissemination with resultant illness, but generally cause less illness and death and, 
therefore, would be expected to have lower public health and medical impact. 
Biological agents that were not believed to present a high bioterrorism risk to public 
health but which could emerge as future threats, as scientific understanding of these 
agents improved were placed in Category C. 
This book was written to provide a resource to scientists, epidemiologists, clinicians, 
and others in the field of bioterrorism defense. Not all possible topics are described. 
Instead, representative topics, authored by international experts provide a unique and 
state-of-the-art perspective on this field. The book consists of this preface and nine 
other chapters that address the broad areas of (1) detection capabilities (ie spatio-
temporal disease surveillance; diagnostic bioterrorism response strategies; methods for 
detecting the presence of botulinum neurotoxins in food and other biological samples; 
and detection of bacillus spores by surface-enhanced Raman spectroscopy) and (2) 
characteristics of specific pathogenic microorganisms and toxins (ie Rickettsia and 
Rickettsial diseases; recent advances in the development of vaccines against Yersinia 
pestis; botulinum neurotoxins; ricin; and staphylococcal enterotoxins).  
 
Dr. Stephen A. Morse  
Associate Director of Science, Division of Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response, 
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1Agricultural Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Albany, CA, 
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1. Introduction  
Botulinum neurotoxins (BoNTs) are some of the most lethal human bacterial toxins and the 
causative agent of botulism (Arnon et al., 2001; Simpson, 2004). The usual routes of 
intoxication for BoNTs are oral ingestion of clostridial spores or pre-formed toxin, 
manifested as infant, foodborne and adult onset botulism. An increasingly common route of 
intoxication is associated with intravenous drug use resulting in wound botulism. BoNTs 
are also classified as Select Agents and have been used as agents of bioterrorism (Arnon et 
al., 2001; Bigalke and Rummel, 2005). Potential methods for toxin exposure include 
intentional contamination of the food and drink supply, or by aerosol spread, leading to 
inhalational botulism. 
Usually, an identification of botulism is made through clinical manifestations and diagnosis, 
with subsequent confirmation by laboratory identification of clostridial spores or toxin in 
foods, environmental or clinical samples (CDC, 1998; Lindström and Korkeala, 2006; 
Solomon and Lilly, 2001). The speed of recovery from botulism increases with the timely 
administration of antitoxin or medical interventions (Arnon et al., 2001; Simpson, 2004). 
Thus, sensitive and rapid toxin detection and diagnostic methods are critical for improved 
recovery time, as well as, facilitate the epidemiologic study of outbreaks. 
Due to the potential for bioterrorism use, much effort and resources have been dedicated to 
the development of detection methods, treatment, and prevention of botulism. A multitude 
of assay formats have been developed over many years, with in some cases, reported 
sensitivities at the attomolar level (Grate et al., 2010). Many assays were designed for use in 
the validation of toxin production, for commercial purposes, or for high-throughput 
screening methods to identify therapeutics that inhibit toxin function. These highly sensitive 
methods usually detect highly purified BoNT samples and are used in research type 
applications. Many such assays are not usable for the detection of BoNT contamination in 
food or other complex samples. This chapter focuses on the diagnostic methods for toxin 
detection and the challenges encountered while adapting analytical methods for the 
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The biology and mechanisms of action of BoNTs are described in a previous chapter in this 
book, and readers should refer to the botulinum neurotoxins chapter by Webb, Roxas-
Duncan and Smith, for more background reading. This chapter will briefly describe the 
properties of BoNTs as they relate to detection methods and will compare and contrast 
currentlyused methods for food and biological sample analyses and methods in 
development. For detailed analyses and descriptions of detection assays please also refer to 
excellent reviews by (Grate et al., 2010; Lindström and Korkeala, 2006; Scarlatos et al., 2005; 
Sharma and Whiting, 2005). We apologize to others not named here due to space 
constraints. 
2. Overview of botulinum neurotoxin structure and function as they relate to 
the development of diagnostic tools 
A single gram of BoNT released and subsequently inhaled can lead to the deaths of more 
than one million people (Arnon et al., 2001; Hill et al., 2007). BoNTs are produced by the 
ubiquitously distributed, gram-positive, strictly anaerobic, spore-forming bacteria 
Clostridium botulinum, C. barati, C. butyricum and C. argentinense. To date, seven different 
botulinum serotypes, indicated by letters A through G, have been identified. Serotypes A, B, 
E, and F have been associated with human disease (Table I).  
 
Type of botulism Average number of 
cases per year 
Percent of total BoNT Serotypes 
Infant 85 66 A, B, E, F 
Wound 24 19 A, B 
Foodborne 19 15 A, B, E, F 
Adult 0.4 0.3 A, B, F 
Unknown 1.4 1 A, B, F 
Table 1. Survey of U.S. human botulism cases from 2001-2009 as reported by the U.S. 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CSTE).  
BoNT serotypes can differ from each other by 34-64% at the amino acid level (Garcia-
Rodriguez et al., 2011; Hill et al., 2007; Jacobson et al., 2011; Smith et al., 2007; Smith et al., 
2005). Genetic variation within each serotype is sometimes significant. And 32 toxin 
subtypes with amino acid level differences of 2.6-32% have been identified thus far, with 
more likely to be identified in the future. Serotype and subtype diversity may impact 
antibody and molecular-based assay designs.  
BoNT is synthesized as an ~150 kDa protein, also called the holotoxin, that is subsequently 
processed by a clostridial trypsin-like protease into two polypeptides linked by a single 
disulfide bond; and are thus similar to other known bacterial A-B dimeric toxins (Oguma, 
Fujinaga, and Inoue, 1995; Singh, 2000). The ~100 kDa fragment, known as the heavy chain 
(HC), facilitates toxin binding to specific host cell receptors and later, translocation of the 
toxin from vesicles into the cell cytosol. The ~50 kDa fragment, known as the light chain 
(LC), contains the enzymatic domain. The LC fragment is often used for the development of 
activity-based assays. HC and LC specific antibodies have been developed for toxin 
neutralization and toxin detection immunoassays. 
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BoNT holotoxin is secreted from bacteria in association with other non-toxic proteins, called 
neurotoxin associated proteins or NAPs, forming large protein complexes of 500-900 kDa. 
These large protein complexes are referred to as progenitor toxins or simply as BoNT 
complex (Inoue et al., 1996). Complexed BoNTs are significantly more toxic in oral 
intoxications (Cheng et al., 2008; Ohishi, Sugii, and Sakaguchi, 1977) than holotoxins. NAPs 
are thought to protect the holotoxin from gastric digestion as well as help holotoxins cross 
the intestinal barrier (Fujinaga et al., 2009; Niwa et al., 2007; Simpson et al., 2004). Toxin 
complexes that survive the gastric challenge translocate across the epithelial cell barrier 
(transcytosis) gaining access into the bloodstream, where the holotoxin is released. BoNT 
complexes are the forms that will most likely be found in natural intoxication and 
bioterrorism cases. Thus, the detection of toxin when associated with NAPs or the use of 
NAPs as detection targets in foodborne intoxications is a consideration in the design of new 
assays. 
The target for BoNT holotoxin is the peripheral cholinergic nerve ending, resulting in flaccid 
paralysis (Simpson, 2004). Specific receptors for the toxin HC of BoNTs have been identified; 
BoNT/A binds to glycoprotein SV2; serotype F binds SV2 and gangliosides; and serotype G 
binds synaptotagmin I and II. Toxin binding to nerve cells is followed by receptor-mediated 
endocytosis and subsequent translocation of the LC (directed by the translocation domain of 
the HC) into the cytoplasm. The LC of different serotypes targets different SNARE proteins. 
BoNT serotypes A, C and E target SNAP-25, and serotypes B, D, F, and G target VAMP2, 
while serotype C targets syntaxin (Hakami et al., 2010). Different SNARE targets of BoNTs 
have been used to develop in vitro assays for toxin activity. Peptides with fluorescent labels 
and quencher molecules have been designed and used in various forms of enzymatic 
activity assays. 
3. Challenges to the development of detection assays for botulinum 
neurotoxins 
The development of robust and sensitive detection assays for BoNTs requires consideration 
of at least six factors explored in detail below. 
3.1 Sensitivity 
Assay sensitivity is not a simple criterion to define and is determined in part by the specific 
application. For example, the human lethal dose (LD) for oral intoxication is estimated at 1 
µg/kg or about 70 µg for a 70 kg adult (Arnon et al., 2001; Scarlatos et al., 2005). Assays 
designed for evaluating food must detect at least this amount in a typical portion. Since 
portions vary widely between individual foods, assay sensitivity requirements may vary 
with specific matrixes. Foods that typically have large portion sizes would require assays 
with lower detection limits. Furthermore the dose to cause illness but not death might be 
lower. Our experience with BoNT exposure in rodents is that a level 10-fold lower than the 
minimal lethal dose falls into this latter category. Thus, a dose level 10-fold lower than the 
LD in humans, 7 µg, translates into an assay sensitivity of 70 ng/mL if a serving is typically 
100 mL. A 10-fold threshold lowers the sensitivity to 7 ng/mL. In contrast, detection levels 
for tests used in sera or other clinical matrices should be as sensitive as possible to account 
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ingested BoNT actually survives the harsh conditions in the gut to reach the bloodstream 
(Cheng and Henderson, 2011; Cheng et al., 2008). The lethal toxin intravenous dose varies 
between 20-200 ng in an adult human with approximately 5 liters of blood (Arnon et al., 
2001). Taking into account natural degradation, and clearance of toxin in sera, the assay 
sensitivity for diagnostic evaluation must be in the low to sub-pg/ml range. 
3.2 Specificity 
There are currently seven known serotypes of BoNTs, and 32 known subtypes. New 
subtypes are expected to be identified in the future. Amino acid sequence differences can 
vary as much as 70% among serotypes (Hill et al., 2007; Smith et al., 2005). This level of 
genetic diversity and variation can prove challenging for both molecular and antibody-
based diagnostic methods. False negative results could be obtained if a gene or protein 
structure of the toxin differ from what established oligonucleotides/PCR primers or 
antibodies can recognize. At the very least, assay performance needs to be established on as 
many toxin sero- and subtypes as practical. Reagents generated for detection assays should 
ideally recognize all known subtypes of each serotype. 
3.3 Matrix effects 
In almost all scenarios, BoNT samples to be tested would be found in a wide variety of 
matrices of food, clinical (serum, sputum, feces, etc) or environmental samples (dust, soil, 
water, etc). Yet, most assay methods are designed, tested and optimized in buffer conditions 
and thus the sensitivity or application in complex matrices may be diminished. Complex 
matrices may contain many challenging conditions such as high fat, high protein or salt 
content, low or high pH; the presence of other active proteases could also interfere with 
detection sensitivity, increase background signal, and give false positive or negative signals. 
Methods to alleviate matrix interference range from simple sample dilution, pH rebalancing, 
addition of protease inhibitors, to specific affinity binding steps prior to detection. Extensive 
analysis of different matrices will be necessary to evaluate assay sensitivity and determine 
the best methods to circumvent matrix effects on assay performance. 
3.4 Activity 
The potent toxicity associated with BoNTs is attributed to their enzymatic properties. The 
differentiation of active versus inactive forms of the toxin is needed for proper risk 
assessment and should be an important consideration in assay design. An active BoNT has 
many roles, it must be able to bind host cell receptors, translocate across membranes and 
finally reach the host cell cytosol and cleave its target protein. Few assays can measure all 
aspects of toxin function. Immunoassays (IA) can generally detect both active and inactive 
toxin and may give false positive results even when no active toxin is present. However, 
positive results from IA requiring the presence of both HC and LC are predictive of active 
toxin (Stanker et al, 2008). Assays measuring endopeptidase activities of BoNTs are available 
but are not as sensitive and amenable to use in complex matrices. Genomic methods, while 
sensitive, detect the presence of toxin genes but not that of toxin. Depending on the 
diagnostic needs, a combination of methods may have to be used to get a full activity profile 
of the toxin. 
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3.5 Ease of use 
For the widest application of an assay, it must be user-friendly and allow for a timely 
diagnosis. Furthermore, assays need to be validated in multiple laboratories, use equipment 
or tools that are readily available, and require minimal training to execute. Ideally, the assay 
should also be field deployable. 
3.6 Cost 
The cost of an assay in terms of reagent or equipment availability can be an important factor 
on how widely an assay is used and deployed.   
4. Current diagnostic methods of toxin detection 
The current “gold standard” for detection of BoNTs is the mouse bioassay. Despite many 
attempts and much research to replace the use of animals, it is still the best assay to model 
all aspects of BoNT intoxication: binding, translocation and enzymatic activity (Grate et al., 
2010). In attempts to replace the mouse bioassay and improve assay time and sensitivity, 
both in vitro and in vivo systems have been developed for the detection of BoNTs. The 
development of a robust detection assay for BoNT requires that the assay meet as many of 
the six challenges mentioned above as possible. This section of the chapter will mainly focus 
on assays that can be used in food and biological samples for the detection of BoNTs. 
4.1 Mouse bioassays 
The mouse bioassay is still one of the most sensitive and robust methods to detect BoNTs 
(Schantz and Kautter, 1978; Solomon and Lilly, 2001).  The mouse bioassay measures BoNT 
in minimal lethal dose (MLD) units, which is the lowest dose at which all tested mice die. 
Mice are usually injected intraperitoneally with 0.5 ml of BoNT sample in a dilution series, 
and then monitored over several days for signs of intoxication and death (CDC, 1998; 
CFSAN, 2001). Signs of intoxication include: ruffled fur, wasp-waist (Figure 1), labored-
breathing, paralysis and death. Signs of intoxication can appear from a few hours post-
injection to a few days depending on the dose and type of BoNT. When enough sample is 
available, the identity of the unknown BoNT can simultaneously be tested by the addition of 
neutralizing antibodies against each of the serotypes (A-G). The serotype is identified by the 
antibody that protects their respective mice from death. The mouse bioassay sensitivity is in 
the range of 20-30 pg for BoNT/A and 10-20 pg/ml for BoNT/B (Ferreira et al., 2004; 
Wictome et al., 1999). 
While the mouse bioassay has high sensitivity, can detect different serotypes and subtypes, 
measures different aspects of active toxin, and is amenable to use in different matrices, it has 
many drawbacks. These include: long assay times, requires specialized animal facilities, 
trained staff, and the use of animals (with death used as an endpoint). There is also 
substantial variation of results observed among different research laboratories.  
Alternative refined animal assays that do not use death as an endpoint such as the mouse 
phrenic nerve hemi-diaphragm assay have been evaluated (Rasetti-Escargueil et al., 2009). 
Although they may be sensitive and faster than the use of whole animals, these assays 
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large samplings of complex matrices (Grate et al., 2010). A recently developed in vivo assay 
using the toe-spread reflex model was tested for the detection of BoNT in buffer, serum and 
milk samples (Wilder-Kofie et al., 2011). This new assay can provide results more quickly 
than standard mouse bioassays. The robustness of this assay and how easily staff can be 
trained to perform this assay have yet to be determined. 
 
Fig. 1. Mouse bioassay. Mice were intraperitoneally treated with BoNT/A (right mouse) or 
phosphate buffered saline (left mouse). The intoxicated mouse shows a typical wasp-waist 
phenotype. 
4.2 Nucleic acid based methods of detecting C. botulinum in food matrices and other 
biological samples 
4.2.1 Polymerase chain reaction 
The use of the polymerase chain reaction (PCR) to identify the presence of C. botulinum 
DNA was originally used to detect the presence of bacterial spores. The method could detect 
the presence of as few as 102 spores per reaction mixture for serotypes A, E and F and only 
10 spores per reaction mixture for BoNT/B. To enhance sensitivity, Lindström and 
colleagues developed an enrichment method that could detect as few as 10-2 spores/gram of 
sample for serotypes A, B and F and 10-1 spores/gram of sample for BoNT/E (Lindstrӧm et 
al., 2001). However, one critical drawback of this method is that enrichment often requires 5 
days. Furthermore, the applicability of the assay for detection of food contamination was 
diminished by the observation that beef could interfere with the sensitivity of the assay. 
Also, if contamination were to occur with the actual toxin, and not cells, this traditional PCR 
method would not be useful.   
4.2.2 Multiplex polymerase chain reaction 
It is highly desirable to analyze unknowns for multiple targets, such as different pathogens 
and/or associated gene products of those pathogens. This approach, known as Multiplex 
technology, is conceptually simple for PCR based assays. Different sets of PCR primers, each 
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one highly specific for a gene of interest can be easily generated, allowing for the 
amplification of multiple targets in one reaction tube. One such multiplex method was able 
to discriminate among BoNT serotypes A, B, E, and F, corroborating mouse bioassay results 
(De Medici et al., 2009). Furthermore, Peck and colleagues developed a culture enrichment 
methods that when coupled with multiplex PCR, can identify strains of C. botulinum that are 
non-proteolytic (BoNT serotypes B, E, and F) (Peck et al., 2010). Importantly, this method 
was robust and reasonably rapid for use with food samples contaminated with C. botulinum. 
Recently, Fach and colleagues have adapted the use of the GeneDisc Cycler (GeneSystems 
PCR Technology) to amplify C. botulinum genes encoding BoNT serotypes A, B, E, and F on 
different microchambers (Fach et al., 2011). This technology allows the simultaneous 
amplification of multiple targets along with a number of different internal controls. A 
number of different toxin-producing clostridia and non-toxin producing bacteria that were 
isolated from different food, clinical, and environmental samples and results were compared 
with those obtained from the mouse bioassay. Notably, all of the botulinum genes were 
detected correctly and no cross-reactivity was observed with either non-toxin producing 
bacteria or with C. botulinum serotypes C, D, and G. Four European laboratories evaluated 
this technology, examining 77 toxin producing clostridia as well as 10 food and clinical 
samples. In all cases, this GeneDisc Cycler was specific and reliable for identifying C. 
botulinum serotypes A, B, E, and F; and was also useful for screening naturally contaminated 
food and fecal samples.  
4.2.3 Real-time polymerase chain reaction 
Real-time or quantitative PCR is useful in studies of gene expression; specifically differential 
expression of genes under different environmental conditions or for comparative studies 
among different organisms. For detection of clostridia, real-time PCR methods that examine 
expression of the NTNH (non-toxic, non-hemagglutinin) genes have been developed, as 
well as methods to study toxin gene expression in C. botulinum serotypes A, B, E, and F 
(Fach et al., 2009). In that study, twenty-nine different strains of toxin-producing C. 
botulinum were screened, and compared with expression profiles from non-toxin producing 
clostridia as controls. This assay has a sensitivity of 100-fg/1000 fg total DNA in the PCR 
tube (equivalent to approximately 25-250 genomes). Converting this DNA concentration to 
its equivalent in cells/ml, suggested a detection limit of approximately 103 to 104 cells/mL. 
Following a 48-hour enrichment under anaerobic conditions, these investigators reported 
the detection of C. botulinum serotype A in a naturally contaminated sample of foie gras 
suspected in a botulism outbreak. Recently, pentaplex methods have been developed to 
simultaneous identify and discriminate among larger numbers of different serotypes using a 
wider array of different genes (Kirchner et al., 2010). This technology should prove to be 
efficient and cost-effective. 
4.2.4 DNA microarrays 
Microarray technology for toxin identification of contaminated food has not been widely used. 
This may be due to the challenge in isolating high-quality RNA samples from clostridia in 
food matrices. A recent oligonucleotide microarray with 62 different sequences based on 
known strain variable regions in the genome of C. botulinum strain ATCC 3502 was 
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2010). Regions corresponding to BoNT genes of various serotypes, and other markers 
components, and other markers were observed. Further development of microarray based 
assay approaches may provide a means to rapidly identify toxin-producing strains.  
4.3 Antibodies as detection tools for BoNT contamination in food 
High-affinity monoclonal antibodies (mAbs) that specifically bind individual or multiple 
BoNT serotypes (and subtypes) have been generated using either mouse hybridoma 
technology or yeast affinity maturation methods (Grate et al., 2010). These antibodies have 
been used extensively in traditional ELISA, bead-based, immuno-PCR, microarray assays or 
in sample preparation before use in a detection assay. Several such assays used in food and 
biological matrices are highlighted below. 
4.3.1 ELISA and ELISA-based methods of detection 
ELISA is a widely used detection assay format that uses anti-BoNT capture and detector 
antibodies usually in a sandwich type format. The read-out for the assay can be colorimetric, 
luminescence or other formats. Most older generation BoNT immunoassays are about 10 
times less sensitive than the mouse bioassay (Ferreira et al., 2004; Scarlatos et al., 2005; 
Sharma and Whiting, 2005). Although not as sensitive, ELISA based methods are relatively 
fast, inexpensive and simple. They are also less subject to matrix effects. Sharma and 
colleagues designed an amplified enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) for 
detecting toxins in food matrices (Sharma et al., 2006). Specifically, toxins for serotypes A, B, 
E, and F could be detected in liquids, solid, and semisolid food. Assay performance in a 
range of foods include broccoli, orange juice, bottled water, cola soft drinks, vanilla extract, 
oregano, potato salad, apple juice, meats, and dairy items were evaluated. Assay sensitivity 
varied for each botulinum complex serotype, and were reported as 60 pg/ml for BoNT/A, 
176 pg/ml for BoNT/B, 163 pg/ml for BoNT/E, and 117 pg/ml for BoNT/F. The tests 
readily detected 2 ng/ml of serotypes A, B, E, and F in a variety of the foods tested. 
Recently, traditional format sandwich ELISA assays using highly sensitive mAbs against 
BoNT/A and BoNT/B have detected as low as 5 pg/mL and 25 pg/mL BoNT/A, in buffer 
and in a milk matrix, respectively (Stanker et al., 2008); and 100 fg and 39 pg/ml of BoNT/B 
in the buffer and milk matrix, respectively (Scotcher, Cheng, and Stanker, 2010). These 
mAbs were also used in electrochemiluminescence ELISA type assays using a Meso Scale 
Discovery (MSD) instrument. Detection sensitivities for BoNT/A using the MSD instrument 
were similar to traditional ELISAs in the buffer system but offered marked improvement in 
detection limits and reduction in backgrounds in liquid food matrices (Cheng and Stanker, 
unpublished results). The higher sensitivity and less time required for these new ELISA 
assays make them great alternatives or complements for the mouse bioassay.  
4.3.2 Multiplex antibody-based detection systems 
The multiplex technology has been applied to the development of methods to analyze 
multiple epitopes on a single antigen or multiple targets in a single sample. This approach 
uses multiple mAbs as well as polyclonal antibodies to reduce false-positive and false-
negative results. The Luminex xMAP technology utilizes microsphere beads conjugated 
with antibodies. The antibody-bead complexes detect multiple epitopes in single sample; for 
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instance, this technology was used to detect abrin, ricin, botulinum toxins, and 
staphylococcal enterotoxins in spiked food samples (Garber, Venkateswaran, and O'Brien, 
2010). The study used paramagnetic beads instead of non-magnetic polystyrene beads to 
help in the analysis of food matrices, such as chipotle mustard, which contain large amounts 
of particulate matter.  
4.3.3 Affinity immunochromatography column-based methods  
Accurate and sensitive detection of contaminated food and other biological samples in the 
field is critical. To this end, Brunt and colleagues (Brunt, Webb, and Peck, 2010) have 
developed a number of rapid affinity immunochromatography column (AICC) assays for 
the detection of BoNT serotypes A, B, E, and F in food matrices. These authors reported a 
detection limit for BoNT/A of 0.5 ng, two fold more sensitive than earlier reported lateral 
flow methods. For serotypes B, E, and F, the minimum detection limit ranged from 5 ng to 
50 ng. Although not as sensitive as ELISA or mouse bioassays, immunochromatographic 
methods generally are rapid assays, requiring only 15 to 30 minutes to complete, do not 
require enrichment steps, making them highly amenable to use in the field. 
4.3.4 Lateral flow technology  
The application of lateral flow methods for detecting toxins has led to the development of a 
number of kits for sensitive and rapid testing. The principle here is that capture antibodies 
are printed on nitrocellulose membranes. Detection antibodies are labeled with materials 
that can be visualized (eg., colloidal gold, or colored latex beads) The sample is added to a 
reagent pad containing labelled detection antibodies that bind toxin, wick across the 
membrane where toxin is retained, thus concentrating the labelled detection antibody. A 
positive reaction leads to a colorimetric change that is usually detected as a line. These 
assays are generally qualitative, and determine the presence or absence of toxin. Sharma and 
coworkers tested different commercial lateral flow devices (such as the Bot-Tox-BTA kit) for 
their capacities to detect toxin in food samples (Sharma et al., 2005). They were able to detect 
as little as 10 ng/ml of BoNT serotypes A and B and 20 ng/ml of BoNT/E in a variety of 
liquids such as milk products, soft drinks, and fruit juices. Results by Stanker (unpublished) 
show sensitivity of 0.5 and 1 ng/ml for BoNT/A in buffer and milk, respectively, in lateral 
flow devices using sensitive mAbs described in the ELISA section above (Stanker et al., 
2008). Although simple lateral flow tests have poorer sensitivities compared to other 
methods, they produced rapid results, require no additional reagents or equipment, are 
easily interpreted, and have many applications. They can be useful for the quick screening 
of samples where the presence of BoNT may be more abundant. 
4.3.5 Immuno-polymerase chain reaction (I-PCR) 
An innovative approach for toxin detection combines antibodies with the amplification 
power of PCR in an assay called immuno-PCR (I-PCR). Here, instead of a secondary 
antibody conjugated to the detection enzyme, template DNA is conjugated to the 
antibody; and upon binding of antigen by the antibody, an indirect test for the presence of 
the BoNT is carried out using PCR. Chao et al. described a sensitive I-PCR method 





2010). Regions corresponding to BoNT genes of various serotypes, and other markers 
components, and other markers were observed. Further development of microarray based 
assay approaches may provide a means to rapidly identify toxin-producing strains.  
4.3 Antibodies as detection tools for BoNT contamination in food 
High-affinity monoclonal antibodies (mAbs) that specifically bind individual or multiple 
BoNT serotypes (and subtypes) have been generated using either mouse hybridoma 
technology or yeast affinity maturation methods (Grate et al., 2010). These antibodies have 
been used extensively in traditional ELISA, bead-based, immuno-PCR, microarray assays or 
in sample preparation before use in a detection assay. Several such assays used in food and 
biological matrices are highlighted below. 
4.3.1 ELISA and ELISA-based methods of detection 
ELISA is a widely used detection assay format that uses anti-BoNT capture and detector 
antibodies usually in a sandwich type format. The read-out for the assay can be colorimetric, 
luminescence or other formats. Most older generation BoNT immunoassays are about 10 
times less sensitive than the mouse bioassay (Ferreira et al., 2004; Scarlatos et al., 2005; 
Sharma and Whiting, 2005). Although not as sensitive, ELISA based methods are relatively 
fast, inexpensive and simple. They are also less subject to matrix effects. Sharma and 
colleagues designed an amplified enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) for 
detecting toxins in food matrices (Sharma et al., 2006). Specifically, toxins for serotypes A, B, 
E, and F could be detected in liquids, solid, and semisolid food. Assay performance in a 
range of foods include broccoli, orange juice, bottled water, cola soft drinks, vanilla extract, 
oregano, potato salad, apple juice, meats, and dairy items were evaluated. Assay sensitivity 
varied for each botulinum complex serotype, and were reported as 60 pg/ml for BoNT/A, 
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instance, this technology was used to detect abrin, ricin, botulinum toxins, and 
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flow devices using sensitive mAbs described in the ELISA section above (Stanker et al., 
2008). Although simple lateral flow tests have poorer sensitivities compared to other 
methods, they produced rapid results, require no additional reagents or equipment, are 
easily interpreted, and have many applications. They can be useful for the quick screening 
of samples where the presence of BoNT may be more abundant. 
4.3.5 Immuno-polymerase chain reaction (I-PCR) 
An innovative approach for toxin detection combines antibodies with the amplification 
power of PCR in an assay called immuno-PCR (I-PCR). Here, instead of a secondary 
antibody conjugated to the detection enzyme, template DNA is conjugated to the 
antibody; and upon binding of antigen by the antibody, an indirect test for the presence of 
the BoNT is carried out using PCR. Chao et al. described a sensitive I-PCR method 





compared standard ELISA as well as sandwich ELISA methods with the sensitivity of the 
I-PCR method. Both ELISA methods were sensitive for toxin detection down to 50 fg, and 
the I-PCR method was between 103 to 105 times more sensitive (Chao et al., 2004; Wu et 
al., 2001). For more background on the basic principles of I-PCR, the reader is referred to 
Niemeyer and colleagues (Niemeyer, Adler, and Wacker, 2005). The use of I-PCR for 
highly sensitive detection of BoNT in food matrices or other biological backgrounds has 
yet to be developed. 
4.4 Activity based assays for detecting food contamination 
Rapidly distinguishing between the presence and absence of active versus inactive toxin is 
critical for intervention. Since BoNTs are zinc metalloproteases, enzyme-substrate assays 
have been developed using knowledge of the human targets for these enzymes. Activity 
assays range from mixing toxin with recombinant versions of host targets (such as SNAP-25) 
and then using immunoblotting to detect cleavage of those substrates, to measuring 
fluorescence emitted from cleavage of fluorogenic peptide substrates. One such peptide, 
called SNAPtide, used in an assay with a reverse phase HPLC with a fluorescence detector, 
can detect as low as 5 pg/mL of BoNT/A in skim milk (Christian, Suryadi, and Shine, 2010). 
Other peptide substrates: VAMPtide and SYNTAXtide, useful for their cognate BoNTs have 
been developed. The levels of substrate cleavage correlate well with toxin activity. 
Other investigators have looked for other indications of substrate cleavage by BoNTs. For 
instance, Nuss and colleagues generated antibodies that specifically recognize the full-
length version of human SNAP25 and not the cleaved form (Nuss et al, 2010). Use of this 
antibody to confirm the absence of toxin activity (by detecting only the intact, full length 
substrate) might be useful to confirm the absence of bioactive forms of the toxin. 
Other activity-based approaches have used physical methods such as surface plasmon 
resonance to detect cleavage of substrates. For instance, Ferraci and colleagues have 
demonstrated that cleavage of the BoNT/B substrate VAMP2, a membrane SNARE protein 
associated with synaptic vesicles, can be measured using real-time surface plasmon 
resonance; vesicle capture is detected by specific antibodies coupled to microchips (Ferracci 
et al., 2010). This assay is functional in low ionic strength buffers and stable over a wide 
range of pH values (5.5-9.0). Cleavage of VAMP2 was detected within 10 minutes with 2 pM 
of native BoNT/B holotoxin. Contamination of liquid food products such as carrot juice, 
apple juice, and milk with low picomolar amounts of BoNT/B toxin is revealed within 3 
hours. BoNT/B activity was detected in sera samples from botulism patients but not in 
healthy patients or in patients with other neurological diseases. 
4.4.1 Cell-based assays and their possible use in detecting food contamination 
Cell-based assays measure BoNT receptor biding, translocation and enzymatic activity and 
can be viable alternatives to the mouse bioassay. A number of different neuronal and non-
neuronal derived cell lines have been generated for use in BoNT assays. These include: rat 
spinal cord cells (Pellett et al., 2007); chick embryo neuronal cells (Stahl et al., 2007); 
neuroblastoma cells N2A (Eubanks et al., 2007); and BE(2)-M17 cells (Hale et al., 2011). The 
read-out for most of the cell-based assays for detection of BoNT/A is the cleavage of SNAP-
25. Antibodies for SNAP-25 allow immunoblot detection of cleavage products, specifically 
detecting a decrease in size of endogenous SNAP-25 protein. 
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Investigators continue to examine different parameters in order to develop a more robust 
cell-based assay. The U.S. Food and Drug Administration recently approved a cell-based 
assay developed by Allergan for use as possible replacement of the mouse bioassay. Details 
of the assay have yet to be published. Cell -based assays may yet prove valuable for toxin 
detection in food. 
4.5 Combining assay methods to increase detection sensitivity 
Detection methods can exploit the power of sensitive antibodies for enrichment or sample 
preparation, as well as the signal amplification ability of enzymatic assays. Two recent 
approaches are highlighted below. 
4.5.1 ALISSA (assay with a large immunosorbent surface area) 
The ALISSA utilizes a two-step approach; first, an antibody-mediated step concentrates 
toxin onto a large bead surface. Captured toxin molecules are then subjected to a SNAPtide 
protease assay (Bagramyan et al., 2008). When compared to other established methods for 
toxin detection in food matrices, the ALISSA assay can detect toxin concentrations as low as 
50 fg/mL, more sensitive than the mouse bioassay or either immunoassay or SNAPtide 
assay alone. The use of this method to evaluate a number of different food matrices suggests 
that it may be useful in food contamination studies. 
4.5.2 ENDOPEP-MS: antibodies, activity assays, and mass spectrometry 
The ENDOPEP-MS method uses antibodies to concentrate and extract BoNT serotypes A, B, 
E, and F from test samples. The concentrated toxins are then subjected to an endopeptidase 
activity-based assay to generate target cleavage products. Finally, mass spectrometry is used 
to identify cleavage target products (Kalb et al., 2005; Kalb et al., 2006). This approach has 
been successful in identifying BoNT serotypes A, B, E, and F in a variety of food and clinical 
sample matrices with sub-mouse bioassay sensitivities. To advance this technique even 
further, a single, high-affinity mAb (4E17.1) that can simultaneous identify BoNT serotypes 
A, B, E and F has been developed (Kalb et al., 2010). The use of this mAb reduced assay time 
while maintaining assay sensitivity. The use of mass spectrometry can give fast and 
definitive results. With the future development of low cost equipment, this method may be 
more readily available to investigators. 
5. Conclusion 
Detection of BoNT presents a unique set of challenges. The high toxicity of BoNT requires 
detection methods capable of toxin measurement in the low to sub pg/mL range. PCR 
methods can readily detect the presence of low levels of C. botulinum DNA but do not detect 
the presence or absence of the toxin. In many cases, such as blood samples, only toxin may 
be present. Current methods for toxin detection rely on 1) the gold standard mouse 
bioassay, or 2) in vitro tests such as molecular tests, immunoassays and/or activity-based 
assays. Recent improvements in the generation of high-affinity mAbs have resulted in 
immunoassays with sensitivities equal to or lower than the mouse bioassay. However these 
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demonstrated that cleavage of the BoNT/B substrate VAMP2, a membrane SNARE protein 
associated with synaptic vesicles, can be measured using real-time surface plasmon 
resonance; vesicle capture is detected by specific antibodies coupled to microchips (Ferracci 
et al., 2010). This assay is functional in low ionic strength buffers and stable over a wide 
range of pH values (5.5-9.0). Cleavage of VAMP2 was detected within 10 minutes with 2 pM 
of native BoNT/B holotoxin. Contamination of liquid food products such as carrot juice, 
apple juice, and milk with low picomolar amounts of BoNT/B toxin is revealed within 3 
hours. BoNT/B activity was detected in sera samples from botulism patients but not in 
healthy patients or in patients with other neurological diseases. 
4.4.1 Cell-based assays and their possible use in detecting food contamination 
Cell-based assays measure BoNT receptor biding, translocation and enzymatic activity and 
can be viable alternatives to the mouse bioassay. A number of different neuronal and non-
neuronal derived cell lines have been generated for use in BoNT assays. These include: rat 
spinal cord cells (Pellett et al., 2007); chick embryo neuronal cells (Stahl et al., 2007); 
neuroblastoma cells N2A (Eubanks et al., 2007); and BE(2)-M17 cells (Hale et al., 2011). The 
read-out for most of the cell-based assays for detection of BoNT/A is the cleavage of SNAP-
25. Antibodies for SNAP-25 allow immunoblot detection of cleavage products, specifically 
detecting a decrease in size of endogenous SNAP-25 protein. 
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Investigators continue to examine different parameters in order to develop a more robust 
cell-based assay. The U.S. Food and Drug Administration recently approved a cell-based 
assay developed by Allergan for use as possible replacement of the mouse bioassay. Details 
of the assay have yet to be published. Cell -based assays may yet prove valuable for toxin 
detection in food. 
4.5 Combining assay methods to increase detection sensitivity 
Detection methods can exploit the power of sensitive antibodies for enrichment or sample 
preparation, as well as the signal amplification ability of enzymatic assays. Two recent 
approaches are highlighted below. 
4.5.1 ALISSA (assay with a large immunosorbent surface area) 
The ALISSA utilizes a two-step approach; first, an antibody-mediated step concentrates 
toxin onto a large bead surface. Captured toxin molecules are then subjected to a SNAPtide 
protease assay (Bagramyan et al., 2008). When compared to other established methods for 
toxin detection in food matrices, the ALISSA assay can detect toxin concentrations as low as 
50 fg/mL, more sensitive than the mouse bioassay or either immunoassay or SNAPtide 
assay alone. The use of this method to evaluate a number of different food matrices suggests 
that it may be useful in food contamination studies. 
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The ENDOPEP-MS method uses antibodies to concentrate and extract BoNT serotypes A, B, 
E, and F from test samples. The concentrated toxins are then subjected to an endopeptidase 
activity-based assay to generate target cleavage products. Finally, mass spectrometry is used 
to identify cleavage target products (Kalb et al., 2005; Kalb et al., 2006). This approach has 
been successful in identifying BoNT serotypes A, B, E, and F in a variety of food and clinical 
sample matrices with sub-mouse bioassay sensitivities. To advance this technique even 
further, a single, high-affinity mAb (4E17.1) that can simultaneous identify BoNT serotypes 
A, B, E and F has been developed (Kalb et al., 2010). The use of this mAb reduced assay time 
while maintaining assay sensitivity. The use of mass spectrometry can give fast and 
definitive results. With the future development of low cost equipment, this method may be 
more readily available to investigators. 
5. Conclusion 
Detection of BoNT presents a unique set of challenges. The high toxicity of BoNT requires 
detection methods capable of toxin measurement in the low to sub pg/mL range. PCR 
methods can readily detect the presence of low levels of C. botulinum DNA but do not detect 
the presence or absence of the toxin. In many cases, such as blood samples, only toxin may 
be present. Current methods for toxin detection rely on 1) the gold standard mouse 
bioassay, or 2) in vitro tests such as molecular tests, immunoassays and/or activity-based 
assays. Recent improvements in the generation of high-affinity mAbs have resulted in 
immunoassays with sensitivities equal to or lower than the mouse bioassay. However these 





active toxin but generally have poorer detection limits than immunoassays. New assays 
must also be carefully validated in individual food matrices or for as many toxin subtypes as 
possible, in order to establish assay performance standards. With refinement of the methods 
described above, the prospect of an assay that is sensitive, cost effective, and fast could be 
possible for use in food or other biological samples. Furthermore, these new strategies for 
assay development can easily be extended to other toxins and pathogens.  
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Detection of Bacillus Spores  
by Surface-Enhanced Raman Spectroscopy 
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2University of Nebraska, Omaha,  
USA 
1. Introduction 
On September 18 and October 9, 2001, two sets of letters containing Bacillus anthracis spores 
passed through the United States Postal Service’s Trenton, NJ, Processing and Distribution 
Center (Jernigan et al., 2001). The first set was destined for Florida and New York, while the 
second set was destined for Washington, DC. The infection of 22 people by these spores 
resulted in 5 deaths: a media employee in Florida, two postal workers in DC, a hospital 
worker in New York, and a retired woman in Connecticut (Inglesby et al., 2002). This 
bioterrorism event closely followed the September 11, 2001 attack on the Pentagon building 
and the World Trade Center towers, which added to the nation’s concern about terrorism 
within US borders. There was additional anxiety associated with this second attack, in that 
the extent of spore distribution along the east coast was unknown, and it took a long time to 
determine who was infected. This was even true for the letter that was mailed to Senator 
Tom Daschle at the Hart Senate Office (HSO) Building in DC. While the powder that fell 
from the letter was immediately suspected as B. anthracis, due to the previous week’s news 
from Florida and New York, and collection of nasal swabs from HSO personnel was initiate 
within 9 hours (Hsu et al., 2002), it still took several additional days to determine who was 
exposed and infected (Jernigan et al., 2001,). 
This delay was due to the fact that the spores must be germinated and grown in culture 
media to sufficient cell numbers so that they can be measured by standard methods. 
Presumptive B. anthracis was based on shape (1 to 1.5 by 3 to 5 µm rods), lack of motility, 
lack of a hemolysis on a sheep blood agar plate, susceptibility to β-lactam antibiotics and to 
γ-phage lysis, and staining for gram-positive bacteria (Center for Disease Control and 
Prevention, CDC, 2001). The time consuming component of this analysis is the culture 
growth of cell colonies. Simply put, the fewer the initial number of spores, the less likely a 
sample will produce detectable colonies. Only samples collected from surfaces or 
individuals that had a high probability of being contaminated produced colonies that were 
evident in 24 hours. Furthermore, tests were initially limited to individuals within the 
vicinity of where the letter was opened, which proved insufficient, as three postal workers 
at the Brentwood, DC, Processing and Distribution Center became infected, two fatally 
(Jernigan et al., 2001; Sanderson et al., 2002). Upon notification of their hospitalization, the 
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1. Introduction 
On September 18 and October 9, 2001, two sets of letters containing Bacillus anthracis spores 
passed through the United States Postal Service’s Trenton, NJ, Processing and Distribution 
Center (Jernigan et al., 2001). The first set was destined for Florida and New York, while the 
second set was destined for Washington, DC. The infection of 22 people by these spores 
resulted in 5 deaths: a media employee in Florida, two postal workers in DC, a hospital 
worker in New York, and a retired woman in Connecticut (Inglesby et al., 2002). This 
bioterrorism event closely followed the September 11, 2001 attack on the Pentagon building 
and the World Trade Center towers, which added to the nation’s concern about terrorism 
within US borders. There was additional anxiety associated with this second attack, in that 
the extent of spore distribution along the east coast was unknown, and it took a long time to 
determine who was infected. This was even true for the letter that was mailed to Senator 
Tom Daschle at the Hart Senate Office (HSO) Building in DC. While the powder that fell 
from the letter was immediately suspected as B. anthracis, due to the previous week’s news 
from Florida and New York, and collection of nasal swabs from HSO personnel was initiate 
within 9 hours (Hsu et al., 2002), it still took several additional days to determine who was 
exposed and infected (Jernigan et al., 2001,). 
This delay was due to the fact that the spores must be germinated and grown in culture 
media to sufficient cell numbers so that they can be measured by standard methods. 
Presumptive B. anthracis was based on shape (1 to 1.5 by 3 to 5 µm rods), lack of motility, 
lack of a hemolysis on a sheep blood agar plate, susceptibility to β-lactam antibiotics and to 
γ-phage lysis, and staining for gram-positive bacteria (Center for Disease Control and 
Prevention, CDC, 2001). The time consuming component of this analysis is the culture 
growth of cell colonies. Simply put, the fewer the initial number of spores, the less likely a 
sample will produce detectable colonies. Only samples collected from surfaces or 
individuals that had a high probability of being contaminated produced colonies that were 
evident in 24 hours. Furthermore, tests were initially limited to individuals within the 
vicinity of where the letter was opened, which proved insufficient, as three postal workers 
at the Brentwood, DC, Processing and Distribution Center became infected, two fatally 
(Jernigan et al., 2001; Sanderson et al., 2002). Upon notification of their hospitalization, the 





associated facilities and several thousand nasal swab samples from visitors to these facilities, 
including first responders, and their employees. According to the team at the National 
Institutes of Health, who processed nearly 4000 samples, current methods of culture growth 
and analysis were “extremely time-consuming and labor-intensive” (Kiratisin et al., 2002).  
From these bioterrorist attacks, it became clear that considerably faster methods of analysis 
are required. This would expedite assessment of the extent of attack, including the path of 
such letters from destination back to origination. More importantly, it would minimize 
fatalities, since it was learned that if exposure is detected within the first few days, the 
majority of victims can be treated successfully using Ciprofloxacin, doxycycline and/or 
penicillin G procaine (Bell et al., 2002).  
At the time of the attack two rapid methods were used, immunoassay kits and polymerase 
chain reaction (PCR) analyzers. Immunoassay methods use competitive binding of the 
bioagent (as an antigen) and its labeled conjugate for a limited number of antibodies. These 
methods can be relatively fast (<20 minutes) with modest sensitivity. The latter was not an 
issue for the Senator Daschle letter, which contained billions of spores (Kennedy, 2001). 
However, as yet no well-defined anthrax antigen has been identified (Bell et al., 2001; 
Kellogg, 2010), and as a result, the false-positive rates remain unacceptably high. 
Consequently, immunoassay development has shifted to detecting the B. anthracis proteins 
involved in infection. This includes the protective antigen and lethal factor (Bell et al., 2002; 
Mabry et al., 2006; Tang et al., 2009). But these immunoassays require several days after the 
onset of infection for these proteins to reach detectable concentrations, even with the use of 
time-resolved fluorescence detection, which may not provide sufficient time to substantially 
improve the odds of successful treatment (Tang et al., 2006).  
During the 2001 bioterrorism event NIH employed Applied Biosystems (Foster City, CA) to 
use PCR to sequence the 16S rRNA B. anthracis gene (Kiratisin et al., 2002). However, the 
specificity of this gene for B. anthracis was in doubt as Bacilli are highly homologous to the 
extent that B. anthracis, B. cereus and B. thuringiensis may belong to one species (Helgason et 
al., 2000, Sacchi et al., 2002). Since the attacks, more definitive B. anthracis gene sequences 
have been identified. Specifically, the genes within the toxin encoding pXO1 plasmid and 
the capsule-encoding pXO2 plasmid are being targeted for analysis. The development of 
“real-time” PCR systems that combine the use of primers to separate these organism-specific 
nucleic acid sequences and polymerases to amplify the sequences (Bell et al., 2001 & 2002; 
Thayer, 2003), resulted in the installation of such systems at some 300 regional US Postal 
offices through 2006 at a cost of $600 million (Shane, 2004; Leingang, 2004).  
While, PCR and immunoassays continue to be developed, other methods are also being 
developed that rapidly assess the extent of contamination in the event of an attack, such as 
fluorescence, luminescence, mass spectrometry, and Raman spectroscopy (Nudelman et al., 
2000; Pellegrino et al., 2002; Hathout et al., 2003; Farquharson et al., 2004, respectively). 
These methods focus on portability and sensitivity, rather than on specificity. 
Most of these methods have been focusing on the detection of calcium dipicolinate (CaDPA) 
or its derivatives as a B. anthracis signature since it has been reported that CaDPA represents 
10 to 15% by weight of these spores (Fig. 1; Janssen et al., 1958; Murrell at al., 1969; Hindle & 
Hall, 1999; Ragkousi at al., 2003; Liu et al., 2004; Phillips & Strauch, 2002). This is a valid 
approach, first because only 13 genera of spore-forming bacteria contain CaDPA (Berkeley 
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& Ali, 1994), but only Bacillium and Clostridium are common (and of interest; Phillips & 
Strauch, 2002), and second, the most widespread, potentially interfering spores, such as 
pollen and mold spores, do not. Relatively fast methods have been developed to chemically 
extract the acid of CaDPA, dipicolinic acid (DPA; Pellegrino et al., 2002), and then to detect it 
directly by mass spectrometry (Beverly et al., 1996; Hathout et al., 2003), fluorescence 
(Nudelman et al., 2000), or indirectly by luminescence (Pellegrino et al., 2002; Rosen et al., 
1997). Although mass spectrometry provides a relatively high degree of discrimination and 
sensitivity, it still requires significant time due to sample preparation. Hot dodecylamine 
(DDA) has been used to extract DPA and form a highly luminescent complex with terbium 
(Pellegrino et al., 2002). Although measurements have been performed in as little as five 
minutes, it was found that as many as three concentration-dependent complexes can form, 
each with different lifetimes. This, coupled with the fact that the Tb3+ cation produces the 
same luminescence spectrum, makes determinations of low spore concentrations 
problematic. Furthermore, the combination of heat and the DDA surfactant severely 
degrade the spore, generating cell debris. This requires sample cleanup and in this 


















Fig. 1. Illustration of a Bacillus spore with major components indicated, and chemical 
structure of calcium dipicolinate. Deprotonated dipicolinic acid is shown within the 
brackets. 
An alternative method, Raman spectroscopy (RS), is attractive in that very small samples 
can be measured without preparation. The sample need only be placed at the focal spot of 
the excitation laser and measured. Moreover, the rich molecular information provided by 
Raman spectroscopy usually allows unequivocal identification of chemicals and biologicals. 
As early as 1974 the Raman spectrum of Bacillus megaterium was measured and shown to be 
dominated by CaDPA (Woodruff et al., 1974). However, the spectrum was collected using 
pure spores and took hours to acquire. Since that time, considerable improvements in 
Raman instrumentation have led to laboratory measurements of single Bacillus spores and 
field measurements of spores captured from a mail sorting system (Esposito et al., 2003; 
Farquharson et al., 2004). Unfortunately, the single spore measurements required the use of 
a microscope system and time consuming efforts to locate the spores, while the field 
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Two approaches are widely used to improve the sensitivity of Raman spectroscopy; 
resonance Raman spectroscopy and surface-enhanced Raman spectroscopy (SERS). The 
former method involves laser excitation at or near the wavelength of a molecular electronic 
absorption to substantially increase the interactions between the radiation and molecular 
states, and was used more than a decade ago to analyze Bacillus spores (Ghiamati, 1992). 
The value of this technique is limited by the extremely low energy conversion of ultraviolet 
lasers, which require substantial power supplies and thus confine measurements to 
laboratory settings. 
SERS involves the absorption of incident laser photons within nanoscale metal structures, 
generating surface plasmons, which couple with nearby molecules (the analyte) and thereby 
enhance the efficiency of Raman scattering by six orders of magnitude or more (Jeanmaire & 
Van Duyne, 1977; Weaver et al., 1985). More than a decade ago, we began investigating the 
potential of SERS to measure B. anthracis ssp. spores, beginning with the first measurement 
of the biomarker dipicolinic acid (Farquharson, 1999). In this chapter we summarize our 
efforts to develop a field portable analyzer that uses a simple digesting agent to extract DPA 
from B. anthracis spores for detection by SERS.  
The approach and ultimately the success of these efforts not only depend on the 
instrumentation, but also on the specific terrorist scenario being addressed. This has 
significant implications for the choice of sampling. For example, detecting a plume of spores 
released from an airplane is very different than detecting spores in envelopes passing 
through a mail sorting machine. Here the focus is the detection of spores on surfaces to 
assess the extent of an attack. For this application specificity at the Bacillus spp. level is 
sufficient, i.e. it is not critical to differentiate between the various Bacillus spp. At present 
there are no guidelines defining the required sensitivity. However, an extensive number of 
surface samples were collected from the Brentwood, DC, mail Processing and Distribution 
Center and their analysis can be used as a guide to estimate sensitivity requirements 
(Sanderson et al., 2004). This analysis determined that the highest concentrations of spores, 
not surprisingly, were in the immediate vicinity of delivery barcode sorter machine number 
17, which processed both letters. Analysis of dust above, within 30 meters, and 30-60 meters 
of this machine recorded average values of 310, 67, and 10 CFU/in2. Since the last average 
value included measurements that detected “zero” spores, it lacks the certainty of the other 
values. Consequently, and somewhat subjectively, we have chosen the middle value, 67 
CFU/in2 (10 spores/cm2), as a minimum requirement for measurement sensitivity. This 
value should not be construed as a definition of lethality.  
Additional measurement requirements include the ease of sampling and speed of analysis. 
Based on the 2001 attacks, we consider a minimum requirement of 500 measurements per 24 
hours as reasonable. Of course more than one analyzer could be used to accomplish this, but 
the fewer the analyzers, the lower the cost and the number of operators. If one analyzer is 
used, then the required measurement time would be less than 3 minutes. This would 
include the time to collect, deliver, measure, and analyze the sample. This suggests that 
sampling should involve a method or device to rapidly collect the sample (e.g. a wet swab 
or vacuum system) and deliver it to the measurement compartment of the analyzer. It also 
suggests that the analyzer should be portable to minimize or eliminate sample delivery 
time.  
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With these criteria in mind, we have developed a three-step method to detect dipicolinic 
acid extracted from surface spores by surface-enhanced Raman spectroscopy. The first step 
employs acetic acid to break apart the spores and release CaDPA into solution as DPA. The 
second step employs single-use, disposable, sol-gel filled capillaries to separate the DPA 
from other cell components and simultaneously deliver it to the SER-active metal particles. 
The third step employs a portable Raman analyzer to measure the SER spectrum and to 
identify and quantify the spores, if present. Development of this three-step method and 
measurements of Bacillus ssp. spores on surfaces are presented. 
2. Experimental 
Dipicolinic acid (2,6-pyridinedicarboxylic acid), acetic acid (glacial, 99.7%), dodecylamine 
(DDA), and all chemicals used to produce the silver-doped sol-gels were obtained at their 
purest commercially available grade from Sigma-Aldrich (Milwaukee, WI) and used as 
received. Calcium dipicolinate was prepared from disodium dipicolinate (Na2DPA), which 
was prepared from DPA according to previous publications (Ghiamati, 1992). Bacillus cereus, 
B. subtilis, and B. megaterium were grown on nutrient agar plates at 30ºC for 7 days 
(Ghiamati, 1992). The vegetative cells were placed into distilled water and lysed by osmotic 
pressure. The resultant spores were collected by scraping them into distilled water and 
pelleting them by centrifugation at 12,100 x g for 10 minutes. The spore pellet was re-
suspended in distilled water and lyophilized, and scraped into glass vials for Raman 
spectral measurements. Approximately 1 gram each, determined to be 99% pure by 
microscopic observation, was produced for this study. The density of the spores varied from 
0.06 to 0.11 g/mL, indicating a high amount of entrained air.  
Calibrated samples of B. cereus spores were prepared by weighing 1-5 mg specks, dispersing 
them in 10 mL water using sonication and vortexing. Sonication was accomplished using an 
Ultrasonik 300 (Neytech, Burlington, NJ), while vortexing was accomplished using a Vortex-
Genie 1 (Scientific Industries, Bohemia, NY). The spores per volume water were calibrated 
by using a Brite-line, phase-contrast hemocytometer counting grid (AO Scientific 
Instruments, Buffalo, NY) and imaged using an Olympus BX 51 microscope (Olympus 
America, Center Valley, PA) fit in-house with a Sony Cyber-shot 2.1 digital camera.  
An initial stock solution of 20 mg of DPA in 20 mL HPLC grade water (Fischer Scientific, 
Fair Lawn, NJ) was prepared for the pH study. The pH of this solution was 2.45 as verified 
using a pH electrode (Corning 314 pH/Temperature Plus, Corning, NY) that had been 
calibrated with pH 4.00, 7.00, and 10.00 buffer solutions (Fischer Scientific). For all pH 
measurements a single 2-mL glass vial coated with silver-doped sol-gel was used (Simple 
SERS Sample Vial, Real-Time Analyzers, Inc. (RTA), Middletown, CT). The vial was never 
moved from the sample holder to ensure that the same portion of silver-doped sol-gel was 
examined. Two pH series were performed. First, 2 mL of the stock solution was added to the 
vial and measured. Then the 2 mL solution was returned to the stock solution and made 
basic using 0.1 M KOH. Prior to re-addition of the solution to the SER-active vial, the vial 
was first rinsed three times with distilled water, then twice with the new solution prior to 
SERS measurement. This procedure was followed to obtain spectra at pH 3.55, 4.33, 4.87, 
5.59, 10.69 and 11.66. Next the solution was brought to a pH of 2.00 by adding 0.1 M HNO3, 
and the spectrum was recorded. Again KOH was added drop wise to make the solution 
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drop wise so that spectra could be obtained at pHs of 2.19, 1.71, 1.35 and 1.17. Throughout 
this process, no more than 20 drops of acid or base were added, and therefore the 
concentration was diluted by no more than 10%.  
For concentration measurements, a second stock solution of DPA was prepared as above 
and used to prepare all lower concentration samples by serial dilution using HPLC grade 
water. Initial spore experiments employed 78 oC, 50 mM dodecylamine to digest the spores 
and release dipicolinic acid for measurement. Pre-weighed spore particles were placed on a 
glass plate for these measurements. Final spore measurements employed room temperature 
acetic acid to digest the spores. Pre-weighed spores were used to prepare a stock solution 
for calibration using a counting grid (see below), from which a known number of spores 
were dried on a glass plate. For both digesting chemicals, after 1 min exposure, the 
degraded spore sample was drawn into a SER-active capillary (Simple SERS Sample Capillary, 
RTA) for measurement. 
The SER-active vials were prepared according to published procedures (Farquharson & 
Maksymiuk; 2003), using a silver amine precursor to provide the metal dopant and an 
alkoxide precursor to provide the sol-gel matrix. The silver amine precursor consisted of a 
5/1 v/v ratio of 1N AgNO3 to 28% NH3OH, while the alkoxide precursor consisted of a 2/1 
v/v ratio of methanol to tetramethyl orthosilicate (TMOS). The alkoxide and silver amine 
precursors were mixed in an 8/1 v/v ratio, then 140 µL were introduced into 2 mL glass 
vials, which were then spin-coated. After sol-gel formation, the incorporated silver ions 
were reduced with 0.03M NaBH4. The SER-active capillaries were prepared in a similar 
manner with the following modifications. The alkoxide precursor employed a combination 
of methyltrimethoxysilane (MTMS) and TMOS in a v/v ratio of 6/1, which was mixed with 
the amine precursor in a v/v ratio of 1/1. Approximately 15 μL of the mixed precursors 
were then drawn into a 1-mm diameter glass capillary coating a 15-mm length. After sol-gel 
formation, the incorporated silver ions were again reduced with dilute sodium borohydride. 
All Raman spectroscopy measurements were performed using 785 or 1064 nm laser 
excitation and Fourier transform Raman spectrometers (RTA, model RamanID-785 and -
1064; Farquharson et al., 1999). For pure Na2DPA, CaDPA, and the spore samples 1064 nm 
excitation was used, for pure DPA and DPA solutions both 785 and 1064 nm laser excitation 
were used, while for all DPA SERS measurements, solutions or extractions, 785 nm laser 
excitation was used. Fiber optics were used to deliver the excitation beam to the sample 
probe and the scattered radiation to the interferometer (2 m lengths of 200 and 365 μm core 
diameter, respectively, Spectran, Avon, CT).  
For 1064 nm excitation, a 24 mm diameter f/0.7 aspheric lens focused the beam to a 600 μm 
spot on the sample and to collect the scattered radiation back along the same axis. An f/2 
achromat was used to collimate laser beam exiting the source fiber optic, while a 4 mm 
prism was used to direct the beam through an f/0.7 aspheric lens that focused the beam to a 
600 micron spot on the sample. The scattered radiation was collected back along the same 
optical axis, while a second f/2 lens focused the beam into the collection fiber optic. A short 
pass filter was placed in the excitation beam path to block the silicon Raman scattering 
generated in the source fiber from reflecting off sampling optics and reaching the detector. 
A long pass filter was placed in the collection beam path to block the sample Rayleigh 
scattering from reaching the detector. For 785 nm excitation, a similar optic probe was used, 
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except a dichroic filter was used to reflect the laser light to sample and pass the Raman 
scattered radiation to the collection fiber. In this case the beam was focused to a 300 μm spot 
on the sample. Also, appropriate short and long pass filters were used for this wavelength. 
All spectra presented were collected using 8 cm-1 resolution. 
In the case of Raman spectral measurements of spores, the samples were placed on a glass 
slide with the probe aimed downward. In the case of SER-active vials or capillaries, the 
samples were mounting horizontally on an XY positioning stage (Conix Research, 
Springfield, OR), so that the probe aimed upwards and the focal point of the aspheric lens 
was just inside the vial or capillary.  
For the SERS concentration and extraction measurements, nine spectra were recorded along 
the length of the capillary with 1 mm spacing. As a practical approach to minimizing the 
variability associated with the SER activity as a function of sample position, the three high 
and three low intensity spectra were discarded, while the three median spectra were 
averaged and reported. Relative standard deviations for all concentrations are reported as 
percent standard deviation in Table 2. SER spectra were collected in 1-min or less as 
indicated in figure captions. 
3. Results and discussion 
The present application begins with a Raman spectral analysis of Bacillus spores with 
regards to contributions from calcium dipicolinate. The primary CaDPA peaks occur at 659, 
821, 1014, 1391, 1446, 1573, 3062, and 3080 cm-1 in the spore spectrum (Fig. 2), and can be 
assigned to a ring CC bend, an out-of-plane CH bend, the symmetric pyridine ring stretch, a 
symmetric OCO stretch, a symmetric ring CH bend, an asymmetric OCO stretch, and the 
CH symmetric and asymmetric stretches, respectively (Table 1, Farquharson et al., 2004).  
 
Fig. 2. RS of A) Bacillus cereus spores and B) calcium dipicolinate. Spectral conditions: 500 
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The remaining peaks can be assigned to protein modes associated with the peptidoglycan 
cell wall, such as amino acids and peptide linkages (amide modes; Woodruff et al., 1974; 
Ghiamati, 1992; Grasselli et al., 1981; Bandekar, 1992; Austin et al., 1993). The former include 
peaks with little intensity at 821, 855, 900 cm-1, which are assigned to several CC bending 
modes, as well as the phenylalanine modes that appear at 1003 and 1598 cm-1. The latter 
include the amide I peak at 1666 cm-1, which is primarily a C=O stretch, and amide III 
combination peaks at 937, 1241, and 1318 cm-1, which are various CC and CN stretching 
combinations (peak positions are given for B. cereus). In several cases, protein and CaDPA 
vibrational modes occur at or close to the same frequency, such as the 821 and 1446 cm-1 
peaks. 
Next, the amount of CaDPA available in a spore that could be measured as DPA was 
considered. Although it is often stated that Bacillus ssp. spores contain 10-15% calcium 
dipicolinate by weight (Janssen et al., 1958; Liu et al., 2004), this value has been reported as 
low as 1% (Halverson, 1961). Since this amount will be used to calculate the number of 
spores measured, it is important to have as accurate a number as possible. For this reason, 
the Raman spectra of Bacillus subtilis, B. megaterium, and B. cereus were acquired (Fig. 3). In 
fact it was found that the most obvious differences between the spectra for the three Bacillus 
species are the CaDPA peaks. In particular, the 1014 cm-1 peak noticeably changes intensity, 
especially when compared to the neighboring phenylalanine peak at 1003 cm-1. If it can be 
assumed that the composition of these Bacilli is very similar, then it may be assumed that the 
relative phenylalanine concentration is nearly constant and its Raman peak can be used as 
an internal intensity standard. (The amide I peak at 1666 cm-1 could also be used.) Using  
the ratio of the CaDPA and phenylalanine peak heights suggests then that the salt 
concentrations for B. megaterium and B. cereus are 1.85 and 2.05 times that of B. subtilis. In the 
latter case, a recent study using resonance Raman spectroscopy of the same sample  
 
Fig. 3. RS of A) B. subtilis, B) B. megaterium, C) B. cereus, and D) CaDPA. Spectral conditions 
as in Fig. 2. 
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concluded that the CaDPA peak intensity corresponded to 6-7 weight percent (Nelson et al., 
2004). This suggests that the CaDPA weight percent for the B. megaterium and B. cereus spore 
samples are 11-13 and 12.5-14.5 wt%, respectively, or in the case of DPA, 9-11 and 10-12 wt% 
(based on MW). It should be noted that the differences between these Bacillus spp. does not 
imply that the CaDPA concentrations are species specific. It is more likely that experimental 
conditions during the original growth of the bacteria, such as time, temperature, and 
available nutrients, influenced the extent of sporulation. Consequently, any calculations of 
the number of spores based on DPA content should assume a range of at least 5-13 weight 
percent of the spores. As a practical matter 10±5% will be used here. 
For comparison purposes, the spectra of CaDPA and DPA are shown in Fig. 4, along with 
Na2DPA, while the observed spectral peaks with vibrational mode assignments are listed in 
Table 1. The assignments for both CaDPA and DPA, based on literature (Carmona 1980; 
Hameka et al., 1996), were used to assign the peaks observed for Na2DPA. Both DPA and 
Na2DPA contain unique peaks with significant intensity at 760 and 1730 cm-1, respectively. 
Since neither peak is observed in the spectrum of CaDPA, it can be concluded that this 
sample does not contain either chemical as an impurity.  
 
Fig. 4. RS of A) dipicolinic acid B) disodium dipicolinate, and C) calcium dipicolinate. 
Spectral conditions as in Fig. 2. 
Next, dipicolinic acid was analyzed by SERS. The assignment of SERS peaks to vibrational 
modes is less straightforward than for RS peaks due to the metal-to-molecule surface 
interactions that shift and enhance various vibrational modes to different extents. 
Furthermore, it is usually found that RS spectra of analytes in solution more closely match 
the SER spectra than in the solid-state. However, it is usually beneficial to acquire and 
examine both when making assignments. Since DPA dissolves in water only sparingly, 1N 
KOH was used to dissolve 80 mg/mL. The RS spectrum of the solution phase is largely the 
same as the solid phase except for some minor changes in peak frequencies, intensities, and 
widths (Table 1). Notably, the 760 cm-1 peak in the solid phase is completely absent in the 
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B. Cereus CaDPA Na2DPA DPA solid DPA solution SERS Tentative Assignments 
 403 413   405  
  433  425  458 CC ring benda 
 478 499 489   C-CO2 stra 
  575 573  567  
659 661 650 646 652 657 CC ring benda 
  696      
    760  (795) HO-C=O in-plane defb 
  805 801    
821 820 814  822 812 CC strd, CaDPA CH out-of-
plane defb 
855 857 856 853  858 CC strd 
900  897    CC strd 
925 923     CaDPA 
937      CC str + amide IIId 
1003      phe sym ring str.c,d 
1014 1015  1003 997 1001 1006 sym ring breathc 
      1029  
1077 1086 1079 1085 1087  trigonal ring breathingb 
1150 1150 1147 1153 1154 1157 CH benda 
 1199  1185 1179 1191 1184  
   1227   1230   
1241      amide III (b)c,d 
 1274 1256 1271   CC strb 
  1293 1296  1285  
1318       CH2 bend, amide IIId 
    1324   C=O str 
1377sh 1383      CH benda 
1391 1398 1393  1386 1381 OCO sym strc 
1446 1447 1437 1445 1438 (1426) CH2 bend,d CaDPA ring CH 
benda or CC strb 
  1466 1464 1461  1466 ring CC str 
1573 1568 1569 1575 1572 1567 OCO asym str 
1583 1583 1589   (1590) CC ring str  
1598sh      phe sym ring str.c,d 
 1643 1634 1643   carboxylatee 
1666       amide Ic,d 
   1704/30    C=O str (doublet) 
       
2879sh      CH3 sym strf 
2934      CH2 antisym strf 
2968sh      CH3 antisym strf 
 3019 3021     
3062 3060  3070   aromatic CH sym strf 
3080 3088  3084 3098   CH antisym strf 
  3137 3150   CH strf 
3302      amide NH strc,d  
Table 1. Tentative Raman vibrational mode assignments for dipicolinates. a is from Hameka 
et al., 1996; b is from Carmona, 1980; c is from Woodruff et al., 1974; d is from Bendaker, 
1992, e is from Ghiamati et al., 1992; f is from Grasselli et al., 1981 and Austin et al., 1993. 
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peak is likely associated with carboxylic acid groups (e.g. HO-C=O deformation), while the 
latter peak is likely associated with deprotonated carboxylic acid groups (e.g. O-C-O 
stretch). The latter assignment is consistent with a sample pH of 10 due to the 1N KOH. The 
former assignment is supported by the fact that the peak does not disappear when DPA is 
dissolved in the aprotic solvents dimethylsulfoxide or N,N-dimethylformamide.  
The SER spectrum of 1 g/L DPA in water is more like the solution than solid phase as 
shown in Fig. 5. The quality of this SER spectrum is considerably better than the first 
reported SER spectrum of dipicolinic acid obtained on a silver electrode in an electrolytic 
cell (Farquharson et al., 1999). In fact, not only are most of the peaks of the solution phase RS 
spectrum observed in the SER spectrum, but peaks shift no more than 10 cm-1 and change 
little in relative intensity. These similarities suggest a weak molecule to silver surface 
interaction. The RS to SERS shifts of the major peaks are: 652 to 657 cm-1, 822 to 812 cm-1, 
1001 to 1006 cm-1, 1386 to 1381 cm-1, 1438 to 1426 cm-1, 1572 to 1567 cm-1. The SERS peaks are 
assigned according to CaDPA above and literature as follows (Ghiamati et al., 1992; 
Woodruff et al., 1974): the 1006 cm-1 peak is assigned to the symmetric ring stretch, the 1381 
cm-1 peak to the symmetric O-C-O stretch, the 1426 cm-1 peak to the symmetric ring C-H 
bend, and the 1567 cm-1 peak to the asymmetric O-C-O stretch. The greatest difference 
between the RS and SER spectra is the appearance of a new peak in the latter spectrum at 
795 cm-1 (see below).  
 
Fig. 5. A) RS of 80 mg DPA in 1 mL 1N KOH in a glass capillary. B) SERS of 1 mg DPA in 1 
mL water in a silver-doped sol-gel filled glass capillary. Spectral conditions: A) 450 mW of 
785 nm, 5 min acquisition time and B) 150 mW of 785 nm, 1-minute acquisition time; both 8 
cm-1 resolution. 
Next the pH dependence of both the measurement and analyte was considered. This could 
be significant if an acid or a base is used to digest spores and extract the CaDPA. It is widely 
known that the pH of the solution can have an effect on the SER signal (Laserna et al., 1988; 
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aggregation (Laserna et al., 1988), which in turn affects the plasmon field and the Raman 
signal enhancement. Other SER-active media are more tolerable to pH changes, such as 
metal coated spheres and posts, or silver-doped sol-gels, as used here. Although these sol-
gels may not be affected by pH, the analyte is a diprotic acid and the neutral and ionic forms 
of DPA, DPA-, or DPA=, must be considered. These species may interact with the silver quite 
differently and consequently influence the amount that each vibrational mode is enhanced. 
For example, it might be expected that DPA= will interact more strongly with electropositive 
silver increasing the chemical component of the SERS mechanism. Furthermore, added 
enhancement might be expected for the vibrational modes of the deprotonated carboxylic 
acid groups that participate in this interaction, or for modes that are favorably aligned 
perpendicular to the surface due to this interaction. 
The relative concentrations of DPA, DPA-, and DPA= can be determined at any pH as long 
as the pKas are known and the initial concentration. According to Lange's Handbook of 
Chemistry, the pKas are 2.16 and 6.92 (Dean 1979), and the deprotonation reactions are: 
 DPA  DPA- + H+       pK1a = 2.16 Reaction 1 
 DPA-  DPA= + H+      pK2a = 6.92 Reaction 2 
The relative concentrations can then be determined by expressing [DPA] and [DPA=] in 
terms of [DPA-] using Reactions 1 and 2, and summing all three to equal the total starting 
concentration, here 1 g/L, viz: 
 [DPA] + [DPA-] + [DPA=] = 1 g/L (1) 
substituting from Reactions 1 and 2: 
 ([H+][DPA-])/K1a + [DPA-] + (K2a[DPA-])/[H+] = 1 g/L (2) 
rearranging: 
 [DPA-] = 1 g/L /(1+[H+]/K1a + K2a/[H+]) (3) 
As shown in Fig. 6, at pH less than pK1a DPA dominates, at pH between the pKas DPA- 
dominates, and above pK2a DPA= dominates.  
Fig. 7 shows SER spectra of DPA for pH 4.87, 5.59, 7.35, 8.22, 10.69, and 11.66 with spectra of 
the 800 cm-1 region for pH 1.35, 1.71, 2.19 and 3.83 (inset). Overall there is only a modest 
decrease in intensity for most of the peaks as a function of pH. For example, the 1006 cm-1 
peak assigned to the pyridine ring stretching mode decreases by ~7% from pH 2 to 11. The 
greatest changes observed, yet still modest, are in the peak intensities at 795, 812, 1567, and 
1590 cm-1 between pH 1.3 and 5.5. These peaks change intensity as pairs. The 795 cm-1 peak 
loses intensity as the pH becomes basic, while the 812 cm-1 peak gains a little intensity. 
Similarly, the 1567 cm-1 peak loses intensity as the pH becomes basic, while the 1590 cm-1 
peak gains intensity. The intensities of the former pair are plotted as a function of pH in Fig. 
6. The peak heights were divided by the peak height of the 1006 cm-1 peak at each pH and 
then scaled with the lowest value set to 0 and the highest to 1 g/L. As can be seen the 795 
cm-1 peak tracts the DPA concentration, while the 812 cm-1 peak tracts the DPA- 
concentration. The former peak is likely associated with carboxylic acid groups, just as in the 
case of the 760 cm-1 peak in the solid phase RS spectrum of DPA. 
 




Fig. 6. DPA and its anion concentrations as a function of pH (lines). A) The 1006 cm-1 peak 
intensity is shown as measured, but scaled to a 0 to 1 g/L concentration range. B) The 795 
and 812 cm-1 peak intensities are normalized to the 1006 cm-1 peak intensity and then scaled. 
These two peaks appear to represent DPA and DPA=, respectively, but both with DPA- 
character.  
 
Fig. 7. SERS of 1 mg/mL dipicolinic acid as a function of pH. The spectral intensities have 
been normalized to the 812 cm-1 peak. Inset: Expanded view of low wavenumber region. 
Spectral conditions: 100 mW of 785 nm, 44 sec acquisition time, 8 cm-1 resolution. 
However, a 35 cm-1 shift is somewhat inconsistent with a weak analyte-to-surface interaction. 
It is also apparent in Fig. 6 that the concentrations of DPA and DPA- based on the 795 and 
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be due to the silver surface influencing the carboxylic acid dissociation energy. Or the peaks 
may contain contributions from the DPA= species. Although clarifying this point will 
require further measurements, the most important conclusions from this data is that the SER 
intensity for most of the prominent DPA peaks change little as a function of pH, and that the 
silver-doped sol-gels do not appear to influence the measurement to any significance. 
Next, the response of the SER intensity for DPA as a function of concentration was 
examined. A preliminary calibration curve was prepared by measuring 100, 50, 20, 10, 5, 2, 
1, 0.5, 0.2, 0.1, 0.05, 0.02, and 0.01 mg/L samples. Fig. 8 shows SER spectra for 100, 1, and 
0.01 mg/L samples measured using 100 mW of 785 nm and 1-min acquisition time. It can be 
seen that even at 10 µg/L the signal-to-noise ratio is quite good. The SER intensity was taken 
as the peak height at 1006 cm-1 minus the value at 950 cm-1 as the baseline. For each 
concentration, a different capillary was used. Spectra were measured at nine points along 
the length of each capillary and the median values are plotted in Fig. 9. It is obvious that the 
response is not linear, in that the peak heights change from 0.2 to 1.5, while the 
concentration changes over 4 orders of magnitude. This Langmuir isotherm response is 
typical for SERS substrates where signal intensity is a function of available silver surface 
area (Mullen & Carron, 1994).  
 
Fig. 8. SERS of DPA in water at A) 100, B) 1, and C) 0.01 mg/L (100 pg in 10 µL sample) 
using the SER-active capillaries, 100 mW of 785 nm and 1 min acquisition time. 
All of these values were also used to estimate limits of detection (LOD), defined as the 
concentration that produces a signal three times as intense as the baseline noise. The signal 
was taken as the height of the 1006 cm-1 peak, while the noise was the relative standard 
deviation of baseline noise measured between 50 and 150 cm-1. The LODs are for 1-min 
measurements using 100 mW of 785 nm laser excitation and 8 cm-1 resolution. As Table 2 
indicates, the lower the measured concentration, in general, the lower the predicted LOD. 
Note that the lowest concentration sample, 10 µg/L (0.01 mg/L), suggests that 0.7 µg/L can  
 





Fig. 9. Plot of SER intensity for 1006 cm-1 peak of DPA as a function of concentration using 
100 mW of 785 nm and 1-min acquisition time. Line connects average value at each 
concentration. Inset includes 10 and 100 mg/L data. 
be measured (S/N equaled 33 for the 1006 cm-1 peak). This is consistent with the fact that 
attempted measurements of 1 µg/L samples did yield spectra, but not in every case. It is 
also worth noting that only 10 µL samples were used to generate the spectra, or in the case 
of the 10 µg/L sample, the actual sample was 100 pg DPA in 10 µL water.  
Conc spores Signal Std Dev RSD Noise S/N LOD LOD LOD
mg/L in 0.1 mL (ave) (%) factor mg/L spores/0.1 mL
0.01 1229 0.14 0.12 86.68 0.0033 41.4 13.8 7.24E-04 89
0.02 2457 0.25 0.05 20.00 0.0042 59.5 19.8 1.01E-03 124
0.05 6143 0.31 0.08 25.99 0.0043 72.9 24.3 2.06E-03 253
0.1 12,285 0.40 0.10 25.00 0.0047 85.1 28.4 3.53E-03 433
0.2 24,570 0.50 0.15 30.00 0.005 100.0 33.3 6.00E-03 737
0.5 61,425 0.56 0.14 25.17 0.006 92.8 30.9 1.62E-02 1986
1 122,850 0.74 0.15 20.24 0.0067 110.9 37.0 2.70E-02 3322
2 245,700 0.83 0.06 7.78 0.008 103.3 34.4 5.81E-02 7133
5 614,251 0.93 0.16 16.90 0.0067 138.8 46.3 1.08E-01 13276
10 1,228,501 1.02 0.17 16.75 0.0096 106.3 35.4 2.82E-01 34687
100 12,285,012 1.38 0.16 11.50 0.0122 113.1 37.7 2.65E+00 325820
~1* 100,000 0.70 0.14 20.11 0.0055 126.7 42.2 2.37E-02 2368
~0.22** 22,000 0.45 0.10 23.20 0.0159 28.3 9.4 2.33E-02 2332  
* Approximate concentrations for dodecylamine surface measurements, see below.  
** Approximate concentrations for acetic acid surface measurements, see below. 
Table 2. Estimated limits of detection in terms of mg DPA per L water and corresponding 
spores per 0.1mL DDA. 
Finally, an enhancement factor (EF) for DPA can be estimated by comparing the 
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spectra are plotted on the same scale in Fig. 10. The 1006 cm-1 peak heights are nearly 
identical at 0.20 and 0.173 (arbitrary units), while the laser power at the sample and 
collection time were somewhat different at 150 and 450 mw, and 1 and 5 minutes for the 
SERS and RS, respectively. In both cases, 1-mm capillaries were used to hold the samples, 
and the same sample optics were used. Taking the concentration into account yields an 
estimated enhancement factor of 2.4x107. It is difficult to determine the precise number of 
molecules in the field of view for the sol-gel, and this number may represent better than 
average enhancement, i.e. better than 106, or it may reflect the ability of the sol-gel to 
concentrate the sample. In either case, the measurement of 10 µg/L suggests that 10 ng of 
spores in a 100 µL solution of a digesting chemical can be measured; assuming all of the 
CaDPA is made available as DPA (10%). Recent estimates suggest that this mass 
corresponds to 1000 spores (Inglesby et al., 2002).  
  
Fig. 10. A) SERS and B) RS of DPA plotted on the same scale, but offset. Conditions:  
A:B 10-5:80 g/L, 150:450 mW of 785 nm, and 1:5 min acquisition time. EF = 2.4x107. 
Next, methods were developed to rapidly extract CaDPA as DPA from Bacillus spores. 
Initially, DPA was obtained from B. cereus spores following the procedure of Pellegrino et al. 
Specifically, a 2 mg sample was placed in 2 mL of 5 mM dodecylamine in ethanol that was 
heated and maintained at 78 oC for 40 minutes. Approximately 10 µL of this solution was 
drawn into a SER-active capillary and measured. Since SER spectra of DPA were readily 
observed, shorter heating periods, higher DDA concentrations and smaller spore masses, 
were examined. In due course experiments were performed in which 100 µL of 78 oC 50 mM 
DDA in ethanol was added to ~10 µg samples of spore specks (~ 1 million spores) placed on 
a surface. After 1 minute exposure, approximately 10 µL of the solution were drawn into a 
SER-active capillary and measured. Fig. 11 shows a representative spectrum for one of these 
capillaries using a 1-min acquisition time. The primary DPA peaks at 657 cm-1, 810 cm-1, 
1006 cm-1, 1382 cm-1, and 1428 cm-1 are easily observed, even in the case of a 2-sec scan. 
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Furthermore, an attempted measurement of 50 mM DDA (without sample) did not produce 
a spectrum that might interfere with the measurement (Fig. 11C). The amount of DPA 
extracted was estimated to be between 0.5 and 5 mg/L by comparing the 0.7 signal intensity 
of the 1006 cm-1 peak to that measured for DPA in water (see Table 2). In fact this intensity is 
closest to that obtained for the 1 mg/L samples. This value can be used to estimate the 
number of spores in the 100 µL DDA sample. Assuming, as stated above, that a spore 
contains approximately 10% DPA by weight, and that 100 spores have a mass of ~1 ng, then 
this corresponds to 100,000 spores per 100 µL DDA or ~10% of the spores in the prepared 
particles. This low percentage could be due to incomplete degradation of the spores by 
DDA, interference from the spore cell debris, inefficient collection of the sample from the 
surface, or inefficient transfer of the DPA to the silver particles.  
 
Fig. 11. SERS of DPA extracted from ~10 µg B. cereus particle using 100 µL of 50 mM hot 
DDA acquired in A) 1 minute and B) 2 seconds. C) Attempted SERS of 50 mM hot DDA in 
ethanol using silver-doped sol-gel coated glass capillary acquired in 1 minute. Spectral 
conditions: 150 mW of 785 nm, 8 cm-1 resolution. 
Although, these initial measurements clearly demonstrated the potential of rapid spore 
analysis using SERS, the approach had two significant limitations. First, the sensitivity is 
insufficient, and second the use of a hot reagent severely limits its practical use in the field. 
To overcome these limitations we investigated numerous acids, bases and solvents (e.g. 
nitric acid, potassium hydroxide, phenol, etc.), separately and as mixtures that could digest 
spores rapidly at room temperature, and make available all or nearly all of the DPA for 
SERS detection.  
Eventually, it was found that glacial acetic acid had the appropriate properties. However, 
reactivity of acetic acid with the sol-gel and competition with DPA for the silver surface was 
a concern, so a series of DPA concentration samples were prepared and measured. Fig. 12 
shows a SER spectrum of 100 pg DPA in 10 µL acetic acid (10 ppb) and a SER spectrum of 
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Fig. 12. A) SERS of DPA in acetic acid at 10 pg/µL, B) SERS of acetic acid, and C) difference 
spectrum of A-B). Spectral conditions: 85 mW of 785 nm, 1 min acquisition time, 8 cm-1 
resolution. 
Acetic acid produced several peaks, notably at 925, 1340, and 1405 cm-1. Subtraction of the 
acetic acid spectrum reveals a standard SER spectrum of DPA (Fig. 12C). The SER spectral 
intensity of DPA in acetic acid as a function of concentration is very similar to that previously 
measured in water. In fact the 1006 cm-1 peak intensity, once corrected for the difference in 
laser power is nearly identical for the same concentration in water (compare 0.13 in acetic acid 
versus 0.14 in water, Table 2). Fig. 13 shows SER spectra of four orders of magnitude of DPA  
 
Fig. 13. SERS of DPA in acetic acid at concentrations of A) 1, B) 10, C) 100, and D) 1000 
pg/µL. Spectral conditions: 85 mW of 785 nm, 1 min acquisition time, 8 cm-1 resolution. 
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concentration in acetic acid, in which the dominant 1006 cm-1 peak intensity is held constant 
and the base line noise is observed to increase with decreasing concentration. 
Next, experiments were performed using acetic acid to digest spore samples on a surface, 
collect the DPA and detect it in SER-active capillaries. As a specific example, a 2 mg sample 
of spores was weighed and dispersed in 10 mL of water by vortexing. The spores per 
volume water were calibrated by placing 10 µL on a standard hemocytometer counting grid. 
Each grid holds 4 nL (0.2x0.2x0.1 mm). Microscope images of 10 grids were recorded and 
870 spores were counted, which represents ~22,000 spores per µL (Fig. 14A). The original 
spore solution was diluted by a factor of 10 to produce a 2200 spore per µL. From this 
solution, a 1 µL sample was placed on a glass slide and allowed to dry producing a 2200 
spores per ~0.2 cm2 spot (Fig. 14B). Although this represents 11,000 spores/cm2, 3-orders of 
magnitude greater than the target sensitivity, no attempt was made to spread the spores 
across the surface (i.e. identical results would likely have been obtained if the sample was 
allowed to dry on a 10 cm2 area). Next, 10 µL of acetic acid was added to the spore spot (Fig. 
14C). After 1 minute, 1 µL of this solution was drawn into a SER-active capillary (Fig. 14D), 
and a 1-minute spectrum measured (Fig. 15A). The measurement represents 220 spores/µL. 
The entire measurement was accomplished in less than 2.5 minutes, and at a measured pH 
of 2.1 the primary DPA peaks at 657 cm-1, 812 cm-1, 1006 cm-1, 1381 cm-1, and 1426 cm-1 are 
easily observed.  
 
Fig. 14. A) Microscope image of initial calibration sample containing 60 spores in a 0.2 x 0.2 
mm field of view (0.1 mm deep). B) 2200 spores were dried from 1 µL on the surface as (~0.2 
cm2). C) 10 µL of acetic acid was added to the spores for 1 min digestion. D) 1 µL of the 
solution was drawn into the chemically-selective, SER-active capillary. And E) the capillary 
was mounted in Raman analyzer sample compartment and the spectrum collected.  
The quantitative accuracy of the measurement was further verified by comparing this 220 
spores/µL spectrum to the 100 pg/µL (~100 spores/µL) solution of DPA in acetic acid 
spectrum. This was accomplished by using the acetic acid peak at 925 cm-1 as an internal 
intensity standard and normalizing both spectra to it. It was found that the primary peak at 
1006 cm-1 of the spore sample is ~ twice the intensity of the reference DPA sample, 
consistent with the 220 spore estimate. This spectral comparison also shows that the spore 






Fig. 12. A) SERS of DPA in acetic acid at 10 pg/µL, B) SERS of acetic acid, and C) difference 
spectrum of A-B). Spectral conditions: 85 mW of 785 nm, 1 min acquisition time, 8 cm-1 
resolution. 
Acetic acid produced several peaks, notably at 925, 1340, and 1405 cm-1. Subtraction of the 
acetic acid spectrum reveals a standard SER spectrum of DPA (Fig. 12C). The SER spectral 
intensity of DPA in acetic acid as a function of concentration is very similar to that previously 
measured in water. In fact the 1006 cm-1 peak intensity, once corrected for the difference in 
laser power is nearly identical for the same concentration in water (compare 0.13 in acetic acid 
versus 0.14 in water, Table 2). Fig. 13 shows SER spectra of four orders of magnitude of DPA  
 
Fig. 13. SERS of DPA in acetic acid at concentrations of A) 1, B) 10, C) 100, and D) 1000 
pg/µL. Spectral conditions: 85 mW of 785 nm, 1 min acquisition time, 8 cm-1 resolution. 
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concentration in acetic acid, in which the dominant 1006 cm-1 peak intensity is held constant 
and the base line noise is observed to increase with decreasing concentration. 
Next, experiments were performed using acetic acid to digest spore samples on a surface, 
collect the DPA and detect it in SER-active capillaries. As a specific example, a 2 mg sample 
of spores was weighed and dispersed in 10 mL of water by vortexing. The spores per 
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Each grid holds 4 nL (0.2x0.2x0.1 mm). Microscope images of 10 grids were recorded and 
870 spores were counted, which represents ~22,000 spores per µL (Fig. 14A). The original 
spore solution was diluted by a factor of 10 to produce a 2200 spore per µL. From this 
solution, a 1 µL sample was placed on a glass slide and allowed to dry producing a 2200 
spores per ~0.2 cm2 spot (Fig. 14B). Although this represents 11,000 spores/cm2, 3-orders of 
magnitude greater than the target sensitivity, no attempt was made to spread the spores 
across the surface (i.e. identical results would likely have been obtained if the sample was 
allowed to dry on a 10 cm2 area). Next, 10 µL of acetic acid was added to the spore spot (Fig. 
14C). After 1 minute, 1 µL of this solution was drawn into a SER-active capillary (Fig. 14D), 
and a 1-minute spectrum measured (Fig. 15A). The measurement represents 220 spores/µL. 
The entire measurement was accomplished in less than 2.5 minutes, and at a measured pH 
of 2.1 the primary DPA peaks at 657 cm-1, 812 cm-1, 1006 cm-1, 1381 cm-1, and 1426 cm-1 are 
easily observed.  
 
Fig. 14. A) Microscope image of initial calibration sample containing 60 spores in a 0.2 x 0.2 
mm field of view (0.1 mm deep). B) 2200 spores were dried from 1 µL on the surface as (~0.2 
cm2). C) 10 µL of acetic acid was added to the spores for 1 min digestion. D) 1 µL of the 
solution was drawn into the chemically-selective, SER-active capillary. And E) the capillary 
was mounted in Raman analyzer sample compartment and the spectrum collected.  
The quantitative accuracy of the measurement was further verified by comparing this 220 
spores/µL spectrum to the 100 pg/µL (~100 spores/µL) solution of DPA in acetic acid 
spectrum. This was accomplished by using the acetic acid peak at 925 cm-1 as an internal 
intensity standard and normalizing both spectra to it. It was found that the primary peak at 
1006 cm-1 of the spore sample is ~ twice the intensity of the reference DPA sample, 
consistent with the 220 spore estimate. This spectral comparison also shows that the spore 





likely due to spore debris that has not been effectively excluded from the metal-doped sol-
gels, and suggests that further “cleaning” the sample could improve sensitivity. The spectral 
background results in a modest S/N of 28, and an estimated LOD of 2330 B. cereus spores 
per 100 µL acetic acid or 1165 spores per cm2 for the above experiment. But, as shown in 
Table 2, the LODs are consistently underestimated, and substantially better sensitivity 
should be expected. 
 
Fig. 15. SERS of A) DPA obtained from 220 Bacillus cereus spores using a 1-minute exposure 
to glacial acetic acid at room temperature and B) 100 pg/µL solution of DPA in acetic acid 
for comparison. Spectral conditions: 85 mW of 785 nm, 1 min acquisition time, 8 cm-1 
resolution. 
4. Conclusions 
We have demonstrated that by combining rapid extraction of dipicolinic acid from Bacillus 
cereus spores with chemical identification by surface-enhanced Raman spectroscopy, 
Bacillus spores on a surface can be identified in 2.5 minutes. This includes the time required 
to dispense acetic acid onto a spore contaminated surface, draw the DPA sample by syringe 
into a SER-active capillary, and acquire the DPA SER spectrum. Using this method, we have 
measured 220 spores/µL from a 0.2 cm2 spot containing 2200 spores (equivalent to 11,000 
spores/cm2) in 2.5 minutes, using a simple, SER-active sampling capillary, syringe and a 
portable Raman analyzer. Although an estimated limit of detection based on the signal-to-
noise ratio suggests that 1165 spores/cm2 could be measured, the LODs are consistently 
underestimated as shown in Table 2. In fact, 1 pg/µL DPA in acetic acid was consistently 
measured. Assuming that the B. cereus spores contained 10 wt % DPA and each spore has a 
mass of 10-11g, this is equivalent to 10 spores/cm2 for the experiment presented here. It 
could also be argued that the same number of spores could be spread over a 10 cm2 region 
and the same amount of digesting agent would produce an equivalent SER signal. Together 
these arguments suggest that the present method is capable of measuring the goal of 10 
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spore/cm2 and that SER-active capillaries could be used to measure surfaces and map 
distribution of anthrax endospores in mail distribution facilities or other environments 
should another verified attack occur. This would greatly aid in determining the extent of an 
attack, deciding who should be tested, and possibly tracing the origin of letters if used. 
Current research is aimed at extending the capability of this method to analysis of nasal 
swabs, and B. anthracis specific SERS-active materials.  
5. Acknowledgements 
The authors are grateful to Professor Jay Sperry of the University of Rhode Island for 
preparing spore samples and the National Science Foundation (DMI-0215819, DMI-0214280, 
DMI-0349687), the U.S. Army (DAAD13-02-C-0015, Joint Service Agent Water Monitor 
Program), and the Environmental Protection Agency (EP-D-06-084). 
6. References 
Austin, J.C., Jordan, T., & Spiro, T.G., (1993), UVRR studies of proteins and related 
compounds, In Biomolecular Spectroscopy, Vol 21, Clark & Hester (Eds.), John Wiley 
& Sons, New York, NY. 
Bandekar, J., (1992), Amide modes and protein conformation, Biochim. Biophys. Acta, 1120, p. 
123. 
Bell, C.A., Uhl, J. R., & Cockerill, F. R., (2001), Direct Detection of Bacillus anthracis using a 
Real-Time PCR Method, ASM 101st General Meeting, Orlando, FL, May 2001. 
Bell, C.A., Uhl, J.R., Hadfield, T.L., David, J.C., Meyer, R.F., Smith, T.F., & Cockerill, F.R. III, 
(2002), Detection of Bacillus Anthracis DNA by Light Cycler PCR, J. Clin. Microbiol., 
40, p. 2897. 
Bell, D.M., Kozarsky, P.E., & Stephens, D., (2002), Clinical issues in the prophylaxis, 
diagnosis, and treatment of anthrax, Emerg. Infect. Dis., 8, p. 222. 
Berkeley, R.C.W., & Ali, N., (1994), Classification and identification of endospore-forming 
bacteria, J. Appl. Bacteriol. (Symp. Suppl.), 76, p. 1S. 
Beverly, M.B., Basile, F., Voorhees, K.J., & Hadfield, T.L., (1996), A rapid approach for the 
detection of dipicolinic acid in bacterial spores using pyrolysis /mass spectrometry, 
Rapid Commun. Mass Spectrom., 10, p. 455. 
Carmona, P., (1980), Vibrational spectra and structure of crystalline dipicolinic acid and 
calcium dipicolinate trihydrate, Spectrochim. Acta, A, 36, p. 705. 
Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, American Society for Microbiology, & 
Association of Public Health Laboratories. Basic diagnostic testing protocols for 
level A laboratories for the presumptive identification of Bacillus anthracis, (2001), 
American Society for Microbiology, Washington, D.C. Accessed Nov 2011, 
Available from: http://www.bt.cdc.gov/Agent/Anthrax/Anthracis20010417.pdf 
Dean, J.L., (1979), Lange's Handbook of Chemistry, 12th Ed., McGraw-Hill, New York, NY. 
Dou, X., Jung, Y., Cao, Z., & Ozaki, Y., (1999), Surface-Enhanced Raman Scattering of 
Biological Molecules on Metal Colloid II: Effects of Aggregation of Gold Colloid 
and Comparison of Effects of pH of Glycine Solutions between Gold and Silver 





likely due to spore debris that has not been effectively excluded from the metal-doped sol-
gels, and suggests that further “cleaning” the sample could improve sensitivity. The spectral 
background results in a modest S/N of 28, and an estimated LOD of 2330 B. cereus spores 
per 100 µL acetic acid or 1165 spores per cm2 for the above experiment. But, as shown in 
Table 2, the LODs are consistently underestimated, and substantially better sensitivity 
should be expected. 
 
Fig. 15. SERS of A) DPA obtained from 220 Bacillus cereus spores using a 1-minute exposure 
to glacial acetic acid at room temperature and B) 100 pg/µL solution of DPA in acetic acid 
for comparison. Spectral conditions: 85 mW of 785 nm, 1 min acquisition time, 8 cm-1 
resolution. 
4. Conclusions 
We have demonstrated that by combining rapid extraction of dipicolinic acid from Bacillus 
cereus spores with chemical identification by surface-enhanced Raman spectroscopy, 
Bacillus spores on a surface can be identified in 2.5 minutes. This includes the time required 
to dispense acetic acid onto a spore contaminated surface, draw the DPA sample by syringe 
into a SER-active capillary, and acquire the DPA SER spectrum. Using this method, we have 
measured 220 spores/µL from a 0.2 cm2 spot containing 2200 spores (equivalent to 11,000 
spores/cm2) in 2.5 minutes, using a simple, SER-active sampling capillary, syringe and a 
portable Raman analyzer. Although an estimated limit of detection based on the signal-to-
noise ratio suggests that 1165 spores/cm2 could be measured, the LODs are consistently 
underestimated as shown in Table 2. In fact, 1 pg/µL DPA in acetic acid was consistently 
measured. Assuming that the B. cereus spores contained 10 wt % DPA and each spore has a 
mass of 10-11g, this is equivalent to 10 spores/cm2 for the experiment presented here. It 
could also be argued that the same number of spores could be spread over a 10 cm2 region 
and the same amount of digesting agent would produce an equivalent SER signal. Together 
these arguments suggest that the present method is capable of measuring the goal of 10 
 
Detection of Bacillus Spores by Surface-Enhanced Raman Spectroscopy 
 
37 
spore/cm2 and that SER-active capillaries could be used to measure surfaces and map 
distribution of anthrax endospores in mail distribution facilities or other environments 
should another verified attack occur. This would greatly aid in determining the extent of an 
attack, deciding who should be tested, and possibly tracing the origin of letters if used. 
Current research is aimed at extending the capability of this method to analysis of nasal 
swabs, and B. anthracis specific SERS-active materials.  
5. Acknowledgements 
The authors are grateful to Professor Jay Sperry of the University of Rhode Island for 
preparing spore samples and the National Science Foundation (DMI-0215819, DMI-0214280, 
DMI-0349687), the U.S. Army (DAAD13-02-C-0015, Joint Service Agent Water Monitor 
Program), and the Environmental Protection Agency (EP-D-06-084). 
6. References 
Austin, J.C., Jordan, T., & Spiro, T.G., (1993), UVRR studies of proteins and related 
compounds, In Biomolecular Spectroscopy, Vol 21, Clark & Hester (Eds.), John Wiley 
& Sons, New York, NY. 
Bandekar, J., (1992), Amide modes and protein conformation, Biochim. Biophys. Acta, 1120, p. 
123. 
Bell, C.A., Uhl, J. R., & Cockerill, F. R., (2001), Direct Detection of Bacillus anthracis using a 
Real-Time PCR Method, ASM 101st General Meeting, Orlando, FL, May 2001. 
Bell, C.A., Uhl, J.R., Hadfield, T.L., David, J.C., Meyer, R.F., Smith, T.F., & Cockerill, F.R. III, 
(2002), Detection of Bacillus Anthracis DNA by Light Cycler PCR, J. Clin. Microbiol., 
40, p. 2897. 
Bell, D.M., Kozarsky, P.E., & Stephens, D., (2002), Clinical issues in the prophylaxis, 
diagnosis, and treatment of anthrax, Emerg. Infect. Dis., 8, p. 222. 
Berkeley, R.C.W., & Ali, N., (1994), Classification and identification of endospore-forming 
bacteria, J. Appl. Bacteriol. (Symp. Suppl.), 76, p. 1S. 
Beverly, M.B., Basile, F., Voorhees, K.J., & Hadfield, T.L., (1996), A rapid approach for the 
detection of dipicolinic acid in bacterial spores using pyrolysis /mass spectrometry, 
Rapid Commun. Mass Spectrom., 10, p. 455. 
Carmona, P., (1980), Vibrational spectra and structure of crystalline dipicolinic acid and 
calcium dipicolinate trihydrate, Spectrochim. Acta, A, 36, p. 705. 
Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, American Society for Microbiology, & 
Association of Public Health Laboratories. Basic diagnostic testing protocols for 
level A laboratories for the presumptive identification of Bacillus anthracis, (2001), 
American Society for Microbiology, Washington, D.C. Accessed Nov 2011, 
Available from: http://www.bt.cdc.gov/Agent/Anthrax/Anthracis20010417.pdf 
Dean, J.L., (1979), Lange's Handbook of Chemistry, 12th Ed., McGraw-Hill, New York, NY. 
Dou, X., Jung, Y., Cao, Z., & Ozaki, Y., (1999), Surface-Enhanced Raman Scattering of 
Biological Molecules on Metal Colloid II: Effects of Aggregation of Gold Colloid 
and Comparison of Effects of pH of Glycine Solutions between Gold and Silver 





Esposito, A.P., Talley, C.E., Huser, T., Hollars, C.W., Schaldach, C.M., & Lane, S.M., (2003), 
Analysis of single bacterial spores by micro-Raman spectroscopy, Appl. Spectrosc., 
57, p. 868. 
Farquharson, S., Smith, W.W., Elliott, S., & Sperry, J.F., (1999), Rapid biological agent 
identification by surface-enhanced Raman spectroscopy, Proc. SPIE, 3855, p. 110. 
Farquharson, S., & Maksymiuk, P., (2003), Simultaneous chemical separation and surface-
enhancement Raman spectral detection using silver-doped sol-gels, Appl. Spectrosc., 
57, p. 479. 
Farquharson, S., Grigely, L., Khitrov, V., Smith, W.W., Sperry, J.F., & Fenerty, G., (2004), 
Detecting Bacillus cereus spores on a mail sorting system using Raman 
Spectroscopy, J. Raman Spectrosc., 35, p. 82. 
Farquharson, S., Smith, W., Carangelo, R.C., & Brouillette, C., (1999), Industrial Raman: 
providing easy, immediate, cost effective chemical analysis anywhere, Proc. SPIE, 
3859, p. 14. 
Ghiamati, E., Manoharan, R.S., Nelson, W.H., & Sperry, J.F., (1992), UV Resonance Raman 
spectra of Bacillus spores, Appl. Spectrosc., 46, p. 357.  
Grasselli, J.G., Snavely, M.K., & Bulkin, B.J., (1981), Chemical Applications of Raman 
Spectroscopy, John Wiley & Sons, New York, NY, Chapter 5.  
Hameka, H.F., Jensen, J.O., Jensen, J.L., Merrow, C.N., & Vlahacos, C.P., (1996), Theoretical 
studies of the fluorescence of dipicolinic acid and its anion, J. Molec. Struct. (Theory), 
365, p. 131. 
Hathout, Y., Setlow, B., Cabrera-Martinex, R-M., Fenselau, C., & Setlow, P., (2003), Small, 
acid-soluble proteins as biomarkers in mass spectrometry analysis of Bacillus 
spores, Appl. Environ. Microbiol., 69, p. 1100. 
Halverson, H.O., Ed., (1961), Spores II, American Society for Microbiology, Washington, 
D.C., p. 153. 
Helgason, E., Økstad, O.A., Caugant, D.A., Johansen, H.A., Fouet, A., Mock, M., Hegna, I., & 
Kolstø, A.B., (2000), Bacillus anthracis, Bacillus cereus, and Bacillus thuringiensis-one 
species on the basis of genetic evidence, Appl. Environ. Microbiol., 66, p. 2627. 
Hindle, A.A., Hall, E.A.H., (1999), Dipicolinic acid assay revisited and appraised for spore 
detection, Analyst, 124, p. 1599. 
Hsu, V.P., Lukacs, S.L., Handzel, T., et al., (2002), Opening a Bacillus anthracis-containing 
envelope, Capitol hill, Washington, D.C.: The Public Health Response, Emerg. Infect. 
Dis., 8, p. 1039. 
Inglesby, T.V., Henderson, D.A., & Bartlett, J.G., (2002), Anthrax as a biological weapon: 
updated recommendations for management, JAMA, 287, p. 2236. 
Jackson, P.J., Hugh-Jones, M.E., Adair, D.M., et al., (1998), PCR analysis of tissue samples 
from the 1979 Sverdlovsk anthrax victims: The presence of multiple Bacillus 
anthracis strains in different victims, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci., 95, p. 1224. 
Janssen, F.W., Lund, A.J., & Anderson, L.E., (1958), Colorimetric assay for dipicolinic acid in 
bacterial spores, Science, 127, p. 26. 
Jeanmaire D.L., & Van Duyne, R.P., (1977), Surface Raman Spectroelectrochemistry, J. 
Electroanal. Chem., 84, p. 1. 
Jernigan, J.A., Stephens, D.S., Ashford, D.A, et al., (2001), Bioterrorism-Related Inhalational 
Anthrax: The First 10 Cases Reported in the United States, Emerg. Infect. Dis., 6, p. 
933. 
 
Detection of Bacillus Spores by Surface-Enhanced Raman Spectroscopy 
 
39 
Kellogg, M., (2010), Detection of biological agents used for terrorism: Are we ready?, Clin. 
Chem., 56, p. 10. 
Kennedy, H., (2001), Daschle letter bombshell billions of anthrax spores, New York Daily 
News, October 31, 2001. 
Kiratisin, P., (2002), Large-scale screening of nasal swabs for Bacillus anthracis: Descriptive 
summary and discussion of the National Institute of Health’s experience, J. Clin. 
Microbio., 40, p. 3012. 
Laserna, J.J., Berthod, A., & Winefordner, J.D., (1988 ), Evaluation and optimization of 
experimental conditions for surface-enhanced Raman detection of analytes in flow 
injection analysis, Microchem. J., 38, p. 25. 
Leingang, M., (2004), Post office installs anthrax detector, The Enquirer (Cincinnati), Sept. 24, 
2004. 
Liu, H., Bergman, N.H., Thomason, B., et al., (2004), Formation and Composition of the 
Bacillus anthracis Endospore, J. Bacteriol., 186, p. 164. 
Mabry, R., Brasky, K., Geiger, R., Carrion, R. Jr., Hubbard, G. B., Leppla, S., Patterson, J. L., 
Georgiou, G., and Iverson, B.L.,(2006), Detection of anthrax toxin in the serum of 
animals infected with Bacillus anthracis by using engineered immunoassays, Clin. 
Vaccine Immunol. 13, p. 671. 
Mullen, K., & Carron, K., (1994), Adsorption of chlorinated ethylenes at 1-octadecanethiol-
modified silver surfaces, Anal. Chem., 66, p. 478. 
Murrell, W.G., Gould, G.W., & Hurst, A. Eds., (1969), The Bacterial Spore, Acad. Press., 
London, p. 215.  
Nelson, W.H., Dasari, R., Feld, M., & Sperry, J.F., (2004), Intensities of calcium dipicolinate 
and Bacillus subtilis spore Raman spectra excited with 244 nm light, Appl. Spectrosc., 
58, p. 1408. 
Nudelman, R., Bronk, B.V., & Efrima, S., (2000), Fluorescence Emission Derived from 
Dipicolinate Acid, its Sodium, and its Calcium Salts, Appl. Spectrosc., 54, p. 445. 
Pellegrino, P.M., Fell Jr., N.F., & Gillespie, J.B., (2002), Enhanced spore detection using 
dipicolinate extraction techniques, Anal. Chim. Acta., 455, p. 167. 
Phillips, Z.E., & Strauch, M.A., (2002), Bacillus subtilis sporulation and stationary phase gene 
expression, Cell. Mol. Life Sci., 59, p. 392. 
Ragkousi, K., Eichenberger, P., Van Ooij, C., & Setlow, P., (2003), Identification of a New 
Gene Essential for Germination of Bacillus subtilis Spores with Ca2+-Dipicolinate, J. 
Bacteriol., 185, p. 2315. 
Rosen, D.L., Sharpless, C., & McBrown, L.B., (1997), Bacterial spore detection and 
determination by use of terbium dipicolinate photoluminescence, Anal. Chem., 69, 
p. 1082. 
Sacchi, C.T., Whitney, A.M., Mayer, L.W., Morey, R., Steigerwalt, A., Boras, A., Weyant, R.S., 
& Popovic, T., (2002), Sequencing of 16S rRNA Gene: A Rapid Tool for 
Identification of Bacillus anthracis, Emerg. Infect. Dis., 8, p. 1117. 
Sanderson, W.T., Hein, M.J., & Taylor, L., (2002), Surface Sampling Methods for Bacillus 
anthracis Spore Contamination, Emerg. Infect. Dis., 8, p. 1145. 
Sanderson, W.T., Stoddard, R.R., Echt, A.S., et al., (2004), Bacillus anthracis contamination 
and inhalational anthrax in a mail processing and distribution center, J. Appl. 
Microbiol., 96, p. 1048. 





Esposito, A.P., Talley, C.E., Huser, T., Hollars, C.W., Schaldach, C.M., & Lane, S.M., (2003), 
Analysis of single bacterial spores by micro-Raman spectroscopy, Appl. Spectrosc., 
57, p. 868. 
Farquharson, S., Smith, W.W., Elliott, S., & Sperry, J.F., (1999), Rapid biological agent 
identification by surface-enhanced Raman spectroscopy, Proc. SPIE, 3855, p. 110. 
Farquharson, S., & Maksymiuk, P., (2003), Simultaneous chemical separation and surface-
enhancement Raman spectral detection using silver-doped sol-gels, Appl. Spectrosc., 
57, p. 479. 
Farquharson, S., Grigely, L., Khitrov, V., Smith, W.W., Sperry, J.F., & Fenerty, G., (2004), 
Detecting Bacillus cereus spores on a mail sorting system using Raman 
Spectroscopy, J. Raman Spectrosc., 35, p. 82. 
Farquharson, S., Smith, W., Carangelo, R.C., & Brouillette, C., (1999), Industrial Raman: 
providing easy, immediate, cost effective chemical analysis anywhere, Proc. SPIE, 
3859, p. 14. 
Ghiamati, E., Manoharan, R.S., Nelson, W.H., & Sperry, J.F., (1992), UV Resonance Raman 
spectra of Bacillus spores, Appl. Spectrosc., 46, p. 357.  
Grasselli, J.G., Snavely, M.K., & Bulkin, B.J., (1981), Chemical Applications of Raman 
Spectroscopy, John Wiley & Sons, New York, NY, Chapter 5.  
Hameka, H.F., Jensen, J.O., Jensen, J.L., Merrow, C.N., & Vlahacos, C.P., (1996), Theoretical 
studies of the fluorescence of dipicolinic acid and its anion, J. Molec. Struct. (Theory), 
365, p. 131. 
Hathout, Y., Setlow, B., Cabrera-Martinex, R-M., Fenselau, C., & Setlow, P., (2003), Small, 
acid-soluble proteins as biomarkers in mass spectrometry analysis of Bacillus 
spores, Appl. Environ. Microbiol., 69, p. 1100. 
Halverson, H.O., Ed., (1961), Spores II, American Society for Microbiology, Washington, 
D.C., p. 153. 
Helgason, E., Økstad, O.A., Caugant, D.A., Johansen, H.A., Fouet, A., Mock, M., Hegna, I., & 
Kolstø, A.B., (2000), Bacillus anthracis, Bacillus cereus, and Bacillus thuringiensis-one 
species on the basis of genetic evidence, Appl. Environ. Microbiol., 66, p. 2627. 
Hindle, A.A., Hall, E.A.H., (1999), Dipicolinic acid assay revisited and appraised for spore 
detection, Analyst, 124, p. 1599. 
Hsu, V.P., Lukacs, S.L., Handzel, T., et al., (2002), Opening a Bacillus anthracis-containing 
envelope, Capitol hill, Washington, D.C.: The Public Health Response, Emerg. Infect. 
Dis., 8, p. 1039. 
Inglesby, T.V., Henderson, D.A., & Bartlett, J.G., (2002), Anthrax as a biological weapon: 
updated recommendations for management, JAMA, 287, p. 2236. 
Jackson, P.J., Hugh-Jones, M.E., Adair, D.M., et al., (1998), PCR analysis of tissue samples 
from the 1979 Sverdlovsk anthrax victims: The presence of multiple Bacillus 
anthracis strains in different victims, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci., 95, p. 1224. 
Janssen, F.W., Lund, A.J., & Anderson, L.E., (1958), Colorimetric assay for dipicolinic acid in 
bacterial spores, Science, 127, p. 26. 
Jeanmaire D.L., & Van Duyne, R.P., (1977), Surface Raman Spectroelectrochemistry, J. 
Electroanal. Chem., 84, p. 1. 
Jernigan, J.A., Stephens, D.S., Ashford, D.A, et al., (2001), Bioterrorism-Related Inhalational 
Anthrax: The First 10 Cases Reported in the United States, Emerg. Infect. Dis., 6, p. 
933. 
 
Detection of Bacillus Spores by Surface-Enhanced Raman Spectroscopy 
 
39 
Kellogg, M., (2010), Detection of biological agents used for terrorism: Are we ready?, Clin. 
Chem., 56, p. 10. 
Kennedy, H., (2001), Daschle letter bombshell billions of anthrax spores, New York Daily 
News, October 31, 2001. 
Kiratisin, P., (2002), Large-scale screening of nasal swabs for Bacillus anthracis: Descriptive 
summary and discussion of the National Institute of Health’s experience, J. Clin. 
Microbio., 40, p. 3012. 
Laserna, J.J., Berthod, A., & Winefordner, J.D., (1988 ), Evaluation and optimization of 
experimental conditions for surface-enhanced Raman detection of analytes in flow 
injection analysis, Microchem. J., 38, p. 25. 
Leingang, M., (2004), Post office installs anthrax detector, The Enquirer (Cincinnati), Sept. 24, 
2004. 
Liu, H., Bergman, N.H., Thomason, B., et al., (2004), Formation and Composition of the 
Bacillus anthracis Endospore, J. Bacteriol., 186, p. 164. 
Mabry, R., Brasky, K., Geiger, R., Carrion, R. Jr., Hubbard, G. B., Leppla, S., Patterson, J. L., 
Georgiou, G., and Iverson, B.L.,(2006), Detection of anthrax toxin in the serum of 
animals infected with Bacillus anthracis by using engineered immunoassays, Clin. 
Vaccine Immunol. 13, p. 671. 
Mullen, K., & Carron, K., (1994), Adsorption of chlorinated ethylenes at 1-octadecanethiol-
modified silver surfaces, Anal. Chem., 66, p. 478. 
Murrell, W.G., Gould, G.W., & Hurst, A. Eds., (1969), The Bacterial Spore, Acad. Press., 
London, p. 215.  
Nelson, W.H., Dasari, R., Feld, M., & Sperry, J.F., (2004), Intensities of calcium dipicolinate 
and Bacillus subtilis spore Raman spectra excited with 244 nm light, Appl. Spectrosc., 
58, p. 1408. 
Nudelman, R., Bronk, B.V., & Efrima, S., (2000), Fluorescence Emission Derived from 
Dipicolinate Acid, its Sodium, and its Calcium Salts, Appl. Spectrosc., 54, p. 445. 
Pellegrino, P.M., Fell Jr., N.F., & Gillespie, J.B., (2002), Enhanced spore detection using 
dipicolinate extraction techniques, Anal. Chim. Acta., 455, p. 167. 
Phillips, Z.E., & Strauch, M.A., (2002), Bacillus subtilis sporulation and stationary phase gene 
expression, Cell. Mol. Life Sci., 59, p. 392. 
Ragkousi, K., Eichenberger, P., Van Ooij, C., & Setlow, P., (2003), Identification of a New 
Gene Essential for Germination of Bacillus subtilis Spores with Ca2+-Dipicolinate, J. 
Bacteriol., 185, p. 2315. 
Rosen, D.L., Sharpless, C., & McBrown, L.B., (1997), Bacterial spore detection and 
determination by use of terbium dipicolinate photoluminescence, Anal. Chem., 69, 
p. 1082. 
Sacchi, C.T., Whitney, A.M., Mayer, L.W., Morey, R., Steigerwalt, A., Boras, A., Weyant, R.S., 
& Popovic, T., (2002), Sequencing of 16S rRNA Gene: A Rapid Tool for 
Identification of Bacillus anthracis, Emerg. Infect. Dis., 8, p. 1117. 
Sanderson, W.T., Hein, M.J., & Taylor, L., (2002), Surface Sampling Methods for Bacillus 
anthracis Spore Contamination, Emerg. Infect. Dis., 8, p. 1145. 
Sanderson, W.T., Stoddard, R.R., Echt, A.S., et al., (2004), Bacillus anthracis contamination 
and inhalational anthrax in a mail processing and distribution center, J. Appl. 
Microbiol., 96, p. 1048. 





Tang, S., Moayeri, M., Chen, Z., Harma, H., Zhao, J., Hu, H.,Purcell, R.H., Leppla, S.H., and 
Hewlett, I.K.,(2009) Detection of Anthrax Toxin by an Ultrasensitive Immunoassay 
Using Europium Nanoparticles, Clin.Vacc. Immun., 16, p. 408. 
Thayer, A., (2003), Homeland Security: Postal Service Readies Defense - Team will install 
PCR-based systems to detect biohazards in mail facilities, C&EN, 81, p. 7. 
Weaver, M.J., Farquharson, S., & Tadayyoni, M.A., (1985), Surface-enhancement factors for 
Raman scattering at silver electrodes: Role of adsorbate-surface interactions and 
electrode structure, J. Chem. Phys., 82, p. 4867. 
Woodruff, W.H., Spiro, T.G., & Gilvarg, C., (1974), Raman Spectroscopy In Vivo: Evidence 
on the Structure of Dipicolinate in Intact Spores of Bacillus Megaterium, Biochem. 
Biophys. Res. Commun., 58, p. 197. 
3 
Staphylococcal Enterotoxins, Stayphylococcal 
Enterotoxin B and Bioterrorism 
Martha L. Hale 
United States Army Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, 
 Integrative Toxicology Division, Fort Detrick,  
USA 
1. Introduction  
Staphylococcal enterotoxins (SEs) are exotoxins produced primarily by Staphylococcus aureus, 
which is a ubiquitous microorganism with world-wide distribution (Bergdoll, 1983; Dinges et 
al., 2000). SEs are a major cause of food poisoning and they are also potent immune activators 
that lead to serious immune dysfunction (Alouf and Muller-Alouf, 2003; McCormick et al., 
2001). Unlike most toxins, SEs are not directly cytotoxic and cell entry is not a requirement for 
them to cause an effect. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) place one SE, 
staphylococcal enterotoxin B (SEB), as a select agent based on its universal availability, ease of 
production and dissemination, and the potential to cause moderate but widespread illnesses. 
Additionally, because these agents are common to the environment and the diseases they 
cause are similar to other diseases, Category B agents require close environmental monitoring 
and enhanced disease surveillance (http://www.bt.cdc.gov/bioterrorism/).  
Many biothreat agents are common inhabitants of the soil and animals, and are known to 
cause disease in areas where they are indigenous. SEs present an additional problem in that 
SE-producing S. aureus are found throughout the world, and are known to produce a variety 
of illnesses, so that detection of a possible bioterrorist attack may be more problematic than 
those of other agents (Ahanotou, et al., 2006). The following sections describe SEB’s history 
as a biowarfare agent and its possible use as a bioterrorism agent. To understand why it is 
considered a Category B agent, a description of the toxin, the main diseases caused, methods 
to treat the diseases, and surveillance mechanisms will also be discussed.  
2. Biowarfare history 
In the era of offensive biological weapons, one of the SEs, SEB, was studied, not so much for 
its mass destruction capabilities but, rather for its ability to incapacitate soldiers so they 
would be incapable of fighting or defending their posts (Croddy and Hart, 2002; Hursh et 
al., 1995). The United States bioweapons program studied the toxin intensively and 
determined that the amount of SEB required to induce incapacitation was considerably less 
than that of synthesized chemicals. When the toxin and chemicals were compared by 
expense, time, and complexity of production, SEB was far more cost-effective. A dose of 400 





Tang, S., Moayeri, M., Chen, Z., Harma, H., Zhao, J., Hu, H.,Purcell, R.H., Leppla, S.H., and 
Hewlett, I.K.,(2009) Detection of Anthrax Toxin by an Ultrasensitive Immunoassay 
Using Europium Nanoparticles, Clin.Vacc. Immun., 16, p. 408. 
Thayer, A., (2003), Homeland Security: Postal Service Readies Defense - Team will install 
PCR-based systems to detect biohazards in mail facilities, C&EN, 81, p. 7. 
Weaver, M.J., Farquharson, S., & Tadayyoni, M.A., (1985), Surface-enhancement factors for 
Raman scattering at silver electrodes: Role of adsorbate-surface interactions and 
electrode structure, J. Chem. Phys., 82, p. 4867. 
Woodruff, W.H., Spiro, T.G., & Gilvarg, C., (1974), Raman Spectroscopy In Vivo: Evidence 
on the Structure of Dipicolinate in Intact Spores of Bacillus Megaterium, Biochem. 
Biophys. Res. Commun., 58, p. 197. 
3 
Staphylococcal Enterotoxins, Stayphylococcal 
Enterotoxin B and Bioterrorism 
Martha L. Hale 
United States Army Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, 
 Integrative Toxicology Division, Fort Detrick,  
USA 
1. Introduction  
Staphylococcal enterotoxins (SEs) are exotoxins produced primarily by Staphylococcus aureus, 
which is a ubiquitous microorganism with world-wide distribution (Bergdoll, 1983; Dinges et 
al., 2000). SEs are a major cause of food poisoning and they are also potent immune activators 
that lead to serious immune dysfunction (Alouf and Muller-Alouf, 2003; McCormick et al., 
2001). Unlike most toxins, SEs are not directly cytotoxic and cell entry is not a requirement for 
them to cause an effect. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) place one SE, 
staphylococcal enterotoxin B (SEB), as a select agent based on its universal availability, ease of 
production and dissemination, and the potential to cause moderate but widespread illnesses. 
Additionally, because these agents are common to the environment and the diseases they 
cause are similar to other diseases, Category B agents require close environmental monitoring 
and enhanced disease surveillance (http://www.bt.cdc.gov/bioterrorism/).  
Many biothreat agents are common inhabitants of the soil and animals, and are known to 
cause disease in areas where they are indigenous. SEs present an additional problem in that 
SE-producing S. aureus are found throughout the world, and are known to produce a variety 
of illnesses, so that detection of a possible bioterrorist attack may be more problematic than 
those of other agents (Ahanotou, et al., 2006). The following sections describe SEB’s history 
as a biowarfare agent and its possible use as a bioterrorism agent. To understand why it is 
considered a Category B agent, a description of the toxin, the main diseases caused, methods 
to treat the diseases, and surveillance mechanisms will also be discussed.  
2. Biowarfare history 
In the era of offensive biological weapons, one of the SEs, SEB, was studied, not so much for 
its mass destruction capabilities but, rather for its ability to incapacitate soldiers so they 
would be incapable of fighting or defending their posts (Croddy and Hart, 2002; Hursh et 
al., 1995). The United States bioweapons program studied the toxin intensively and 
determined that the amount of SEB required to induce incapacitation was considerably less 
than that of synthesized chemicals. When the toxin and chemicals were compared by 
expense, time, and complexity of production, SEB was far more cost-effective. A dose of 400 





by an aerosol attack, while 200 ng/kg body weights would be lethal for 50% of those 
exposed (Ahanotu, et al., 2006; Bellamy and Freedman, 2001; Ulrich et al., 1997).    
By 1966, the U.S. and its allies had produced stockpiles of various biowarfare (BW) agents, 
including SEB (under the code name WG) and research to establish parameters for SEB’s use 
as an aerosolized bioweapon continued at several facilities in the U.S. and Great Britain. In 
the fall of 1969, President Nixon stopped the offensive BW program and by 1972, all 
stockpiles of agents were destroyed (Greenfield et al., 2002; Franz et al., 1997). On April 10, 
1972, Great Britain, United States, and Soviet governments signed the Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) 
and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, which went into effect March 26, 1975.  
During the latter half of the Cold War, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) suspected that the USSR was continuing to stockpile and 
test biological weapons and therefore, defensive research programs were established for 
vaccine and therapeutic development (Ulrich et al., 1997). Not only have these research 
programs aided in development of surveillance mechanisms, the programs have 
significantly contributed to a greater understanding of diseases and the development of 
possible therapeutic interventions.  
With the end of the Cold War and dissolution of the USSR, threat of BW was greatly 
diminished. Other rogue nations were still stockpiling weapons and the CIA uncovered 
evidence that Iraq was building an arsenal of biological weapons. Although weaponized 
SEB was considered a high probability, it was not found when the Iraqi weapons program 
was dismantled (Zalinskas, 1997). 
3. The toxin 
SEB is one of several exotoxins isolated from S. aureus that are known for their emetic and 
superantigen traits (Bergdoll et al., 1974; McCormick et al. 2001). These exotoxins were the 
first superantigens to be identified, but since their discovery, additional superantigens have 
been isolated in other bacteria, particularly from the closely related genus, Streptococcus. 
Although staphylococcal and streptococcal superantigens are very similar, descriptions of 
toxin here will be limited to those toxins produced by staphylococci and the toxins will be 
identified as SEs or superantigens (SAG).  
3.1 Description of the toxin 
SEB belongs to a group of pyrogenic enterotoxins, produced primarily by S. aureus 
(McCormick et al., 2001). They are water soluble and relatively resistant to heat and 
proteolytic enzymes, including pepsin, trypsin, and papain (Le Loir et al., 2003). Stability 
does also depend upon purity of the toxin preparation, the medium’s composition, and the 
pH. SEB is one of the most stable toxins when exposed to extreme temperature and pH, one 
characteristic that makes SEB an attractive bioterrorism agent (da Cunha et al., 2007; Le Loir 
et al., 2003; Nout et al., 1988).  
Although they vary in amino acid sequence, SEs share a common three-dimensional 
structure that maintains their unique binding regions (Fig. 1) (Baker and Acharya, 2004; 
Papageorgiou et al., 1998). At least 20 serologically distinct SEs have been isolated primarily  
 




Fig. 1. Molecular structure of SEB (from PDB:3SEB using Jmol version 12.0.41) showing α- 
helices (magenta), β-strands (gold), and loop strucuture. The β-grasp domain is on the left, 
and the disulfide bond in the right. The N terminus and C terminus are labeled. 
from S. aureus (Table 1). Using the Clustal W program, the amino acid sequences of the SEs 
were aligned and evolutionary distances determined. A dendrogram constructed by the near 
neighbor-joining method divides the toxins into three major and two minor monophyletic 
groups (Ono et al., 2008; Uchiyama et al., 2003). The first two groups contain the classical 
toxins SEA, SED, SEE (Group 1) and SEB, SEC (Group 2) in addition to newly identified SEs; 
Group 3 contains only newly identified toxins. There is some similarity in structure in that 
Groups 1, 2, and 5 have a disulfide bond while Group 3 and Group 4 (TSST-1) do not.  
Many, but not all, SEs require zinc ions for functional binding to the MHC class II and for 
stability of its tertiary structure (Fraser et al., 1992; Ples et al., 2005); related to their amino 
acid sequences, the SEs bind zinc at various locations within the molecule (Brosnahan et al., 
2010). Some bind zinc in the concave β sheet of the C terminal domain while others bind 
zinc in a cleft between the two domains. SEB and toxic shock syndrome toxin (TSST-1 do not 
bind zinc ions (Brosnahan and Shlievert, 2011; Ly, et al., 2001; Sundstrom, et al, 1996).  
3.2 Genetic analysis of SE genes 
Analysis of SE genes indicates divergence from a common ancestry. Most genes coding for 
the enterotoxins are found on mobile elements such as pathogenicity islands, plasmids and 
bacteriophages, making horizontal transfer a common occurrence (Jarraud et al., 2001; 
McCormick et al, 2001; Yarwood, et al., 2002). In 2001, a cluster of genes with homologies to 
SE genes was identified and named the enterotoxin gene cluster (egc). Since many of the 
genes produced SE-like proteins, Jarraud et al. (2001) suggested that the gene cluster formed 
an enterotoxin nursery where genomic rearrangements would lead to new SEs, a fact that 
has now been confirmed with the development of the new exotoxin SEG (Lindsay, 2011; 
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SEA 27.1 phage yes
SED 26.9 plasmid (pIB485) yes
SEE 29.6 prophage yes
SEJ 31.2 plasmid (pIB485) yes
SEN 26.1 egcc yes
SEO 26.8 egc yes
SES 26.2 phage yes
SEP 26 phage yes
SHEc 25.1 transposon yes
SEB 28.4 SaPId yes
SEC1 27.5 SaPI yes
SEC2 27.6 SaPI yes
SEC3 27.6 SaPI yes
SEG 27 egc yes
SEIR 27 plasmid (pIB485) yes
SEU 27.2 egc yes
3 SEI 24.9 egc poor
SEK 26 SaPI yes
SEL 26.8 SaPI no
SEM 24.8 egc yes
SEQ 26 SaPI unknown
4 TSST-1 21.9 PI no
5 SET 22.6 egc poor 





aStaphilococcal enterotoxins are divided into 5 monophyletic groups according to ammino acid 
sequence alignment (Uchiyama et al., 2003; Ono et al., 2008) 
bGene location of the toxin 
centerotoxin gene cluster 
dStaphylococcus aureus phatogeniciti islands 
Table 1. Staphylococcal enterotoxin/superantigens 
As shown in Table 1, genetic elements containing SE genes vary. Most are located on mobile 
genetic elements (MGEs) which are DNA pieces with ends that encode genes (Lindsay, 
2011). There are several types of MGEs, including plasmids, pathogenicity islands, 
bacteriophages, and transposons. MGEs move from one bacterium to another or between 
various genetic elements in the same bacterium. Mobility of the genes is thought to 
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contribute to the number and genetic variation within this group of toxins. Interestingly, 
however, diversity in amino acid sequences has not affected toxin binding to its receptors, 
suggesting that as the proteins evolved, selective pressures maintained their binding sites by 
keeping a tertiary structure that supports the characteristic binding (Baker and Achara, 2004; 
Ulrich et al., 2007). 
Expression of SE genes is highly regulated by growth phase and environmental conditions, 
and not all conditions are suitable for gene activation (Lindsay, 2011). With the proper 
medium, most toxin production occurs in late log or stationary phase (Otero et al., 1990; 
Rahkovic et al., 2006; Soejima et al, 2007). S. aureus produces regulatory proteins and small 
RNAs that control toxin production, probably so that in harsh conditions, the bacterium can 
conserve energy (Horsburg, 2008; Fournier, 2008).  
One major regulator of some, but not all SE toxin production, is the accessory regulator gene 
(Agr) system (Lindsay, 2011). When bacteria reach a critical mass, a quorum-sensing system 
activates Agr, which, in turn, activates some toxin genes (SEB, for example). Other 
regulatory systems such as SarA can also up-regulate toxin genes indicating that regulatory 
pathways are complex and multiple systems probably control toxin production. 
3.3 Superantigen characteristics of SEB 
Marrack and Kappler (1990) coined the term “superantigen” to connote the similarities 
between SEs and conventional protein antigens that activate T cells by cross-linking T cells 
to antigen-presenting cells (APC). Both superantigens (SAG) and conventional antigens bind 
to the major histocompatibility class II (MHC class II) receptor located on APCs (Haffner, et 
al., 1996). However, conventional antigens bind to MHC class II molecules inside their 
antigen-binding grove and are processed into peptides expressed on the cell surface before 
they are presented to T cells via the T-cell receptor (TCR). In contrast, SAGs bind directly to 
MHC class II molecules outside the antigen-binding groove; they are not processed into 
peptide fragments before presentation to TCRs (Fig. 2). 
 
Fig. 2. Conventional antigen and SAGs bind APC and TCR. (A) SAGS bind to the outer 
region of the TCR Vβ and to the outer region of the MHC Class II determinant. (B) 
Conventional antigens are processed into peptides that are then presented to the antigen-
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While SAG must first bind to MHC class II molecules, their ability to activate large 
populations of T cells depends largely upon their binding to the TCR (Alber et al., 1990; 
Pontzer, et al., 199; Stevens, 1997; White et al., 1989). There are five different elements (Vα, 
Jα, Vβ, Dβ, and Jβ) that comprise the two-chain TCR receptor with each composed of a 
constant and variable region. The TCR uses all five elements for recognition of processed 
peptides on the surface of APCs (from conventional antigens). Peptide binding occurs 
within the peptide-binding region and requires a helper molecule such as CD4. 
Superantigens bind only to Vβ elements and specificity of binding results from the types of 
Vβ molecules present (Fig. 1). For example, SEB binds to human Vβ phenotypes 3, 12, 14, 15, 
17, which differ from phenotypes bound by other SAGs (Table 2). Because many T cells 
contain the same Vβ phenotype, SAGs may activate up to 20% of the whole T-cell 
population rather than the 0.01% activation by conventional antigens.  
SAGs are not restricted and can bind to both CD4 and CD8 T cells if the SAG recognizes the 
TCR Vβ chains, which increases the number of T cells they can affect. Superantigen-
activated T cells can undergo at least five to six rounds of cell division (Nagshima et al., 
2004). The massive clonal T-cell expansion results in the activation of programmed cell 
death in which cells responding to the specific superantigen are deleted (Choi et al., 1989; 
Yuh et al., 1993). Apoptosis of large numbers of T cells, clonal deletion and anergy of 
specific T-cell populations, and massive release of proinflammatory cytokines are all factors 
in the toxin’s pathogenesis. 
4. SE pathogenesis 
There are two major diseases caused by the staphylococcal enterotoxin superantigens (SEs), 
and most diseases attributed to the SEs relate to chronic disease states caused by 
autoimmunity and repetitious stimulation by SEs. Those autoimmune diseases in which SEs 
are thought to play a role require more than one challenge and therefore, will probably not 
be a concern in a bioterrorism threat. The two diseases that are pertinent to potential 
bioterrorism attacks are SEB (or SEs) in the food or water supply (food poisoning) or an 
aerosol attack in which the toxin will be inhaled into the lungs, possibly causing toxic shock 
syndrome.  
4.1 Food poisoning 
As noted previously, S. aureus is a ubiquitous microorganism with a world-wide 
distribution, and is responsible for causing large numbers of food poisoning cases 
throughout the world (Bergdoll, 1989; Le Loir et al., 2003; Ortega, et al., 2010). In its normal 
environment, the gram-positive cocci and its toxins do not cause disease; however, when 
introduced into foods such as cream, mayonnaise, or similar foods, the bacteria grow 
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1960; Bergdoll et al., 1959; Bergdoll et al., 1965; Casman et al., 1967). Since the 
characterization of the five serotypes, at least 20 more SEs (Table 1) have been isolated and 
characterized with many inducing emesis in monkeys or humans (Uchiyama et al., 2003).  
Enerotoxin TCR Vβ Specificity 
SEA 1.1,5.3,6.3,6.4,6.9, 
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workers who carry the bacterium may contaminate food when they handle food without 
washing their hands or wearing gloves. The microorganism is also found in unpasteurized 
milk and cheese products and, being salt tolerant, grows in salty foods as well. Because they 
are highly resistant to heat and enzymatic inactivation, foods that do not require cooking or 
those prepared by hand provide greater risks of contamination with the bacteria and 
subsequent toxin production. The short incubation period, approximately 4-6 hr after 
ingestion, usually differentiates SE-induced food poisoning from those caused by bacteria 
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The onset is sudden and vomiting is the hallmark symptom. Other symptoms, such as 
diarrhea, abdominal pain, and nausea may also be present, but systemic manifestations such 
as fever are very uncommon (Alouf and Muller-Alouf, 2003; Kerouanton et al., 2007). 
Although extremely incapacitating, staphylococcal food poisoning is usually self-limiting 
and symptoms last about 1 day. Fatality in healthy adults is rare (0.03%); however, the rate 
is higher in susceptible populations (children, elderly, and immune-compromised adults) 
and may also depend upon the concentration of the toxin ingested (Do Carmo, et al., 2004). 
SE-induced food poisoning was initially thought to be caused by the local interaction of the 
toxin with intestinal cells because the toxin stimulates nerve centers in the gut through 
serotonin (5-hydroxytryptamine or 5 HT) release from intestinal mast cells (Alouf and Muller-
Alouf, 2003; Hu et al., 2007). Serotonin binds to 5-HT3 receptors which are ligand-gated ion 
channels located on the afferent vagus nerve terminals. The binding of serotonin to the 
receptor opens the channel which signals the medulla emetic reflex center to generate nausea 
and an emetic response. However, such interactions do not explain the disease 
pathophysiology. Patients with SE intoxication can exhibit rather severe gastrointestinal 
damage including mucosal hyperemia, regional edema, petechiae, and purulent exudates 
(Ortega et al., 2010; Palmer, 1951). SEs cross the intestinal epithelial barrier and gain access to 
local and systemic lymphoid tissues, suggesting that activation of local immune tissue may be 
partially responsible for gastrointestinal damage (Hamad et al., 1997). Involvement of the 
immune system in pathogenesis could explain why immuno-compromised adults develop a 
more severe, life-threatening disease than normal healthy adults. However, emesis is not 
directly linked to T-cell proliferation because TSST-1, a potent immune activator, does not 
cause emesis. TSST-1 is more susceptible to enzymes in the digestive tract and could be the 
reason for its lack of emetic activity. SEs with emetic activity have a disulfide bond located at 
the top of the B domain and probably are responsible for stabilizing the molecule in a 
conformation needed to induce emesis (Brosnahan and Schievert, 20l1).  
4.2 Toxic shock syndrome 
During the late 1970’s, Todd and coworkers (1978) described an acute illness in seven 
children, between the ages of 8 to 17. Symptoms included high fever, hypotension, 
vomiting, watery diarrhea, a scarlatiniform rash, and renal failure. Although bacteria were 
not isolated from blood, cerebrospinal fluid, or urine, S. aureus was isolated from mucosal 
sites. Culture filtrates from cultures of these isolates were shown to contain a toxin that 
would cause a rash (Nikolksy sign) in newborn mice. Todd named the new disease toxic 
shock syndrome (TSS). In 1977 through 1980, 22 women between the ages of 13-24, were 
diagnosed with TSS (Chesney et al., 1981). Investigations showed that this TSS was the 
result of highly absorbent tampons, which became contaminated with S. aureus. A toxin, 
tsst-1, was isolated from the bacteria cultured from the contaminated tampon and shown to 
be similar to that discovered by Todd et al. (1978). The super absorbent tampons were found 
to introduce oxygen into the anaerobic environment of the vagina which facilitated the 
growth of S. aureus and release of TSST-1. When the absorbent tampons were taken off the 
market, the incidence of menstrual TSS decreased dramatically.  
From these early investigations, TSS has been divided into two categories. The first, 
menstrual TSS, occurs primarily in young women, ages 16-25, during menstrual periods and 
is usually associated with tampon use. As first identified in the 1980s, TSST-1, remains the 
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leading cause of menstrual TSS (Chesney et al, 1981; Brosnanhan and Schlievert, 2010). 
TSST-1 is also a major etiologic agent for the other TSS category, non-menstrual TSS, 
comprising 50% of the reported cases (Buchdahl et al, 1985). Two other SEs, SEB and SEC, 
have been identified as the causative agent in most of the remaining 50%. Since its 
discovery, TSS had been considered a rare, but often fatal disease. After removal of 
absorbent tampons from the market and efforts to inform the public about TSS, incidences 
of menstrual TSS dropped from 13.7% to 0.3% per 100,000 individuals in the U. S. Since 
1986, reported incidences of TSS in the U.S. have remained stable with the annual incidence 
rate around 0.32%-0.52% per 100,000 people (DeVries, et al., 2011; Haijeh et al., 1996). 
Several reasons may account for the disease’s rarity. One reason lies in the fact that most 
adults have been exposed to SEs over a period of many years, and therefore, possesses 
antibodies against many of the SEs. The lack of anti-SE antibodies could also explain why 
children and young adults are more susceptible to the disease. In addition to immunity 
against SEs, another problem in TSS diagnosis relates to the lack of a single diagnostic test 
and, therefore, diagnosis relies upon a complex analysis of clinical symptoms. Requirements 
for a case to be identified as TSS are rigorous, and while SEs are significant virulence factors 
in many infections, most infections do not meet the diagnostic criteria for TSS as established 
by CDC (Table 3).  
TSS pathophysiology involves many intricate extracellular and intracellular signaling 
pathways and at this time, the exact pathways or pathways responsible for the syndrome 
are not known (Davis et al., 1980; Kumar et al., 2010; Pinchuk et al., 2010). Hallmark studies 
during the 1990s showed that the toxicity of SEB was due to massive T-cell proliferation and 
proinflammatory cytokine production (Marrack et al., 1990; White et al., 1989). 
Investigations using T-cell reconstituted immuno-deficient SCID mice confirmed the role of 
T-cell activation in SE-induced lethality (Miethke et al., 1992; Canaan, et al. 1999). 
Furthermore, these studies indicated that tumor necrosis factor alpha (TNF-α) plays a 
crucial role in SE-induced lethality because passive immunization with an anti-TNF-α/β 
monoclonal antibody protected the animals against an SE challenge (Fast et al., 1989; 
Miethke et al., 1992). Although the precise mechanisms by which proinflammatory 
cytokines induce TSS, these early studies and further investigations provide overwhelming 
evidence that tissue damage, shock, and multiple organ failure is caused by the production 
of pathological concentrations of proinflammatory cytokines and chemokines such as TNF-
α, interleukin 1β (IL-1 β), interferon gamma (IFN-γ) and interleukin 6 (IL-6), and 
macrophage chemoattractant protein-1 (MCP-1) (Marrack et al., 1990; Williams, 1991). 
Although T cells appear to play a dominant role in TSS, more recent investigations indicate 
that SE interactions with other cell types may also contribute to TSS pathophysiology (Das, 
2000; Faulkner et al., 1997; Marrack et al., 1990; McCormick et al. 2001). Initially, the purpose of 
the APC MHC class II interaction with SEs was thought to provide a mechanism for T-cell 
activation and production of proinflammatory cytokines by T-cell populations. That MHC 
class II interactions play a more active role in TSS was shown by studies in which mortality 
from TSST-1 was not reduced in T-cell depleted rabbits (Dinges et al, 2003). In addition, TSST-1 
induced proinflammatory cytokines in these animals, again suggesting that other cells may 
play a role in cytokine production. These studies are further supported by investigations in 
which the SE-MHC class II interaction by itself was shown to be sufficient to activate 
intracellular signaling pathways which induce downstream pro-inflammatory signaling and 
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• Fever: temperature greater than or equal to 38.9°C 
•Rash: diffuse macular erythroderma 
•Desquamation: 1-2 weeks after onset of rash 
•Hypotension: systolic blood pressure less than or equal to 90 mm Hg 
for adults or less than fifth percentile by age for children aged less than 16 years 
Multisystem involvement (three or more of the following organ systems: 
•Gastrointestinal: vomiting or diarrhea at onset of illness  
•Muscular: severe myalgia or creatine phosphokinase level 
at least twice the upper limit of normal 
•Mucous membrane: vaginal, oropharyngeal, or conjunctival hyperemia 
•Renal: blood urea nitrogen or creatinine at least twice the upper limit of 
normal for laboratory or tract infection 
•Urinary sediment with pyuria (greater than or equal to 5 leukocytes 
per high-power field) in the absence of urinary tract infections
•Hepatic: total bilirubin, alanine aminotransferase enzyme, or asparate 
aminotransferase enzyme levels at least twice the upper limit of normal values
•Hematologic: platelets less than 100,000/mm3 
•Central nervous system: disorientation or alterations in consciousness 
without focal neurologic signs when fever and hypotension are absent 
Laboratory criteria for diagnosis
•Negative results on the following tests, if obtained: 
•Blood or cerebrospinal fluid cultures blood culture may be positive for 
Staphylococcus aureus 
•Negative serologies for Rocky Mountain spotted fever, leptospirosis, 
or measles 
Case classification
•Probable: a case which meets the laboratory criteria and in which four of the 
five clinical findings described above are present 
•Confirmed: a case which meets the laboratory criteria and in which all five of 
the clinical findings described above are present, including desquamation, 
unless the patient dies before desquamation occurs  




Table 3. CDC 1997 Definition for Toxic Shock Syndrome 
 




Fig. 3. Systemic SEB (SE) intoxication is a complex disease 
SEB interacts with (A) lymphoid cells and induces production of proinflammatory 
cytokines. SEB stimulates (B) endothelial and (C) epithelial cells to release cytokines (some 
proinflammatory)/chemokines and growth factors. Red arrows show interactions between 
cell types are also affected by SEB-induced release of these factors that ultimately leads to 
endothelial cell dysfunction, vascular leak, and shock resulting from multi-organ failure.  
SE binding to lymphoid cells has been extensively characterized and interactions of SEs with 
these cells are fairly well understood (Achara and Baker, 2004; Broshanan et al. 2011; Larkin 
et al., 2009). The complexity of the disease suggests that SEs may affect more than lymphoid 
cells, and recently, an epithelial binding moiety has been identified on the SE molecule 
(Brosnahan and Schlievert, 20011). SEs bind to epithelial cells and elicit the production of 
specific cytokines. SEs have also been shown to cross polarized epithelial cells in vitro 
suggesting that SEs gain systemic access to the body (Hale, unpublished data). Rajagpjalan 
et al. (2007) show acute activation of the systemic immune system and inflammatory 
response in mice that were vaginally or intranasally exposed to SEB (Rajagopalan et al. 2007; 
Rajagopalan et al., 2006). Since the toxin was introduced on mucosal surfaces, the only 
method for systemic activation would be if the toxin crossed the epithelial cell barrier and 
gained access to the body. Vaginal epithelial cells were also shown to bind TSST-1 and 
induce TNFα production while treatment of epithelial cells with TSST-1 or SEB induced 
production of MIP-3α and IL-8 (Brosnahan et al., 2001; Peterson, et al., 2005).  
SE-induced shock causes severe damage to the endothelial vasculature and vascular leak 
contributes significantly to TSS pathology (Krakauer, 1994; Ortega et al. 2010). Elevated 
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or septic shock (Karlsson et al. 2008). Because there are common features among 
hemorrhagic shock, septic shock, and toxic shock syndrome, factors that regulate 
endothelial homeostasis are probably important in its prevention. Future studies examining 
the interplay among lymphoid, endothelial and epithelial cells will provide more 
understanding of the disease and enable a logical approach for therapy.  
4.3 Pulmonary complications 
One of the most effective and deadly forms of a bioterrorism attack is delivery of the toxin 
or microorganism by aerosol exposure (Ulrich et al., 1997). Understanding SE-intoxication in 
humans has been difficult because there is no direct comparison between the pathogenesis 
of human disease and the disease caused by an intentional aerosol attack. Perhaps the most 
descriptive and informative reports detailed an accidental laboratory inhalational exposure 
of fifteen workers (Rusnak et al., 2004). Ten became symptomatic and nine were 
hospitalized. The onset was rapid (1 1/2 hrs to 24 hr) after exposure with the illness lasting 
3-4 days. Commonly observed symptoms were fever, headache, myalgias, pulmonary 
symptoms, and gastrointestinal symptoms.   
A Rhesus macaque animal model was used to characterize SEB intoxication by an aerosol 
route. In these studies, nonhuman primates (NHP) were exposed to a lethal dose (5 LD50) of 
aerosolized SEB in a modified Henderson head-only aerosol exposure chamber. NHPs 
developed gastrointestinal symptoms (anorexia, diarrhea, and emesis) within 24 hr after 
exposure. The gastrointestinal symptoms appeared to be self-limiting, but 24 hr later, the 
NHPs developed an abrupt onset of lethargy, dyspnea, and facial pallor. Usually within 4 
hr, the animals died or were euthanized when moribund. Postmortem examination revealed 
lesions in the lungs and signs of pulmonary edema. Both large and small intestines showed 
petechial hemorrhaging and mucosal erosion, and lymph nodes were swollen. There was 
definite damage to the endothelium and endothelial cells. The authors of the study 
concluded that SEB is a potent stimulant in rhesus monkeys and that a similar dose in 
humans could produce similar symptoms. One thing to consider, however, when 
extrapolating from NHP to human, is that the NHP were seronegative when tested for the 
presence of antibodies against SEB; most humans have some degree of past exposure to the 
toxin and therefore would perhaps have some immunity.  
Since these studies on NHP, there is evidence that links SEs exposure to asthma and 
respiratory problems (Kumar et al., 2010). Inflammatory reactions in the lung are induced 
by TNF-α and two life-threatening syndromes, vascular leak and respiratory distress 
develop during toxic shock (Aubert et al., 2000; Herz et al., 1999; Neuman et al., 1997). Other 
studies show that cytokine-mediated acute respiratory distress syndrome and inflammatory 
lung disease occur during SE intoxication (DeSouza et al., 2006; Fujisawa et al., 1998; Slifka 
and Whitton, 2002). Both conditions are critical and may be lethal without therapeutic 
intervention (Das, 2000; Kasai et al., 1997). Anti-inflammatory drugs reduce TNF-α and 
other proinflammatory cytokines which alleviates the symptoms and helps the individuals 
to recover from these life-threatening illnesses. 
5. Animal models  
A major problem in understanding the disease process of SE intoxication is the lack of 
appropriate animal models that mimic the human disease. There are several animal models 
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for studying TSS, but each model has its own limitations, which need to be understood in 
order to use each model in furthering our understanding of the disease process.  
5.1 Mouse 
The mouse remains the most common model for TSS studies, although they are not sensitive 
to the toxin and must be sensitized with either hepatotoxins (e.g., D-galactosamine and 
actinomycin D) or with endotoxin to achieve an effect (Chen et al., 1994; Nagaki et al., 1994; 
Blank et al., 1997; Sugiyama et al., 1964). Endotoxin is a natural component of gram-negative 
bacteria found in the intestines and may actually contribute to shock syndromes. Although 
tissue damage from SE and lipopolysaccharide (LPS) may vary, acute shock caused by 
abnormally high levels of TNF-α and other proinflammatory cytokines results in life-
threatening situations (Das, 2000; Miekthe et al, 1997; Sifka and Whitton, 2000). Thus, an 
animal model in which the SEB effects are magnified by sublethal concentrations of LPS 
provides an in vivo system useful for studying various facets of lethal shock. While each 
mouse model lacks some characteristics of the disease in humans, Krakauer et al. (2010) 
found that three different mouse models with different susceptibility to SEB could be used 
to study SEB intoxication.  
T-cell deficient mice or mice engineered to have specific cytokine deficiencies show that 
TNF-α and T cells are both required for SE-induced lethality (Blank, et al. 1997). Transgenic 
mice expressing human TCR/MHC class II determinants solve some problems associated 
with mouse lymphoid cells binding SE and SAG-sensitive mice show a biphasic release of 
cytokines with early TNF-a release mediating lethal shock (Faulkner et al., 2005; 
Rajagopalan et al., 2002). These investigations point also to the spleen as a major source of 
TNF-a production during an acute (early) cytokine response. The studies support the idea 
that TSS is not simply due to cytokines released by T cells, but entails a series of events 
affecting major organs throughout the body. Recently, a humanized mouse in which T-cell 
immune deficient mice, SCID, were transfused with human hematopoietic fetal liver CD34+ 
cells that had previously been implanted with human fetal thymic and liver tissues 
developed long-term human innate and adaptive immune responses. When TSST-1 was 
injected into these mice, the mice responded immunologically in a manner similar to 
humans (Melkus et al., 2006) suggesting that this mouse model may overcome many of the 
problems associated with mouse models for SE intoxication.  
5.2 Rat 
Rats have been an excellent model to study TSS effects on the nervous system. Wang et al, 
(2004) showed activation of neuronal developmental genes after rats were given 
intraperitoneal injections of SEB. Activation appeared to occur through the tenth cranial 
nerve, the vagus, because severing this nerve prevented neuronal activation. These studies 
support the idea that brain-immune system communications play a role in TSS. Some 
sequalae of TSS relate to memory loss and confusion which would indicate involvement of 
the nervous system (Kusnocov and Goldfaith, 2005). 
5.3 Minature swine 
Because a major drawback for murine and rodent models in TSS is the lack of clinical 
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piglets are given a lethal dose of SEB intravenously (van Gessel et al., 2004). Intoxicated 
piglets develop vomiting, diarrhea, febrile temperature spikes, anorexia, and hypotension 
similar to the clinical course of disease observed in humans and may offer an in vivo model 
with more of the symptoms observed in human TSS. 
5.4 Rabbit 
McCormick et al. (2003) noted that rabbits, when given SAG by a continuous perfusion, 
developed pyrogenic symptoms similar to humans. Investigations showed that the lethal 
pathology was similar to that observed in human TSS, but with newer animal models and a 
greater understanding of mechanisms involved in TSS, rabbits are not a major animal model 
for TSS. 
5.5 Shrew 
Most of the small animal models used to study the effects of SE-intoxication do not display 
an emetic response (King, 1990). Hu et al. (2003) developed an emetic model with which to 
study SE-induced emesis. They reported that several SE serotypes, known to induce emesis 
in NHP, induced emesis in the house musk shrew (Suncus murinus). Concentrations 
required to induce an emetic response were approximately 0.4 μg per animal, but the dose 
varied with the SE serotype. Variations in SE toxicity among the serotypes were similar to 
those observed in NPHs and humans, making the shrew an excellent small animal model to 
study emesis induced by SEs.  
5.6 Nonhuman primate  
NHP exhibit a similar disease progression as that observed in humans and are susceptible 
when given SEB orally (Boles et al., 2003; Mattix et al., 1995; Ulrich et al., 1997). Because 
there are limitations in the number of NHP available for studies and because of the expense 
involved in NHP studies, they are usually reserved for preclinical investigations. While TSS 
manifestations in NHPs resemble those observed in humans, there are differences between 
the immune systems, which may become more evident as more is learned about the disease 
process.  
6. Therapy and prophylaxis 
Most therapeutic and prophylatic measures are concerned with TSS or systemic SE 
intoxication because food poisoning is usually self-limiting. Although identification of 
unusual food poisoning incidents should be monitored as a possible biothreat action, the 
disease itself should not be life-threatening, and recovery occurs without serious side effects. 
Because therapy for food poisoning is not a serious concern, this section will address the 
measures to treat disease pathogenesis resulting from systemic SE intoxication. 
6.1 Current therapeutic measures 
At the current time, intravenous human gamma globulins (IVIG) is the primary therapeutic 
to treat TSS. Because there are no specific drugs available for treatment, a primary goal of 
any therapeutic intervention is to maintain important body functions and physiological 
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homeostasis. Recommendations for treating TSS include first the removal of any foreign 
materials that might be contaminated with S aureus ( i.e., tampons or nasal packings) and 
draining sites of infection to prevent further bacterial growth. Treatment with anti-
microbials is also recommended if sepsis is involved. In severe cases, other therapeutic 
interventions that may minimize the risk of tissue damage and organ failure include fluids 
to prevent dehydration, dialysis if severe kidney problems occur, drugs to control blood 
pressure and cardiovascular function, anti-inflammatory agents, and possibly insulin, if 
needed. Supportive care should be aggressive and monitored carefully. Length of 
hospitalization may vary between 5 and 11 days (DeVries et al., 2011).   
6.2 Antibody therapy for SE intoxication 
As shown by studies in NHP, animals could be protected against SE intoxication using 
passive immunization with anti-SEB antibodies. The antibodies provided protection if given 
up to 4 hr after the NHPs had received 5 LD50sof aerosolized SEB (LeClaire et al., 2002). 
These studies showed that the antibodies were able to neutralize the toxin in vivo and 
provide protection after intoxication had occurred. Unfortunately, the antibody was a 
monoclonal antibody (Mab) created in a chicken, and the antibody itself may be antigenic 
and cause serum sickness. There are several anti-SEB Mab preparations that will not cause 
adverse reactions in humans. Because most Mabs are not developed using human cells, Mab 
development for human use will require “humanization of the Mab in order to eliminate the 
molecule’s antigenicity (Goldsmith and Signore, 2010). Investigations using immune 
lymphocytes to prepare Mabs may provide therapeutics without the expense of 
humanization. Additionally, developing small-domain antibody fragments such as camilid 
antibodies may also provide therapeutic agents that, because of their size, may not be 
antigenic in humans (Graef et al., 2011). Further studies are needed to identify antibody 
reagents that will be successful therapeutics, and whether the antibody reagents will need to 
be combined with pharmacologic agents to enhance their efficacy. 
6.3 Possible pharmacologic agents to treat SE intoxication 
Over the past 20 years, there have been numerous investigations showing efficacy of various 
pharmacologic agents that prevent or delay lethality when animals are treated after a SE 
challenge, and as yet none has advanced to human clinical trials (Krakauer, 2010). Human 
activated protein C (hAPC) was approved for patients in severe septic shock, and had been 
used to treat TSS (DeVries et al. 2011). On October 25, 2011, Eli Lilly withdrew Xigris (hAPC) 
because more in depth clinical trials indicated that drug did no better than a placebo in reducing 
mortality (http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/752169). The complexity of TSS tends to 
discount development of a single drug capable of treating the disease . Because the disease 
affects the endothelial cell vasculature of multiple organ systems, including drugs that treat 
endothelial cell damage should also help to establish a therapeutic regimen for TSS.   
6.4 Vaccines 
To protect soldiers against SEB exposure, the U. S. Army developed a formalin-treated 
SEB toxoid that had some degree of success in protecting animals against a SEB challenge 
(Tseng et al., 1995). Due to the fact that formalin treatment did not always inactivate every 
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inactivation. A vaccine developed by site-specific mutagenesis provided safer and more 
effective vaccines. The most effective vaccine (SEBvax) was designed with mutations in 
the MHC class II binding region so that the vaccine no longer was capable of cross-linking 
T cells to APCs (Ulrich et al., 1998). The military is no longer funding development of 
SEBvax. The vaccine is now being used to develop a trivalent subunit vaccine that 
includes mutated Tst-1 and SEA proteins as well. The combination vaccine should 
provide protection against SEB but also against SEs more commonly associated with TSS 
(http://www.regionalinnovation.org/success.cfm?story=32). 
7. Detection of SEs and SEB 
Since September 11, 2001, The U.S. and its allies have been concerned with detection of those 
agents that could be dispersed by aerosol (Kman and Bachman, 2011). There are several 
methods used for monitoring agents of bioterrorism and surveillance occurs through an 
umbrella of monitoring systems. A major component of surveillance, syndromic 
surveillance, results from the monitoring of clinical manifestations of certain illnesses to 
determine if there is a higher than normal number of cases. This is usually followed by 
laboratory surveillance in which certain markers and laboratory data indicate the presence 
of a bioterrorism agent. Another type of surveillance is environmental during which the 
environment is continually sampled for the presence of biological agents. In situations like 
SEB which is not generally monitored environmentally via the BioWatch Program, 
syndromic and laboratory surveillance becomes extremely important for monitoring 
bioterrorism attacks.  
SEs are stable proteins and therefore identification of the proteins using anti-SEB reagents 
should be possible in both the field and medical facilities. Available immunoassays are 
capable of identifying the protein in picogram amounts and can be used to monitor samples 
taken from the environment (Kahn et al. 2003; Sapsford et al., 2005). Because most humans 
have been exposed to SEs and have developed antibodies against them, the presence of anti-
SE antibodies is of little diagnostic value, but the detection of the toxin in body fluids or 
from nasal swabs (after an aerosol exposure), should provide a positive confirmation (Ulrich 
et al., 1997).  
In cases of infection with S. aureus, polymerase chain reaction (PCR) assays can determine 
the presence of the SE gene (Chiang et al., 2008; Rajkovic et al., 2006). Particularly in the case 
of a toxin that is known to be present in staphylococcal infections, surveillance and 
monitoring at the clinical level is imperative for differentiating between random outbreaks 
of the disease and a bioterrorist attack.  
8. Category B biothreat agent  
Although redefined after September 11, 2001, rogue nations have used bioterrorism for 
centuries as a method to harm their opponents (Bellamy and Freedman, 2001; Phillips, 2005). 
As described by CDC, bioterrorism agents are separated into three categories for 
preparedness purposes depending upon their ease of dissemination, and the ability to cause 
excessive morbidity and mortality (Rotz et al, 2002). Category A includes agents such as 
Variola major (smallpox) and Yersinia pestis (plague) that have been used as a weapon of 
mass destruction (WMD) (Henderson, 1999). As previously mentioned, Category B agents 
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are easy to disseminate and produce moderate morbidity and low mortality. Category B 
agents do not meet criteria for use as a WMD, but dispersal of a Category B agent could 
result in regional disruptions and hysteria.  
From all accounts, SEB meets the criteria for a Category B agent in that it is stable, easy to 
disseminate, and induces severe emesis and toxic shock. An aerosol of SEB in a crowded 
area could lead to an incapacitating disease in several hundred individuals. Although 
mortality would be low, the illness would create a serious public health impact by 
disrupting normal work days and cause havoc by increasing individual use of emergency 
rooms (Ulrich et al., 1997).  
Many bioterrorism agents such as SEB are found in nature, are easy to isolate and produce 
in mass quantities and are usually stable in adverse environmental conditions (Ahanotu, et 
al., 2006). Because the agent is a common inhabitant in the environment, monitoring the 
agent becomes more difficult. The fact that there are accidental cases of food poisoning and 
occasional cases of TSS annually also complicates identifying bioterrorism incidents using 
SEB. In the final analysis, although SEB may not be the most favored bioterrorism agent, 
there is always a possibility that it will be used in an attack and, therefore, mechanisms 
should be in place for decontamination and treatment.  
9. Summary 
SEs are produced primarily by S.aureus which is a common inhabitant in the environment 
worldwide. SEs are a major cause of food poisoning and toxic shock syndrome. In the 1960s, 
SEB was weaponized as an incapacitating agent, and now is listed as a Category B 
bioterrorism agent. When inhaled, the toxin causes severe respiratory damage and 
endothelial dysfunction, often resulting in acute respiratory distress and severe lung 
damage. As yet, there is no FDA-approved vaccine or therapeutic agents to prevent or treat 
SEB-intoxication and with its ease of dissemination, SEB remains a serious bioterrorism 
agent.   
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area could lead to an incapacitating disease in several hundred individuals. Although 
mortality would be low, the illness would create a serious public health impact by 
disrupting normal work days and cause havoc by increasing individual use of emergency 
rooms (Ulrich et al., 1997).  
Many bioterrorism agents such as SEB are found in nature, are easy to isolate and produce 
in mass quantities and are usually stable in adverse environmental conditions (Ahanotu, et 
al., 2006). Because the agent is a common inhabitant in the environment, monitoring the 
agent becomes more difficult. The fact that there are accidental cases of food poisoning and 
occasional cases of TSS annually also complicates identifying bioterrorism incidents using 
SEB. In the final analysis, although SEB may not be the most favored bioterrorism agent, 
there is always a possibility that it will be used in an attack and, therefore, mechanisms 
should be in place for decontamination and treatment.  
9. Summary 
SEs are produced primarily by S.aureus which is a common inhabitant in the environment 
worldwide. SEs are a major cause of food poisoning and toxic shock syndrome. In the 1960s, 
SEB was weaponized as an incapacitating agent, and now is listed as a Category B 
bioterrorism agent. When inhaled, the toxin causes severe respiratory damage and 
endothelial dysfunction, often resulting in acute respiratory distress and severe lung 
damage. As yet, there is no FDA-approved vaccine or therapeutic agents to prevent or treat 
SEB-intoxication and with its ease of dissemination, SEB remains a serious bioterrorism 
agent.   
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for Communicable Disease Control (SMI). The aim of FBD is to strengthen the diagnostic 
capacity in Sweden regarding dangerous pathogens. The various laboratory networks that 
have been established in different countries have more or less the same objectives: rapid 
detection, identification and characterization of pathogens, targeted surveillance programs, 
strengthen laboratory response capacities and capabilities, and recovery. This includes; 
harmonization of diagnostic methods, increasing diagnostic capacity, training and exercises, 
interactions with other networks, and coordination of diagnostic emergency response. For 
these reasons, a broad diagnostic portfolio is needed in order to respond to covert and overt 
bioterrorism incidents. Diagnostic collaboration and networks are essential for an efficient 
response to a bioterrorism attack. Diagnostic response strategies must consider the abilities 
of the network in handling of the following: laboratories expertise, index case, decision 
making, tracing and tracking, and crime scene investigations.  
2. Strategic planning 
To obtain international multisectoral cooperation, in terms of bioterrorism prevention, 
policy makers have an important function. Policy makers at the local, regional, national and 
international levels must work in the same direction. However, this is not always realistic 
and as a result strategic planning is crucial, and the use of planning scenarios (DHS, 2005) 
can enhance strategic planning (Davis et al., 2007). Interagency collaborative efforts are one 
of the most critical factors to ensure an efficient bioterrorism preparedness and response 
plan. Several intergovernmental organizations such as INTERPOL (INTERPOL, 2010), 
World Health Organization (WHO), Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) and World 
Organization for Animal Health (OIE) have ongoing programs and activities to counter the 
threat of attacks on humans, animals and plants (Pearson, 2006). The Biological and Toxin 
Weapon Convention (BTWC) prohibits the deliberate release of agents to attack plants, 
animals and humans (UN, 1972). However, effective prevention and countermeasures for 
deliberate attacks need to be developed in harmony with measures to control either natural 
or accidental outbreaks of disease. 
A lot of strategic planning is taking place at the national level. For example, reports by the 
US Congressional Research Service identifies strategic planning as one of four critical areas 
of bioterrorism preparedness and that agency implementation will be a key component to 
translate strategic goals into effective programs and polices (Gottron, 2011). The European 
Union has also developed strategic plans on how to counter bioterrorism and CBRN attacks 
that are outlined in the EU CBRN Action Plan (EC, 2009). The Action Plan will be 
implemented in the period 2010 to 2014. Some examples of other countries focusing on 
strategic planning for bioterrorism are Canada (CRTI, 2007), South Korea (Hwang, 2008). A 
lot of progress has been made in strengthening local, regional/state, national and 
international capacities to detect and respond to bioterrorism since letters containing spores 
of Bacillus anthracis were sent via the US mail in 2001 (Rotz et al., 2004) (Smith, 2004). The 
anthrax letters caused the CDC to revise its strategic plan for bioterrorism preparedness and 
response (Koplan, 2001), which is focused on the following six focus areas:  
1. Preparedness planning and readiness assessment (including the National 
Pharmaceutical Stockpile);  
2. Detection, surveillance and epidemiology capacity;  
3. Laboratory capacity including diagnosis and characterization of biological agents;  
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4. Response and health alert network/communications and information technology;  
5. Communicating Health Risks and Health Information Dissemination; and  
6. Education and training (Kun et al., 2002).  
The European political leadership has made efforts to improve a coordinated EU response to 
the bioterrorism incidents. (Sundelius et al., 2004) (Tegnell et al., 2003). The efforts have 
improved strategic, tactical, and operational aspects of preparedness planning and response 
(Brandeau et al., 2009). The strategic planning efforts have formed the basis for multisectoral 
R&D activities within the field of bioterrorism diagnostics and have improved the 
laboratory response networks and interagency cooperation. 
3. Laboratory infrastructure and communication 
Interagency and multi-sectoral laboratory cooperation requires a well developed 
infrastructure in terms of (i) communication and IT-systems, (ii) facilities, (iii) 
instruments/equipments and (iv) staff. A solid interagency cooperation of the public health 
laboratories, veterinary, agriculture, military, and water- and food-testing laboratories 
infrastructure must be based on strategic plans. These plans must facilitate building 
integrated response architectures and the promotion of coordination. Various tools, such as 
discrete event simulation modeling (Hupert et al., 2002) and information infrastructure tools 
(Kun et al., 2002) are useful in developing the interagency cooperation for laboratory 
bioterrorism preparedness. 
Communication and IT-systems. The laboratory infrastructure must include services to 
inform and communicate accurate diagnostic data at different levels (Zarcone et al., 2010). A 
key element for bioterrorism preparedness is information exchange and diseases outbreaks 
reporting (Horton et al., 2002). Surveillance systems are crucial for early warning of 
biothreat agents and a coordinated information infrastructure between surveillance and 
laboratory activities is needed. It has been found that there is a need for coordination 
between syndromic and laboratory based surveillance (Sintchenko et al., 2009). The 
diagnostic response strategies must simultaneously fit both the epidemiological and 
criminal investigations and ongoing activities to improve capabilities to share electronic 
laboratory diagnostic data (Zarcone et al., 2010). Rational communication procedures are a 
key mechanism to effective bioterrorism preparedness (Pien et al., 2006). Appropriate and 
secure communication tools are especially important in the alarm chain allowing police and 
first responders to contact public and animal health official in terms of covert and overt 
bioterrorism incident (Holmdahl et al,. 2011). In addition, it is important to facilitate 
communication between clinicians, sentinel laboratories and US LRN reference laboratories. 
A failure to communicate information may lead to delayed detection and a greater pressure 
to handle the incident (Pien et al., 2006). An important infrastructure feature is data 
handling and electronic information sharing. The US LRN includes approximately 1200 
users which require a central point of contact (Morse, 2003). To securely share standard 
laboratory results between laboratories, LRN Results Messenger (LRN RM) has been 
established (CDC, 2007). The need for sharing data was clearly identified during the anthrax 
letter incident in 2001. Approximately 125,000 samples and more than 1 million tests were 
reported during the event (CDC, 2007). The lack of efficient data sharing tools made it 
difficult for the laboratories to share data. Laboratory results are critical during an outbreak 
and they facilitate the decision making. Therefore, to support early detection and response 
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150 LRN laboratories including public health, military, federal, food, veterinary and 
international labs (CDC, 2007). It allows storage and sharing of tests results for biological 
LRN assays. In addition, the data management supports electronic reporting of proficiency 
testing results and the ability of laboratories to review their test results and their 
performance. 
Facilities and laboratories. To respond to human, animal and plant biothreat agents a 
number of laboratory facilities are needed; e.g. clinical laboratories, animal laboratories, 
plant laboratories, environmental laboratories, military laboratories and forensic 
laboratories. Most biothreat agents, which are also select agents (CDC) (APHIS), require 
various biosafety levels due to their pathogenic characteristics. According to work biosafety 
regulations agents such as Variola major (smallpox) and viral hemorrhagic fevers (Ebola, 
Marburg, etc) requires work at Biosafety Level 4 (BSL-4). Other agents such as Bacillus 
anthracis, Fransicella tularensis, and Yersinia pestis require BSL-3 laboratories. Foot and Mouth 
Disease virus (FMD), which is an animal pathogen, also requires a BSL-3 laboratory. In total, 
there are various laboratory levels such as BSL-2, BSL-3, BSL-4 and BSL-2 and BSL-3 animal 
facilities. All of these facilities have various design features and each facility has to fulfill 
different functional and operational goals. 
 
Fig. 1. The US Laboratory Response Networks in terms of operational components; National 
laboratories to perform definitive characterization, Reference laboratories to perform 
confirmatory testing and Sentinel labs to recognize and rule-out (Nauschuetz, 2005). 
Instruments/equipments. The laboratories must be equipped with appropriate and 
evaluated instruments that also are operational in a BSL-3 or BSL-4 laboratory. The interior 
of these labs must also be designed for different chemical and gas decontamination 
methods. Many BSL-3 and BSL-4 laboratories are composed of stainless steel to allow 
decontamination work of highly pathogenic microorganisms, which require the highest 
level of cleanliness and durability. Proper biosafety cabinets, autoclaves, glove boxes and 
ventilation systems must continuously be monitored and tested. A lot of work in these 
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laboratories is based on traditional methods such as labor intensive cultivation, autopsy and 
necropsy. However, there is a need to have alternative methods for complementary tests 
such as molecular based instruments in a BSL-3 level or BSL-4 environment. It is therefore 
important to evaluate computers, DNA extraction robots and PCR equipment from an 
operational point of view for these laboratories. 
 
Fig. 2. The unique potassium iodide KI-discus-test, to validate a class II safety cabinet with a 
DNA isolation robot in a BSL-3 laboratory. The KI discus test is defined in the European 
Standard for microbiological safety cabinets, EN12469:2000 as a test method for validating 
the operator protection capabilities of the cabinet (Photo: SVA). 
Staff. Having trained personnel is critical for the overall bioterrorism preparedness effort 
(Barden, 2002) and leadership (Marshall et al., 2010). Additional training and education is 
necessary to work in BSL-3 and BSL-4 labs. Minimum requirements in terms of general 
biosafety training include definitions of biological and bio-hazardous materials, risk 
groups, biosafety containment levels, controls and protective clothing including staff at 
sentinel laboratories (Wagar et al., 2010). Various training courses are available and one 
example is a Bioterrorism Preparedness Training for LRN Sentinel Laboratories offered by 
the National Laboratory Training Network (NLTN, 2011). It is important to have training 
on various diagnostic methods as well as training related to biosafety and biosecurity 
(Kalish et al., 2009). Joint laboratory exercises are used to evaluate the laboratory 
organization. Education is also crucial in the other sectors such as veterinary laboratories 
(Lowenstine et al., 2006). 
4. Laboratory standards, certification and methods 
Many regulations, practices, programs and inspections have to be met and/or fulfilled to 
be allowed to work on biothreat agents. This requires inspections at organizational-, 
facility- and personnel level. The regulations and inspections differ from country to 
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and transfer of specific biological agents and the program promotes laboratory safety and 
security (CDC, 2010). Other countries such as the United Kingdom, France, Denmark, 
Japan, Australia and Canada also have programs for governing facilities and personnel 
working on biothreat agents (NCBI, 2009). The Biological Weapon Convention (BTWC) 
(UN, 1972) and the United Nations Security Council (UNSCR1540, 2004) states that each 
nation should take action to implement national measures to avoid misuse of biological 
agents. However, other groups also exist. One example is the Australian Group, which is 
an informal forum of countries which seeks to ensure that exports do not contribute to the 
development of biological weapons (AG, 2010). These various programs and conventions 
to avoid misuse of biological agents shall be considered for laboratories working on 
biothreat agents. 
Laboratory standards. In 2004 the World Health Organization (WHO) published the latest 
edition of their biosafety manual (WHO, 2004). After publication of this manual, WHO 
continued to work and in 2006 they published the Biorisk Management: Laboratory Biosecurity 
Guidance (WHO, 2006). This guide integrates biosafety and biosecurity. The European 
Committee for Standardization/Comité Européen de Normalisation (CEN) has continued to 
work on the WHO Biorisk management standard, and in 2008 CEN published Laboratory 
Biorisk Management Standard CWA 15793:2008 (CEN, 2008). The biorisk management 
standard provides guidance to an organization to identify, monitor and control laboratory 
biosafety and biosecurity in order to ensure that organizations are well prepared to respond 
if biological agents are released or go missing. 
Laboratory certification. For laboratories working on biothreat, BSL-3 and BSL-4 agents, it is 
important to have a certified laboratory to confirm that the organization and facility is 
working with the highest and most appropriate standards. For this reason the organization 
must operate within international guidelines and national regulations. Facilities working on 
biothreat agents require laboratory or personnel certification (Gottron, 2011). The laboratory 
certification process of BSL3- and BSL-4 laboratories involves compliance with a number of 
criteria in terms of bisafety and biosecurity. For instance, it includes a systematic review of 
safety processes within the laboratory such as personal protective equipment, building and 
system integrity and standard operating procedures (SOPs). It also includes administrative 
documentation and record retention systems. Therefore, to respond to a bioterrorism 
incident a laboratory certification process will form the basis for a well prepared and 
appropriate laboratory capability.  
Laboratory methods and harmonized protocols. Harmonized methods and protocols are 
extremely important for multisectoral cooperation (Hodges et al., 2010). This means that 
standard protocols and reagents must be used to confirm tests. These activities can differ 
from country to country. To allow development of standardized and validated methods for 
detection and identification of biothreat agents, proficiency testing and ring trials by 
sending samples to different laboratories are required. For this reason a Critical Reagents 
Program (CRP) has been established in the US. The CRP collection includes inactivated 
antigens of select agent, genomic materials from biothreat agents and monoclonal and 
polyclonal antibodies of biothreat agents (CRP, 2011). This is a key component of laboratory 
preparedness as shortages of critical reagents will significantly influence the response 
testing (APHL, 2006). Based on validated reagents new methods can be developed, 
evaluated and tested (Donoso Mantke et al., 2005). The LRN laboratories use standardized 
protocols and reagents to detect and identify biothreat agents. The standardized protocols 
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are developed in such a manner that they contain information for chain-of-custody 
requirements.  
5. Development of diagnostic response strategies 
Law enforcement and public health must plan together to develop diagnostic response 
strategies for overt and covert bioterrorism incidents. This involves joint efforts to: (i) 
follow-up on lessons learned from previous incidents; (ii) scenario planning, training and 
exercises; (iii) R&D activities; and (iv) validate and implement methods in response plans. 
Methods for detection and identification of microorganisms and toxins forms the basis 
(Skinner et al., 2009) (Musshoff et al., 2009). 
Lessons learned from bioterrorism incidents and biocrimes. Several bioterrorism incidents 
and biocrimes have taken place, which have provided important lessons learned. For 
example, some more well known cases includes a salmonellosis outbreak in Oregon, a 
shigellosis outbreak in Dallas, the anthrax attacks of 2001 (amerithrax) and the the Aum 
Shinrikyo’s attempt to develop biological weapons. The first case, the source of the 1984 
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salmonellosis outbreak in The Dalles, Oregon, was puzzling beacuse the epidemiological 
investigation revealed multiple items of food were involved instead of a single suspect item 
(Table 1). In total, 751 salmonellosis cases were identified and 45 persons were hospitalized. 
This was a deliberate outbreak perpetrated by members of the Rajneeshee cult. The cult 
legally obtained Salmonella Typhimurium ATCC 14028 and spread cultures of this organism 
on salad bars in area restaurants. The cause of the outbreak was found to be due to 
intentional contamination in October 1985, when the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
investigated the cult (McDade et al., 1998). The FBI together with an Oregon public health 
laboratory official found an open vial of the strain in their laboratory more than a year after 
the outbreak took place. The culture of Salmonella Typhimurium ATCC 14028 found at the 
Rajneeshees farm was identical and indistinguishable from the outbreak strain that was 
isolated from clinical specimens and food items. The retrospective epidemiology was 
consistent and the deliberate contamination of the salad bars was confirmed (Torok et al., 
1997). The case demonstrated the need for having joint cooperation between law 
enforcement and public health investigations. In addition, the case showed that many 
different food items and matrices may be responsible for a deliberate foodborne outbreak 
challenging the diagnostic capabilities. Various sample preparations methods for the 
different food items and food matrices will be needed. 
In 1993 the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo cult released aerosolized spores of B. anthracis on two 
occasions. The first event took place in June when the cult sprayed B. anthracis from the roof 
of a building in downtown Tokyo. A month later the cult sprayed B. anthracis from a moving 
truck onto and around the Imperial Place and the Japan’s parliament building in Tokyo 
(Dembek, 2007). However, none of the attacks led to any anthrax cases. In 2001, samples 
collected from the exterior of the exposed buildings in Tokyo were analyzed and it was 
found that the B. anthracis isolates were similar to the Sterne 34F2 strain, which is the strain 
used in animal vaccines for anthrax and is regarded as nonpathogenic for 
immunocompetent individuals. The release of this strain had little possibility of causing 
harm or death (Takahashi et al., 2004). From this incident one can learn that environmental 
sampling and proper storage is important. It also showed that microbial forensics is 
important as it enabled the investigators to identify the strain of B. anthracis released 8 years 
after the incident (Keim et al., 2001). 
During the period between October 29th and November 1, 1996, 13 workers at a clinical 
laboratory in Dallas, Texas developed acute and severe diarrhea after consumption of 
muffins or doughnuts (Carus, 2001). The pathogen Shigella dysenteriae type 2 was isolated 
from stool samples from the infected workers. This pathogen is uncommon and no other 
shigellosis outbreaks occurred in the US at that time. Furthermore, no work on Shigella had 
taken place at that clinical laboratory. However, an examination of the freezer in the clinical 
laboratory showed some evidence of tampering with reference cultures of S. dysenteriae type 
2. In August 1997, a laboratory technician was convicted of deliberately infecting coworkers 
with Shigella dysenteriae type 2 and sentenced to 20 years in prison (Everett, 2002). The 
laboratory and epidemiological investigations revealed a match of the laboratory strain to 
those isolated from food and clinical specimens. The tracing and epidemiological study was 
helped by the fact that only postproduction adulteration of the baked muffins and 
doughnuts could have resulted in their successful contamination. 
On October 4, 2001, shortly after 9/11, an inhalation anthrax case was reported in a 63-old 
male in Florida (Fennelly et al., 2004). Subsequently, additional persons were identified who 
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were infected with B. anthracis. Before the end of 2001, 22 cases of anthrax and 5 deaths had 
been reported. All of the anthrax cases were among postal workers or persons who had been 
in contact with contaminated mail. Exceptional collaboration was required from the 
different agencies involved. This event emphasized the importance of conducting public 
health and criminal investigations at the same time. The LRN served as a resource for 
identifying the agent in both environmental and clinical samples. An important lesson 
learned from this outbreak is that fine particles of a biological agent can become airborne, 
thus contaminating areas and placing persons at a risk and the need of microbial forensic 
(Dance, 2006). 
There are many lessons to be learned from these incidents. Different types of attackers such 
as extremist groups and lone wolves have been involved. In addition, these incidents 
necessitate that forensic and epidemiological investigations occur at the same time. For 
example, to provide the link between isolates from clinical and various environmental and 
food samples with the person responsible for the deliberate spread. The need for multiple 
response teams has also been identified as a lesson learned. 
Preparedness scenarios, training and exercises: The use of planning and preparedness 
scenarios between public health and law enforcement organizations will contribute to 
developing diagnostic response strategies. Different software tools are available for different 
preparedness applications. Over the last 10 years, various scenarios have been developed 
and used for different purposes. Modeling and bioterrorism scenarios have been used to 
evaluate responses to attacks with different agents causing diseases such as anthrax (Zaric et 
al., 2008), (Hupert et al., 2009), Foot and Mouth Disease (Schoenbaum et al., 2003), and Q-
fever (Pappas et al., 2007), as well as decision making (O'Toole et al., 2001) and Bayesian 
approaches for estimating bioterror attacks (Ray et al., 2011). Different scenarios and 
exercises have been used to improve various counter measures such as a local bioterrorism 
exercise (Hoffman et al., 2000), an exercise on threat assessment and quantitative risk 
assessment (Zilinskas et al., 2004), and an exercise training bioterrorism surveillance system 
(Berndt, 2003). Because there are a number of published models and scenarios available 
these can be used to develop and improve scenarios to challenge diagnostic response 
strategies in terms of coordination, capabilities and capacity. Results and output from these 
scenarios, training and exercises can be used to initiate new R&D activities. 
R&D activities. Joint R&D activities between first responders, forensic institutes and 
public health officials will contribute to developing appropriate methods. However this 
requires strategic planning and a laboratory infrastructure. Many R&D activities are 
performed in a specific sector, such as public health, animal health, food safety and law 
enforcement. Over the last few years joint diagnostic methods have been developed to 
counter bioterrorism. However, a lot of research has been performed without questioning 
the different diagnostic end-users at local, regional or national level and lessons learned 
from incidents and exercises have not always been considered. R&D activities have 
involved a broad spectra of methods such as electron microscopy (Goldsmith et al., 2009), 
new molecular methods (Casman, 2004), automated testing (Byrne et al., 2003) and 
screening (Emanuel et al., 2005), immunoassays for toxins (2008), microarray and 
multiplexing and nanotechnology methods (Menezes, 2011). Although technology has 
improved significantly since 2001 many diagnostic methods are still based on 
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based immunoassays and portable PCR-assays for biothreat detection, and local and 
sentinel public health laboratories uses traditional culture and biochemical assays, ELISAs 
and molecular-based PCR methods for biothreat identification. A problem with 
conventional detection methods are the lack of positive controls since these methods are 
based on living organisms. Rapid detection methods have been well investigated (Canton, 
2005) (Peruski et al., 2003). The most useful technology for identification of biothreat 
agents is real-time PCR. However, microarray and multiplex assays for detection of 
biothreat agents, such as Bacillus anthracis, Francisella tularensis and Yersinia pestis by using 
multiplex qPCR have recently improved (Janse et al., 2010). 
Implementation in response plans. Once new diagnostic methods are developed, they need 
to be evaluated and validated. This is an important step and requires access to reagents for 
proficiency testing and ring trial evaluations. Methods need to be validated for use in real 
incidents. The methods must also full fill requirements for forensic applications, which adds 
another aspect, see Table 2. 
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Table 2. A Bioterrorism response matrix outlining laboratory support and the 
multidisciplinary cooperation. 
6. Challenges – coordination, capability and capacity 
Diagnostic bioterrorism response strategies shall consider coordination/resilience, 
harmonization, robustness and high- resolution diagnostic tools. This includes R&D efforts 
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of multidisciplinary detection technologies related to sampling, sample preparation, 
biomarker discovery, multiplexing and high resolution diagnostic typing tools (Knutsson et 
al., 2011). Clear mandate for coordination of response mechanisms is crucial and strong 
links between early warning systems provide a basis for the diagnostic bioterrorism 
response strategies. 
Coordination – public health and forensic laboratories. Full international cooperation and 
efficient detection technologies are essential in order to respond efficiently to a bioterrorism 
event. Considering the detection needs for covert and overt bioterrorism events will require 
a broad range of analytical tools. There are many promising technologies on the market but 
still there is a need to develop emerging technologies for different end-users. This can be 
promoted by multidisciplinary cooperation between first responders, forensic institutes and 
diagnostic laboratories representing LRNs. First responders have prerequisites to use the 
technology for a rapid identification of the agent on site and at the crime scene. The 
detection technology must be user friendly and allow usage in hot, warm and cold 
emergency zones. Forensic institutes’ major interest is to maintain chain of custody and 
have methods that are validated for use in court, including methods for evaluation of the 
results given the circumstances of the case (forensic interpretation). Public and animal 
health diagnostic laboratories have in general other needs. They must have a broad range of 
diagnostic methods available for further characterization and typing of the etiological agent. 
In general, joint response teams and the coordination and back-up of different laboratories 
are therefore crucial. The decision making procedure is very important and it has been 
described that in response to bioterrorism clinicians must make decisions in 4 critical 
domains (diagnosis, management, prevention and reporting to public health) and public 
health organizations must make decisions in 4 other domains (interpretation of bioterrorism 
surveillance data, outbreak investigation, outbreak control and communication) (Bravata et 
al., 2004). Early warning and coordinated rapid detection is a backbone and therefore the 
physicians’ ability to recognize potential cases in the identification and treatment of diseases 
associated with bioterrorism is crucial (Bush et al, 2001), as well as for veterinarians (Davis, 
2004). Bioterrorism response clinicians are essential partners to LRNs (Gerberding et al., 
2002) and especially at sentinel laboratories (Pien et al., 2006). Examples of the importance of 
the clinicians work is clearly documented (Maillard et al., 2002) (Harris et al., 2011) and also 
the consequences if the diseases is not identified (Harris et al., 2011). 
Capability and harmonization. To announce, for instance an anthrax outbreak (Sternberg 
Lewerin et al., 2010), and to make a declaration of an incident, decision makers needs 
validated methods. Standardized and validated PCR assays for high risk agents, such as B. 
anthracis (Wielinga et al., 2011) (Scarlata et al., 2010) and C. botulinum neurotoxin (Fenicia et 
al., 2011) are fundamental for confirming disease outbreaks. The methods should be tested 
in different countries and in different types of laboratories.  
Capacity and robustness. Initial sampling and rapid detection is crucial (Leport et al., 2011). 
However, feed, food, environmental and clinical samples all contains components that may 
inhibit the analysis (e.g., PCR-inhibitors). Appropriate sampling (Knutsson et al., 2003) and 
pre PCR processing strategies are therefore needed in order to circumvent inhibition. For 
this purpose models to investigate PCR inhibition is an important step to study and evaluate 
prior to applying a method for a specific purpose (Knutsson et al., 2002) (Knutsson et al, 
2002). Another important function is to have a laboratory surge capability in different areas 
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Fig. 3. Up-scaling capabilities by the use of automated DNA extractions robot in a BSL-3 
laboratory (Photo: SVA). 
High-resolution diagnostic tools. Multiplexing strategies for detection of several 
biomarkers (Lindberg et al., 2010), as well as various molecular typing methods are useful 
for crime scene investigation, but also for tracing and tracking the deliberate contamination. 
The use of massive parallel sequencing will be useful to study strain isolates from a 
suspicious deliberate contamination event. By applying bioinformatics it is possible to 
rapidly analyze large amounts of sequence data with minimal post-processing time 
(Segerman et al., 2011).  
7. Conclusions 
To obtain diagnostic bioterrorism response strategies a number of issues must be solved 
including strategic planning, laboratory infrastructure and standards. The laboratory work 
has to be strongly linked to different early warning and surveillance systems. Multiple 
teams as well as joint laboratory protocols are also important resources to have in place. The 
development of diagnostic bioterrorism response strategies should be based on lessons 
learned from previous attacks/incidents, planning scenarios, R&D activities and validation 
and implementations of methods. Laboratories must be able to detect, identify, respond and 
recover from covert and overt bioterrorism incidents. Key recommendations include:  
 Multisectoral and international laboratory cooperation to obtain rapid detection and 
identification of biothreat agents 
 Robust sampling and laboratory capacity for high-throughput needs 
 Laboratory capabilities for diagnostic characterization needs 
 Efficient IT-systems for sharing of data 
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1. Introduction 
A bioterrorism attack- is the deliberate release of biological agents such as viruses, 
bacteria, or toxins used to cause illness or death in people, animals, or plants (CDC). 
These agents are typically found in nature, but it is possible that they could be changed to 
increase their ability to cause disease, make them resistant to current therapeutics, or to 
increase their ability to be spread into the environment. Biological agents can be spread 
through the air, through water, or in food. Terrorists may use biological agents because 
they can be extremely difficult to detect and may not cause illness for several hours to 
several days. Some bioterrorism agents, like Variola major and Yersinia pestis, can be 
spread from person to person, while others e.g. Bacillus anthracis are not (Bioterrorism 
review, 2009). Biological agents make attractive weapons because they are relatively easy 
to obtain and carry from place to place, can be easily dispersed, and can cause widespread 
fear and panic beyond the actual physical damage they can cause. Many of the agents that 
could be used for bioterrorism have been divided into three categories A, B, and C, for 
public health preparedness based on various characteristics of the microbes or the 
diseases they cause.  
Category A includes the most "dangerous" and highest priority for public health 
preparedness. Some of these pathogens can be transmitted from person-to-person, cause 
diseases with a high mortality rate and are likely to cause public panic and social disruption. 
Category A agents include B. anthracis (anthrax), Variola major (smallpox), Francisella 
tularensis (tularemia), Y. pestis (plague), Clostridium botulinum neurotoxin (botulism), and 
Viral hemorrhagic fever viruses (e.g. arenaviruses, filoviruses, bunyaviruses, and 
flaviviruses).  
This chapter will discuss the Category A agent Y.pestis,the disease it causes,and recent 
efforts to develop vaccines.  
Plague, a zoonotic disease caused by the gram-negative bacillus Y. pestis is primarily a 
disease of rodents, with transmission occurring through infected fleas. Human disease is 
acquired through rodent flea vectors, as well as respiratory droplets from animal to humans 
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acquired through rodent flea vectors, as well as respiratory droplets from animal to humans 





2. History of plague 
The first reported pandemic of plague has been referred to as the “Great Plague of 
Justinian” (Sticker, 1908; Hirst,1953). This pandemic began around 532 AD in Egypt and 
spread through the Middle East and the Mediterranean basin, reaching Turkey, 
Constantinople, Greece, Italy, and the territories of France and Germany. The second 
pandemic, which is also known as the Black Death, began in 1334 in China and then spread 
westward along the trade routes to the Black Sea and eventually to Constantinople. The 
disease, which spread slowly and inevitably from village to village by infected rats and 
humans, or more quickly from country to country by ships, eventually killed 20 to 30 
million people in Europe (Gottfried,1983). The third pandemic probably originated in the 
Chinese province of Yunnan around 1855 and spread to the southern coast of China, causing 
several smaller outbreaks. Larger epidemics occurred when the disease finally reached 
Canton and Hong Kong in 1894, thus marking the beginning of the third pandemic. Plague 
spread rapidly throughout the world through all inhabited continents, except Australia. 
Rats aboard the faster steamships that had replaced slow-moving sailing vessels in 
merchant fleets carried the disease. Between 1894 and 1903, plague entered 77 ports on 5 
continents. During the early years of the third pandemic, the death toll in India and China 
alone was 12 million. In United State, plague was introduced in 1900. Between 1900 and 
1924, most plague cases in the U.S. occurred in port cities along the Pacific and Gulf coasts 
(Link, 1955). More recently, a plague epidemic caused the death of several hundred 
residents in the Surat city of India between September and October 1994 (Perry and 
Fetherstone 1997). 
The recent increase in the number of human plague cases together with the reappearance of 
epidemics in countries such as Malawi, Mozambique, and India has led to its designation by 
WHO as a re-emerging infectious disease (World Health Organization 2002, World Health 
Organization 2003). As of 30 July 2010, the Ministry of Health in Peru confirmed a total of 17 
cases of pneumonic plague in Ascope province of Department La Libertad. The onset of 
symptoms for the last reported case of pneumonic plague was on 11 July 2010. During the 
investigations, 10 strains of Y. pestis were isolated from humans, rodents and domestic cats. 
In 2009, the Chinese Ministry of Health, reported a cluster of pneumonic plague cases in the 
remote town of Ziketan, Qinghai province. The first case was a 32 year old male herdsman, 
who developed fever and haemoptysis. Between 1990 and 2005, a total of 107 cases of 
plague were reported in the U.S.(Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2006). 
Recently there have been reports of 14 deaths potentially due to pneumonic plague in 
Madagascar (http://www.promed mail.org). 
2.1 Plague as a biological weapon 
In 1346, during the siege of Kafa (now Feodossia, Ukraine) the attacking Tartar forces 
catapulted the bodies of warriors who had died of plague into the besieged city as a 
weapon. It has been speculated that this operation may have been responsible for the advent 
of the Black Death in Europe (Wheelis, 2002; Lederberg, 2001). In World War II, Unit 731 of 
the Japanese army, developed plague-infected fleas in China resulting in outbreaks of 
plague (Harris, 1994). Later, to eliminate dependency on the flea vector, the U.S. and the 
Soviet Union biological weapons programs developed methods to aerosolize Y.pestis. The 
World Health Organization (WHO) has estimated that, if 50 kg of Y. pestis were released as 
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an aerosol over a city of 5 million people, 150,000 would get pneumonic plague infection of 
which 36,000 would die (WHO 1970). The plague bacilli would remain viable as an aerosol 
for 1 hour for a distance of up to 10 km.  
3. Clinical characteristics of plague 
Plague can be broadly classified into three forms: 
3.1 Bubonic plague 
This is the classic form of the disease, which is characterised by swollen lymph nodes called 
buboes. Common symptoms are fever, headache, and chills occurring within 2 to 6 days of 
exposure to the organism either by flea bite or by contamination of open wounds with 
infected material. Gastrointestinal complications such as nausea, vomiting, and diarrhoea 
are common (Iteman et al., 1993, von Reyn et al., 1977). Buboes typically occur in the 
inguinal and femoral regions but may also occur in other regions of the body (Butler, 1989; 
Conrad et al., 1968). Bacteraemia or secondary plague septicaemia is frequently seen in 
patients with bubonic plague (Gage et al., 1992). In humans, the mortality of untreated 
bubonic plague is approximately 60%, but this is reduced to less than 5% with prompt, 
effective therapy.  
3.2 Septicaemic plague 
Primary septicaemic plague occurs mainly in patients with positive blood cultures but no 
palpable lymphadenopathy. Clinically, septicaemia caused by Y.pestis resembles that caused 
by other gram-negative bacteria. Common symptoms include chills, headache, malaise, and 
gastrointestinal disturbances. Patients with septicaemic plague are more likely to experience 
abdominal complications than compared those with  bubonic plague. Even with treatment, the 
mortality of septicaemic plague may range from 30 to 50% (Crook and Tempest 1992, Hull et 
al., 1987, Poland and Barnes, 1979); untreated septicemic plague is virtually 100% fatal. 
3.3 Pneumonic plague 
Pneumonic plague is an infection of the lungs due to either inhalation of the organism (i.e., 
primary pneumonic plague), or dissemination to the lungs via the blood stream (i.e., 
secondary pneumonic plague). Pneumonic plague is the only form of the disease which is 
readily spread from person to person via respiratory droplets through close contact (2 to 5 
ft) with an infected individual. It progresses rapidly from a flu-like illness to pneumonia 
with coughing and the production of bloody sputum. The incubation period for primary 
pneumonic plague is between 1 and 3 days. The last case of pneumonic plague in the U.S., 
resulting from person-to-person transmission occurred during the 1924 - 1925 epidemic in 
Los Angeles (Meyer, 1961). Between 1970 and 1993, 12% of U.S. plague patients developed 
pneumonia secondary to either the bubonic or septicemic form of the disease (Doll, 1994); In 
recent decades, 28% of human plague cases resulting from exposure to infected domestic 
cats in the U.S. presented as primary pneumonic plague. The mortality rate for untreated 
pneumonic plague is nearly 100%. Recent data from Madagascar epidemic indicates that 
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plague (Harris, 1994). Later, to eliminate dependency on the flea vector, the U.S. and the 
Soviet Union biological weapons programs developed methods to aerosolize Y.pestis. The 
World Health Organization (WHO) has estimated that, if 50 kg of Y. pestis were released as 
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The genus Yersinia, a member of the family Enterobacteriaceae, consists of eleven species, of 
which three are pathogenic for humans: Y. pestis; Y. pseudutuberculosis and Y. enterocolitica. Y. 
pestis, is a gram-negative, non-motile, non-spore forming coccobacillus measuring 0.5 to 0.8 
µm in diameter and 1 to 3 µm in length. The organism grows at 4 to 400 C with optimum 
growth at 28 to 30 0 C; the optimum pH range is 7.2 to 7.6 but extreme pH (5 to 9.6) can be 
tolerated (Brubaker, 1972; Holt et al., 1994; Poland and Barnes, 1979; Poland et al., 1994). The 
lipopolysaccharide of Y.pestis is characterized as rough, possessing core components but 
lacking the extended O-group side chains. There is no true capsule; however, a 
carbohydrate-protein surface component, termed capsular antigen or fraction 1 (F1) is 
produced during growth above 330C (Barnes and Quan, 1992; Brubaker et al., 1972; Poland 
et al., 1994).Three biotypes (or biovars) of Y. pestis can be differentiated based on the 
conversion of nitrate to nitrite and fermentation of glycerol: Antiqua, Orientalis and 
Mediaevalis. Biotype Antiqua is positive for both characteristics, bitype Orientalis converts 
nitrate to nitrite but does not ferment glycerol, and biotype Mediaevalis ferments glycerol but 
does not form nitrite. Strains of the three biotypes exhibit no difference in their virulence or 
pathology in animals or humans (Brubaker et al., 1972; Poland et al., 1979). It is thought that 
Antiqua was responsible for the First Pandemic, Mediaevalis for the Second Pandemic, and 
Orientalis for the Third Pandemic. The majority of Y. pestis strains contain three virulence 
plasmids of 9.5, 70 to 75, and 100 to 110 kb (Ben-Gurion and Shafferman, 1981; Ferber and 
Brubaker, 1981; Filippov et al., 1990). In strain KIM and its derivatives, these plasmids are 
referred to as pPCP1 (pesticin, coagulase, plasminogen activator), pCD1 (calcium 
dependence), and pMT1 (murine toxin). 
4.1 Life cycle 
Plague primarily affects rodents. Transmission between rodents is associated with their 
fleas. While infection can occur by direct contact or ingestion, these routes do not normally 
play a role in the maintenance of Y. pestis in animal reservoirs. The rat flea (Xenopsylla 
cheopis), the classic vector for plague, ingests blood from an infected rodent (Hinnebusch 
and Schwan 1993). A bacterial load of 104 CFU/ml of rodent blood would ensure ingestion 
of at least 300 Y. pestis organisms. Y.pestis is cleared by some fleas but multiplies in the 
midgut (stomach) of others. Two days after an infected blood meal, the stomach exhibits 
clusters of brown specks containing Y. pestis. These develop into cohesive dark brown 
masses containing bacilli, a fibrinoid-like material, and probably hemin which extend 
throughout the stomach and into the proventriculus and esophagus. By 3 to 9  days after the 
infected blood meal, the bacterial masses may completely block the proventriculus, extend 
into the esophagus, and prevent newly ingested blood from reaching the stomach. As the 
hungry flea repeatedly attempts to feed, the blood sucked from the mammal mixes with 
bacilli and is regurgitated into the mammalian host (Bacot, 1914; Bacot, 1915; Bahmanyar, 
1976; Bibikova 1977; Cavanaugh 1971, 1956). At higher environmental temperatures (> 28 to 
300 C), blockage of fleas decreases and clearance of the infection increases, possibly due to 
the temperature regulation of hemin storage and/or Pla protease. (Burroughs, 1947; 
Cavanaugh, 1971; Cavanaugh, 1980; Kartman, 1969). The normal digestive process of fleas 
involves maintaining the blood meal as a liquid, which is subsequently degraded primarily 
by proteolytic enzymes (Wigglesworth, 1984). The fate of the blocked flea is death from 
starvation and dehydration (Bacot, 1914; Bibikova, 1977).   
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Y. pestis spreads from the site of the flea bite to the regional lymph nodes and multiplies, 
resulting in the formation of primary and sometimes secondary buboes (swollen lymph 
node). The bacilli can spread into the bloodstream (bacteremia), where they are 
preferentially removed by the spleen and liver. Growth of the organisms continues in the 
blood, liver, and spleen and eventually spreads to other organs (Pollitzer, 1954). 
Development of a bacteremia of sufficient degree and duration is essential for effective 
transmission in nature. Infection of the flea via the blood from a bacteremic rodent 
completes the cycle. If bubonic plague progresses to the pneumonic form in humans, the 
potential for respiratory droplet spread and a primary pneumonic plague epidemic occurs 
(Poland and Barnes, 1979; Poland et al., 1994). This type of epidemic is currently uncommon 
due to the advent of effective antibiotics and modern public health measures. 
5. Diagnosis 
Clinical diagnosis of disease is based on patient symptoms and exposure history. Bubonic 
plague is characterized by painful, swollen lymph node(s), fever, and a history of exposure 
to fleas, rodents, or other animals. It is very difficult to diagnose septicemic plague without 
a blood culture because of its resemblance to other gram-negative septicemias. Likewise, 
pneumonic plague has been mistaken for other pulmonary syndromes (Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention. 1994). Recent data indicate that pneumonic plague should be 
suspected in symptomatic persons with a history of exposure to infected pets, especially cats 
(Craven et al., 1993; Doll et al., 1994; Gage et al., 1992).  
Specimens for laboratory diagnosis include blood, bubo aspirates, and sputum, which can be 
stained with Gram, Giemsa, Wright, or Wayson stain (Poland et al., 1979). A positive 
fluorescent-antibody assay directed against purified F1, a capsular antigen expressed 
predominantly at 370 C can be used as presumptive evidence of a Y. pestis infection (Du and 
Forsberg, 1995; Poland et al., 1979). To confirm a diagnosis of plague by bacteriological means, 
it is necessary to isolate the organism. Other methods for diagnosing plague include: enzyme 
linked immunosorbent assays (ELISA) (Cavanaugh et al., 1979; Williams et al., 1984), 
polymerase chain reaction (PCR) assays (Norkina OV 1994), and DNA hybridization 
(McDonough et al., 1988). ELISAs have been used to measure levels of either F1 antigen or 
antibodies to F1 in serum (Williams et al.,1984). PCR-gel electrophoresis based methods have 
been developed for detecting Y. pestis in fleas and other specimens (Hinnebusch and Schwan, 
1993; Norkina et al., 1994, Tsukano et al., 1996). Real-time PCR assays in various formats have 
also been developed for detecting and identifying Y. pestis (Higgins et al., 1998; Iqbal et al., 
2000; Lindler and Tall, 2001; Loiez et al., 2003; Tomaso et al., 2003; Chase et al., 2005; Woron et 
al., 2006). Real-time PCR based methods are more specific, and require less time and labor than 
conventional PCR assays. Real-time PCR methods include SYBR Green (Saikaly et al., 2007), 
molecular beacons (Varma-Basil et al., 2004), TaqMan probes (Loiez et al., 2003; Chase et al., 
2005) and minor groove binding (MGB) probes (Skottman et al., 2007), and target specific 
sequences on the chromosome and (or) plasmids. However, PCR based diagnosis is expensive 
compared to immunoassays, which may be useful for mass screening during epidemics. 
6. Treatment 
Patients suspected of having bubonic plague should be placed in isolation until two days 
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such as streptomycin, gentamicin, oxytetracyclne, tetracycline and chloramphenicol have 
been used to treat primary infection (Meyer, 1950). Due to the toxicity associated with 
streptomycin, patients are not usually maintained on this antibiotic for the full 10-day 
course but shifted to one of the other antibiotics, usually tetracycline. The tetracyclines are 
also commonly used for prophylaxis, while chloramphenicol is recommended for the 
treatment of plague meningitis (Becker et al.,1987). Newer antibiotics have been used to 
successfully treat experimental plague infections in mice (Bonacorsi et al., 1994). Recently, 
the quinolone levofloxacin was found to be effective against Y.pestis, B.anthracis, and F. 
tularensis (Peterson et al., 2010). 
7. Immunology of Y. pestis 
Yersinia spp like many other gram-negative bacterial pathogens, employ a specialized 
secretory apparatus called the type III secretion system (TTSS) to interact with host cells 
(Cornelis et al., 1998; Cornelis, 2000). The TTSS is a multicomponent secretion apparatus that 
injects specialized proteins (effectors) into the cytosol of the host cell where they interact 
with a variety of host proteins to manipulate cellular functions to ultimately benefit the 
pathogen (Galan and Collmer, 1999). The Yersinia effector proteins called Yops– (Yersinia 
Outer membrane Proteins) and other proteins involved in the TTSS are encoded on a 70-kb 
plasmid (Cornelis et al., 1998). The functions of the Yops are currently under intense study 
and fall into two general categories: proteins facilitating the translocation of Yops into the 
host cells, and those actually secreted into the cytosol. Notably, YopD, YopB, and LcrV (low 
calcium response protein V) appear to function in the translocation of other Yops into the 
cytosol whereas YopE, YopH, YopJ (Yop P in Y. enterocolitica), YopM, YopO, and YopT 
function within the host cell. Yops are virulence factors that can interfere with phagocytosis, 
inhibit the antimicrobial oxidative burst, inhibit the production of inflammatory cytokines 
(e.g. TNF-α,), and promote apoptosis in macrophages and neutrophils (Cornelis et al.,1998, 
2000). Like TTSS effectors of other bacterial pathogens, Yops function by mimicking 
activities of host cellular proteins and either activate or inhibit cellular processes to promote 
the pathogen’s survival and replication (Staskawicz et al., 2001). 
LcrV, is an important virulence factor (Sing et al., 2002; Fields et al., 1999; Lee et al., 2000). It 
forms the tip of TTSS and helps to translocate effector proteins to host cells. LcrV can also be 
secreted into the environment (Fields et al., 1999) where it has been shown to down regulate 
host protective immune responses in an IL-10 mediated manner (Sing et al., 2002). Thus, 
pretreatment of wildtype peritoneal macrophages with recombinant LcrV (rLcrV) inhibited 
zymosan induced TNF-α production. The anti-inflammatory effect of macrophages was found 
to be IL-10 dependent because it could be reversed by neutralizing antibodies specific to IL-
10.There was no effect of neutralizing antibodies against IL-4 or TGF-β, two other cytokines 
known to inhibit inflammatory responses of macrophages (Sing et al., 2002). The cell receptors 
responsible for LcrV-induced IL-10 production were identified as CD14 and TLR2 (Sing et al., 
2002). IL-10 secretion in response to rLcrV was abrogated in CD14- and TLR2- deficient 
macrophages. Furthermore, the TLR2 stimulating region of LcrV mapped to a short N-
terminal 19 amino acid sequence (Sing et al., 2002). CD14 / TLR2 mediated production of IL-10 
by LcrV was further established by the observation that TLR2-deficient mice were more 
resistant to Y. enterocolitica infection than their wild-type parents (Sing et al., 2002). 
Y. pestis replicates extracellularly; whether its virulence relies upon intracellular replication 
remains a question of debate. Y. pestis replicates within macrophages/ dendritic cells as well as 
Recent Advancement in the Development  
of Vaccines Against Y. Pestis  – A Potential Agent of Bioterrorism 
 
89 
in vitro (Cavanaugh et al., 1959; Janssen et al., 1969; Straley et al.; 1984; Pujal et al., 2005). 
Nevertheless, detailed kinetic studies of mice infected intranasally (Lathem et al., 2005) and 
rats infected intradermally (Sebbane et al., 2005), failed to observe significant numbers of 
intracellular organisms in vivo. However, Y.pestis bacilli were detected in spleen cells and in 
CD11b-expressing macrophages when mice were infected   subcutaneously (Lukaszewski et 
al., 2005). In addition, studies of pneumonic plague in nonhuman primates have documented 
the presence of intact Y. pestis within alveolar macrophages (Finegold et al., 1969; Davis et al., 
1996). Electron microscopy confirmed the presence of alveolar macrophages containing intact 
bacilli in the lungs of aerosol-infected macaques (Finegold et al., 1969). 
Although, the growth of Y. pestis within phagocytes, plays an important pathogenic role, 
extracellular bacilli predominate during the late stages of infection although intracellular 
organisms have also been detected at that time (Finegold et al., 1969; Davis et al., 1996; 
Lukaszewski et al., 2005). These findings suggested that cells of the monocyte/macrophage 
lineage offer Y. pestis a protected intracellular niche that provides sufficient time for the 
pathogen to grow within mammals by upregulating expression of capsular F1 protein, LcrV 
and Yops (Cavanaugh et al., 1959). 
One to 4 hours after infection of macrophages, Y. pestis rapidly expresses virulence markers 
such as Yops, F1 antigen, and V antigen. By 1 to 2 days postinfection, the virulence-
associated proteins begin to paralyse host immune mechanisms by inducing apoptosis, 
suppressing the production of proinflammatory cytokines (e.g. TNF-α), inhibiting Fc 
receptor-mediated phagocytosis, and preventing neutrophil chemotaxis (Perry and 
Fetherston, 1997). Inside macrophages, Y. pestis F1 protein (fraction 1 antigen) forms a 
capsule around the bacterium. This capsule enhances resistance to engulfment by both 
macrophages and neutrophils, probably by preventing interactions of receptors that could 
facilitate uptake of the pathogen (Du et al., 2002). It was also observed that Y. pestis produces 
a less-acylated (tetra-acylated) lipid A at 37 °C, which results in poor induction of host toll-
like receptor (TLR) 4-mediated innate immune responses and ultimately poor activation of 
human macrophages (Kawahara et al., 2002; Kolodziejek et al., 2010). When Y. pestis 
KIM1001, which expresses a poorly TLR4-stimulating LPS, was modified to strongly induce 
TLR4, it became avirulent (Montminy et al., 2006). 
A fimbrial structure in Y. pestis, PsaA (pH 6 antigen) is induced at 37°C in acidic media, an 
environment similar to that of the macrophage phagolysosome (Lindler and Tal, 1993; Price 
et al., 1995). PsaA selectively binds to apolipoprotein B (apoB)-containing lipoproteins (LDL) 
in human plasma (Makoveichuk et al., 2003), which may prevent recognition by the host 
immune system (Huang XZ 2004, Makoveichuk et al., 2003). 
Infection by Y.pestis leads to a global depletion of NK cells and decreased secretion of IFN-γ, 
resulting in reduced macrophage function. These immunomodulatory effects depend on the 
effector YopM (Kerschen et al.,2004). Phagocytes (macrophages and neutrophils) are the 
main target cells of the Yops. YopH, YopE, YopT, and YopO inhibit the phagocytosis of 
Yersiniae, either by interfering with the host cell actin regulation of Rho GTPases (YopE, 
YopT, and YopO) or specifically and rapidly inactivating host proteins associated with 
signalling from the receptor to actin (YopH) (Aepfelbacher and Heesemann, 2001; 
Aepfelbacher et al., 2005; Andersson et al., 1996; Iriarte et al., 1998; Rosqvist et al., 1990). 
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in vitro (Cavanaugh et al., 1959; Janssen et al., 1969; Straley et al.; 1984; Pujal et al., 2005). 
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Yersiniae, either by interfering with the host cell actin regulation of Rho GTPases (YopE, 
YopT, and YopO) or specifically and rapidly inactivating host proteins associated with 
signalling from the receptor to actin (YopH) (Aepfelbacher and Heesemann, 2001; 
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elicited by infected cells. YopP inhibits TNF-α and IL-8 release by macrophages, and 
epithelial, and endothelial cells, respectively (Boland and Cornelis 1998). TNF-α is a potent 
proinflammatory cytokine, released by activated macrophages and plays a crucial role in 
limiting the severity of the bacterial infection. In addition to YopP, YopM interacts with 
protein kinase C-like 2 and ribosomal protein S6 kinase, which are also involved in 
proinflammatory signalling (McDonald et al., 2003). The suppression of the production of 
proinflammatory factors not only reduces the activation of NK cells and phagocytes, but 
also destroys the inflammatory environment needed for adaptive immunity. 
7.1 Current vaccine strategy 
There is a need for a safe and effective plague vaccine to counter the threat of bioterrorism. 
Researchers have been trying for more than 100 years to develop such a vaccine (Titball and 
Williamson, 2004). The first vaccine consisting of a heat-killed broth of densely grown, fully 
virulent Y. pestis was developed in 1897 (Haffkine, 1897; Taylor, 1933). This formulation was 
found to be effective against bubonic plague but had undesirable side effects, such as high 
grade fever, in the majority of human recipients and severe adverse reactions limited its 
acceptance (Taylor, 1933). This vaccine was not effective against the pneumonic form of 
disease (Taylor, 1933; Lien-Teh, 1926). Later, Meyer and colleagues (1974, 1970) developed a 
more refined whole-cell plague vaccine comprised of formalin-killed Y. pestis organisms 
suspended in a saline solution. Ultimately, a vaccine of this type was licensed and sold as 
Plague Vaccine, USP, and was used to protect U.S. military personnel against bubonic 
plague during the Vietnam War (Meyer, 1970; Cavanaugh et al., 1974). However, these 
vaccines also caused significant adverse effects, including fever, headache, malaise, 
lymphadenopathy, erythema and induration at the site of injection (Meyer KF et al., 1974). 
In addition, they generally failed to protect mice and nonhuman primates against 
pulmonary Y. pestis challenge (Titball and Williamson, 2004; Meyer et al.,1974; Meyer et 
al.,1970; Kolle  and Otto 1904).  
In 1904, Kolle and Otto showed that relatively small quantities of live-attenuated Y. pestis 
were sufficient to protect rodents. Later, Strong (1906, 1908) reported that live-attenuated 
vaccines protected humans from bubonic plague. In subsequent years, this formulation was 
used to immunize millions of people in Indonesia, Madagascar and Vietnam (Girard, 1963). 
The results suggested that these vaccines were fully protective in humans against both the 
bubonic and pneumonic form of plague (Titball and Williamson, 2004; Meyer et al., 1970; 
Girard, 1963). Unfortunately, the live attenuated vaccines were found to be unstable, 
sometimes killing experimental animals (i.e., nonohuman primates) due to the retention of 
significant virulence (Welkos et al., 2002; Meyer et al., 1970; Meyer et al., 1974; Russell et al., 
1995). In addition, they also produced frequent side effects in humans such as, debilitating 
fever, malaise and lymphadenopathy (Meyer et al., 1974). These safety concerns have 
limited the use of live-attenuated plague vaccines in the U.S. and Europe.  
Current vaccines are based on variants of a pigmentation-negative Y. pestis strain EV76. 
Strain EV76 produces a robust T-cell response that contributes to protection against 
pneumonic plague in a murine model (Sha et al., 2008). Despite safety concerns and a high 
degree of immune variability among vaccine recipients, the NIIEG line of strain EV 76 is still 
in use today (Zilinskas, 2006). However, uncertainty about the reversal of virulence makes 
the EV76 live attenuated option much less appealing than the development of new vaccines. 
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To overcome the problems associated with the EV76 strain, researchers are trying to find 
non-pathogenic substitutes by replacing it with a plasmid-expressed gene that could 
engender protection. In that context, an Escherichia coli-derived plasmid encoding the 
lipopolysaccharide LpxL, which was over-expressed in the EV76 strain, was chosen because 
of its immunogenicity and ability to activate TLR-4 (Szaba et al., 2008).  
The E.coli lpxL gene was introduced into the Y. pestis chromosome, which encodes a hexa-
acylated lipid A. LpxL is a potent TLR-4 agonist, capable of inducing a strong innate 
immune response. Immunization with this strain resulted in 100 % protection from 
subsequent subcutaneous and intranasal challenges (Sun et al., 2011). Genes for additonal 
virulence proteins such as, Ail (attachment invasion locus, also designated as OmpX), 
plasminogen activator protease (Pla), and pH 6 antigen (Psa) have been deleted in an effort 
to generate effective live attenuated vaccine strains (Felek et al., 2010). In a pneumonic 
plague model, animals infected with a ompX mutant of Y. pestis CO92 survived for two days 
longer than those infected with the parent strain (Kolodziejek et al., 2010). Moreover, Δcaf1 
mutants and ΔpsaA mutants exhibited decreased virulence in a murine infection model 
(Weening et al., 2011). In a recent study, a Δcaf1 mutant of Y. pestis CO92 was attenuated for 
virulence in a mouse model of bubonic plague but not in a pneumonic plague mouse model 
when compared to the WT CO92 strain (Sha et al., 2011). 
7.2 Subunit vaccines based on the F1, LcrV and YscF proteins 
The F1 antigen plays important role in preventing phagocytosis by macrophages. In 1952, 
Baker and colleagues purified the capsular F1 protein. F1 specific antibodies produced in 
rabbits, agglutinated plague bacilli and passively protected mice and rats following 
subcutaneous challenge with virulent Y. pestis (Baker et al., 1952). Passive transfer of F1-
specific antibodies also protected macaques against pneumonic plague (Ehrenkranz and 
Meyer, 1955). Subsequently, vaccination with recombinant F1 was shown to protect mice 
against aerosolized Y. pestis (Andrews et al., 1996). Despite this apparent success, it is now 
well established that virulent F1-negative Y. pestis strains exist (Winter et al., 1960; 
Friedlander et al., 1995; Welkos et al.,1995, Davis et al., 1996; Worsham et al., 1995). Thus, 
vaccines based solely upon F1 antigen will likely fail to protect against all strains of Y.pestis.  
The multifunctional LcrV protein is important for the virulence of Y.pestis (Brubaker et al., 
2003; Une and Brubaker, 1984; Viboud and Biliska, 2005; Heesemann et al., 2006; Bacon et al., 
1956; Janssen et al., 1963; Lawton et al., 1963, Une et al., 1984). Immunization with purified 
LcrV protected mice against subcutaneous challenge; protection was also observed following 
the passive transfer of LcrV-specific antibodies (Une T et al., 1984, Lawton et al., 1963, Une et 
al., 1984, Sato et al., 1991; Nakajima and Brubaker, 1993; Motin et al., 1994). Immunization with 
recombinant LcrV was shown to protect mice against aerosol infection with both F1-positive 
and F1-negative strains of Y. pestis (Motin et al., 1994; Price et al., 1989; Leary et al., 1995; 
Anderson et al., 1996; Anderson et al., 1998). In spite of these important findings, a vaccine 
based on LcrV alone did not fully protect against pneumonic plague, perhaps due to lack of 
cross-protective immunity against LcrV variants (Roggenkamp et al., 1997).  
YscF, a recently identified vaccine candidate, is located on the cell surface and forms the 
TTSS channel, which is required for the secretion of Yops and toxins (Allaoui et al., 1995, 
Haddix and Straley, 1992; Hoiczyk et al., 2001; Marenne et al., 2003). Immunization of mice 
with YscF resulted in a high anti-YscF titer and provided partial protection against 
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Vaccines based on recombinant F1 and LcrV provided better protection than vaccines 
comprised of either subunit alone  (Williamson et al., 1995,1996 ). F1 and LcrV formulations 
administered with the adjuvant alum provided protection in mice against pulmonary Y. 
pestis challenge (Williamson et al., 1997; Jones et al., 2000). In a similar study, investigators at 
the US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) demonstrated 
that a formulation consisting of a recombinant F1-LcrV fusion protein (rF1V) and alum 
protected mice against pulmonary challenge with either F1-positive or negative strains of Y. 
pestis (Anderson et al., 1998, Heath et al., 1998). 
Yops have also been investigated as protective antigens. Immunization of mice with 
recombinant Yops ( H, E, N, K, or M) engendered no significant protection against Y. pestis 
infection (Andrews et al., 1999; Leary et al., 1999; Nemeth et al., 1997). However, mice 
immunized with complexes of YopB, YopD, and YopE (BDE) produced high-titers of 
antibodies specific for Yop B, D, and E, and were protected against lethal intravenous 
challenge with F1- but not F1+ Y. pestis. Furthermore, mice passively immunized with anti-
BDE serum were also protected from lethal challenge with F1- Y. pestis (Ivanov et al., 2008).  
Huang et al. (2009) evaluated a vaccine consisting of a spray-freeze dried powder form of a 
recombinant F1-V fusion protein in a mouse model. The vaccine engendered an antibody 
response and provided 70-90% protection against lethal subcutaneous challenge with Y. 
pestis. Ren et al. (2009) developed a vaccine consisting of recombinant F1, and V from 
Y.pestis, and the Protective Antigen from B. anthracis (rF1 + rV+ rPA). This formulation 
protected mice from subcutaneous challenge with 107 colony-forming units (CFU) of a 
virulent Y. pestis strain, and fully protected rabbits against subcutaneous challenge with 
1.2×105 spores of virulent B. anthracis.  
CpG oligodeoxynucleotide (ODN) has been used as an adjuvant together with F1-V antigen 
to enhance its immune response in mice. CpG ODNs significantly augmented the antibody 
response even up to 5 months and increased the efficacy of the vaccine in murine model of 
bubonic and pneumonic plague (Amemiya et al., 2009).  
Immunization with flagellin and with F1-V elicited a robust humoral immune response in 
mice and two species of nonhuman primates. The flagellin-F1-V formulation fully protected 
mice against intranasal challenge with Y. pestis CO92 (Mizel et al., 2009). Oral immunization 
with cationic liposome–nucleic acid complexes (CLDC) combined with F1 antigen elicited 
protective immunity against lethal pneumonic plague in C57BL/6J. This formulation 
protected mice up to 18 weeks post vaccination. Protection mediated by oral CLDC with F1 
antigen depends primarily on CD4+ T cells, with a partial contribution from CD8+ T cells 
(Jones et al., 2010). 
Ramirez and Alejandra (2009) constructed an attenuated Salmonella Typhi strain that expressed 
the F1 antigen of Y. pestis (S. Typhi (F1)), and evaluated its immunogenicity. Newborn mice 
primed intranasally with a single dose of S. Typhi (F1) exhibited a mucosal and cellular 
immune response one week post immunization. S. Typhi(F1) enhanced the activation and 
maturation of neonatal CD11c+ dendritic cells, and MHC-II cell surface markers and the 
production of proinflammatory cytokines. The S. Typhi(F1)- based formulation improved the 
capacity of DC for antigen presentation and T cell stimulation in vitro. 
The protective efficacy of the F1 + rV270 (an LcrV variant lacking amino acid residues 271–
300) vaccines compared to that of EV76 was evaluated. The F1 + rV270 formulation was 
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tested in both guinea pigs and New Zealand White rabbits by determining the antibody 
response and protection against subcutaneous challenge with the virulent Y. pestis 141 strain 
( Qi Z et al., 2010).  
Xiao et al. (2010) developed an anti-F1-specific human monoclonal antibody (mAb) (m252) 
and anti-V-specific human mAbs (m253, m254) against the F1 and V antigens, respectively. 
These monoclonal antibodies were found to be more effective than the corresponding 
mouse antibodies. Neutralization of TNF-α and IFN-γ interfered with the protective efficacy 
of F1- or LcrV- specific antibodies against the fully virulent pgm-positive Y. pestis strain 
CO92 (Lin et al., 2010). Recently, a recombinant rF1+rV vaccine provided protection in 
Cynomolgus macaques against pneumonic plague following inhalational challenge with a 
clinical isolate of Y. pestis (CO92) (Williamson et al., 2011). 
7.3 Plant based vaccines 
The use of plant-based oral recombinant vaccines could be an alternative approach for plague 
immunoprophylaxis. However, F1 and LcrV genes expressed in recombinant plant tissue were 
relatively less immunogenic due to the lack of signals recognized by the innate immune 
system through Toll Like receptors. In one such study, Swiss-Webster mice exhibited 
significant protection following subcutaneous immunization with Nicotiana tabacum leaves that 
expressed a LcrV–F1 (F1-V) translational fusion protein on its surface (Arlen 2008). In a 
separate study, guinea pigs immunized with a transgenic Nicotiana benthamiana tobacco plant 
expressing the F1-V fusion protein were protected against a subsequent pneumonic plague 
infection (Del Prete, 2009). However, the amount of recombinant protein produced in plant-
based vectors was generally poor. To overcome this problem, the N-terminal of the γ-Zein 
protein (produced in maize and induces protein body formation) was fused with an F1-V 
fusion construct, which resulted in up to three times higher accumulation of protein in 
Nicotiana tabacum drived tissues than the F1-V fusion protein alone (Alvarez et al., 2010). Plant-
based vaccines have also been evaluated for other Category A agents such as Variola major 
virus and B. anthracis (Rigano et al., 2009). Recently, an F1-V fusion protein expressed in carrot 
tap roots and lettuce was found to be stable and immunogenic for mice. (Rosales-Mendoza et 
al., 2010a; Rosales-Mendoza et al., 2010b). 
7.4 DNA vaccine straties 
DNA vaccines have been developed as an alternative to protein-based vaccines. LcrV- and 
F1-based DNA vaccines have been developed that contain either all or part of the open 
reading frames encoding either LcrV, F1, or both. One vaccine containing a portion of LcrV 
that encoded a 127-amino acid peptide, was found to elicit a strong humoral immune 
response. Furthermore, mice immunized with this vaccine exhibited a 60% survival rate 
following challenge with Y.pestis (Vernazza. et al., 2009). A vaccine consisting of the IL-12 
coding sequence and the genes for F1 or LcrV was used to immunize mice intranasally. This 
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tested in both guinea pigs and New Zealand White rabbits by determining the antibody 
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response. Furthermore, mice immunized with this vaccine exhibited a 60% survival rate 
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to develop protective DNA vaccines (Wang et al., 2010). Immunization with the F1-V based 
DNA vaccine and the adjuvant, lymphotactin (LTN) resulted in high levels of serum IgG 
and mucosal IgA antibodies (Yamanaka et al., 2010). The LcrV based DNA vaccine elicited a 
CD8+ immune response against specific epitopes of this antigen (Wang et al., 2011). 
Immunization of mice with a DNA vaccine consisting of F1 and V and the gene encoding 
the heat-labile enterotoxin (LT) of E. coli as an adjuvant resulted in 40% protection 
(Rosenzweig et al., 2011). 
7.5 Virus vector based vaccines 
Live avirulent or attenuated recombinant viruses expressing genes encoding virulence 
antigens offer several advantages over their bacterial counterparts. Non-enveloped/ naked 
viruses may be a better vehicle for vaccine development as these viruses can be stored for a 
long time without losing their infectivity. In one such case, a recombinant vaccinia virus 
vector was used to express an F1-V fusion protein. The vaccine was orally administered to 
C57BL/6J mice and was found to protect against an inhalational challenge of ten times the 
lethal dose of Y.pestis KIM/D27. It provided 100% protection up to 45 weeks post-
immunization (Bhattacharya et al., 2010). Moreover, a recombinant raccoon pox virus 
producing F1 antigen elicited significant protection in orally immunized prairie dogs 
(Cynomys spp.) (Rocke et al., 2008). More recently, two recombinant raccoon pox viruses 
producing the F1 antigen and a 307-amino-acid truncated form of LcrV engendered a better 
humoral response and protection in both mice and prairie dogs following subcutaneous 
challenge with virulent Y. pestis CO92 (Rocke et al.,2010a, b). 
The route of immunization and booster plays an important role in the immune response and 
subsequent protection. A recombinant Vaccinia virus Ankara vector producing either the 
full-length F1 or the truncated 307 amino acid peptide form of LcrV was administered 
intramuscularly (IM). Vaccines consisting of truncated V antigen and full length F1 antigen 
provided 85% and 50% protection, respectively, against both intranasal and intraperitoneal 
challenges with Y. pestis CO92 (Brewoo et al., 2010). Recently, modified, non-replicating 
adenovirus vectors were evaluated for the development of antibodies against both the 
heavy and light chains of a previously identified anti-LcrV protective antibody. 
Surprisingly, immunized C57BL/6J male mice showed significant levels of IgG that 
persisted for up to 12 weeks and exhibited 80% protection in mice after intranasal challenge 
with a 2×104-cfu of fully virulent Y. pestis CO92 (Sofer-Podesta et al., 2009). 
Human vesicular stomatitis virus (VSV) has been evaluated as an effective vector for the 
development of a novel plague vaccine. VSV was engineered to express LcrV. Immunized 
female BALB/c mice showed strong humoral responses with an IgG2a bias dichotomy and 
exhibited 90% protection from an intranasal challenge with Y. pestis CO92 (Chattopadhyaya 
et al., 2008). These finding highlight the importance of the choice of viral-vectors in the 
development of plague vaccines. 
7.6 Synthetic vaccines based on defined B and T cell epitopes 
The concept of synthetic peptide vaccines was laid by the pioneering work of Anderer who 
demonstrated that a peptide from tobacco mosaic virus (TMV) showed immunoreactivity with 
antiserum against TMV. In addition, a peptide coupled to a carrier induced specific virus 
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precipitating and neutralizing antibodies (Deber et al., 1985). The first step in developing a 
synthetic peptide vaccine for plague is to identify the relevant antigen(s) determine their 
amino acid sequence, and identify protective B and T cell epitopes. Sabhnani and Rao (2003) 
identified the immunodominant epitopes of F1 antigen. The immunogenicity of the B cell (B1, 
B2, and B3) and T cell (T1, T2) peptides was studied in mice using alhydrogel and liposomes as 
delivery vehicles. B-T constructs of F1 antigen engendered protection in mice. PLGA (poly 
(DL-lactide-co-glycolide) microsphere delivery of B-T constructs enhanced protection (Tripathi 
and Rao, 2006). Later, several B and T cell epitopes of V antigen were identified by direct 
binding, competitive, and T cell proliferation approaches. V antigen peptides a, g and j were 
found to be  pure B cell epitopes and peptides d and k pure T cell epitopes, whereas other 
peptides b, f and i showed both B and T cell properties ( Khan and Rao, 2008). Furthermore, 
mice immunized intranasally with B-T conjugates of V antigen peptides entrapped in 
microspheres resulted in high titers of serum and mucosal IgG and IgA upto 120 day 
postimmunization. Interestingly, some of the conjugates showed enhanced protection in mice 
challenged with live bacteria (Uppada and Rao, 2009). Gupta et al. (2009) demonstrated the cell 
mediated immune response of some of the best B-T conjugates in different strains of mice. 
Surprisingly, some of the B-T conjugates of F1 and V antigen resulted in good lymphocyte 
proliferation and cytokine production in vitro as determined by ELISPOT assay. FACS analysis 
of some conjugates showed the presence of IFN-γ and perforin secreting CD4+ cells as 
compared to CD8+ T cells (Gupta et al. 2011), which demonstrated the importance of CD4+ T 
cells in conferring immunity in the host. 
8. Future perspectives 
The development of a fully protective vaccine against plague remains a challenge . A perfect 
vaccine must protect humans against all three biotypes of Y.pestis. None of the formulations 
of F1 and V based vaccines were fully protective against experimental infections. The ideal 
vaccine would  stimulate robust antibody and cell mediated immune response with respect 
to serum IgG, IgG sub classes and mucosal IgA along with Th1/ Th2 /Th17 cytokines 
correlation. These parameters could be exploited for protection studies in humans. 
Standardized procedures will facilitate human clinical trials to determine vaccine 
formulations, dosages and schedules that best prime protective responses. Incorporating 
additional antigens such as YscF into F1/LcrV-based vaccines and modifying existing 
formulations, on both the DNA and protein level, will be more effective and could lead to 
fully protective vaccine against all strains of Y.pestis. Furthermore, using different ways of 
immunization with novel delivery vehicles and adjuvants could enhance the immune 
response and efficacy of different formulations. Currently, we have extended our study by 
designing MAP (Multiple Antigen Peptide) incorporating the relevant protective epitopes of 
F1, V and YscF antigen in PLGA nanoparticles using CpG, as an adjuvant to activate Toll 
Like Receptor 9 (TLR-9) of the innate immune system (Uppada et al. 2011). This preparation 
gave a better immunogenicity profile than that of single epitope based immunogens. 
A better understanding of virulence mechanisms, host pathogen interactions that operate 
within the body and especially the lungs during infection, could provide some new 
alternative targets for vaccines and therapeutics. The focus should be on the pneumonic 
form of disease rather than the bubonic and septicemic forms. Identifying agonists of TLR-2 
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products that activate the Th1 and Th17 pathways are also beneficial to host immunity. 
However, given present concerns for bioterrorism, which may involve the release of 
aerosolized Y. pestis, there is now a greater need to explicitly characterize virulence factors 
that impact pulmonary disease. 
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1. Introduction 
Botulism is a neuroparalytic disease caused by neurotoxin produced from the bacterium 
Clostridium botulinum. The botulinum neurotoxins (BoNTs) are among the most potent 
known biological toxins and have an estimated human median lethal dose (LD50) in the 
nanogram/kilogram range. Botulinum toxins have historically been employed as biological 
weapons (BW) through state-sponsored programs in Japan, Germany, the United States, 
Russia and Iraq as well as by independent terrorist organizations. The extreme potency of 
the toxin, its persistence within affected neurons, the need for protracted intensive care, and 
the lack of an effective post-intoxication therapeutic intervention make BoNTs a potentially 
deadly offensive biological weapon.  
2. Botulinum neurotoxins as biological weapons 
2.1 Historical applications of botulinum toxins in biological warfare 
There have been reports of botulinum neurotoxin being used as an offensive weapon since 
the early 1900s. Anecdotal accounts describe the implementation of crude anaerobic 
fermenters made by burying canteens filled with water, green beans and slivers of meat to 
facilitate C. botulinum production for use against Mexican federal troops in 1910 (Carrus, 
2001). Documented state sponsored programs utilizing BoNT as a potential BW were 
reported as early as the 1930s when the military medical commander of Unit 731, General 
Shiro Ishii, confessed to feeding food contaminated with lethal cultures of C. botulinum to 
prisoners of war (Williams & Wallace, 1989). In the early 1940s, the US developed a BoNT-
based BW program in response to Allied intelligence reports that Germany was attempting 
to develop the neurotoxin as an offensive weapon to be used against an invasion force 
(Franz et al., 1997). The initial efforts of the US program were primarily directed at the 
isolation and purification of the toxin and the elucidation of the mechanism of pathogenicty 
of BoNT, then referred to as agent “X” (Cochrane, 1947). In response to the potential threat 
from Germany, over 1 million doses of a botulinum toxoid vaccine were prepared for Allied 
troops involved in the D-Day invasion in Normandy (Bryden, 1989). The 1972 Convention 
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reported as early as the 1930s when the military medical commander of Unit 731, General 
Shiro Ishii, confessed to feeding food contaminated with lethal cultures of C. botulinum to 
prisoners of war (Williams & Wallace, 1989). In the early 1940s, the US developed a BoNT-
based BW program in response to Allied intelligence reports that Germany was attempting 
to develop the neurotoxin as an offensive weapon to be used against an invasion force 
(Franz et al., 1997). The initial efforts of the US program were primarily directed at the 
isolation and purification of the toxin and the elucidation of the mechanism of pathogenicty 
of BoNT, then referred to as agent “X” (Cochrane, 1947). In response to the potential threat 
from Germany, over 1 million doses of a botulinum toxoid vaccine were prepared for Allied 
troops involved in the D-Day invasion in Normandy (Bryden, 1989). The 1972 Convention 





(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction signed by President Richard M. 
Nixon went into effect in March of 1975, effectively terminating the US BW efforts. All of the 
biological agent stockpiles created in the US offensive program, including botulinum 
neurotoxins, were destroyed. Despite being signatories on the convention, the Soviet Union 
continued not only to pursue its biowarfare program, including research on botulinum 
neurotoxins, but expanded their program during the post-Soviet era (UNSC, 1995; 
Bozheyeva et al., 1999). Botulinum toxins were reportedly one of several biological agents 
tested at the Soviet Aralsk-7 site on Vozrozhdeniye (Renaissance) Island in the Aral Sea. The 
Soviets were also believed to have attempted to use recombinant DNA technology to 
introduce BoNT genes into alternative strains of bacteria for the purpose of enhancing toxin 
production (Alibek & Handleman, 1999). Iraq, which also ratified the 1975 convention, 
reportedly also significantly expanded its biological weapons program (UNSC, 1995). After 
the Persian Gulf War, Iraq admitted to a United Nations Special Commission inspection 
team that approximately 4,900 gallons of concentrated botulinum neurotoxins had been 
produced for use in specially designed bombs, missiles and tank dispersion instruments in 
1989 (Zilinskas, 1997). Iraq maintains that no biological weapons were employed during the 
Persian Gulf War or Operation Iraqi Freedom and that its stockpiles have since been 
destroyed (Blix, 2004).  
The Japanese cult Aum Shrinkyo (now referred to as Aleph) attempted to develop both 
chemical and biological weapons after its political aspirations were defeated in the 1990 
Japanese Diet elections. Formed in 1987 by Shoko Asahara, this group developed rapidly 
and was reported to have 50,000 members and over US$ 1 billion in financial resources by 
1995 (Sugishima, 2003). The Aum executed a deadly sarin nerve gas attack in Matsumoto 
City on June 27, 1994 which killed seven people. On March 20, 1995 they perpetrated a sarin 
gas assault on a Tokyo subway which killed 12 people and injured over 1000 individuals. 
Less than a month later they attempted a cyanide gas release in a restroom of the subway’s 
Shinjuku Station. Senior Aum members obtained soil samples in an attempt to isolate toxin-
producing strains of C. botulinum. Despite the cult having members with a variety of 
scientific expertise, they are believed to have experienced difficulty cultivating toxigenic 
strains of C. botulinum and were most likely unable to produce any substantial amount of 
toxin (Sugishima, 2003; Leitenberg, 1999).  
2.2 Domestic threat targets 
The possibility of dissemination of toxins such as BoNT through municipal water supplies 
or centralized agricultural or food distribution hubs has been explored in a number of 
scenarios. There has never been a confirmed case of waterborne botulism. In 1980, 
Notermans & Havelaar reported on the stability of BoNT/A, /B and /E when introduced 
into samples of reservoir surface water, drinking water prepared by sand-filtration, and 
sterile distilled water. Toxicity was reduced 99% in just over 3 days in the surface water, 9 
days in filtered water and relatively stable in sterile distilled water. Treatment with FeCl3, 
a common coagulant processing step employed in municipal water treatments to remove 
iron, removed 75-95% of the toxins. Treatment with 1 mg of ozone per liter for 2 min 
destroyed ≥99% of the toxins and 0.3-0.5 mg/L sodium hypochlorite ablated 99% of the 
toxicity in 30 seconds. Despite the extreme potency of BoNTs, their application as a 





unsuccessful when conventional municipal water treatment methods are employed 
(Notermans & Havelaar, 1980; Wannemacher, at al., 1993). Another consideration is that 
large-capacity reservoirs undergo a relatively slow turn-over rate and so a comparably 
large inoculum of botulinum toxin would be needed (Burrows et al., 1997). Given the 
technical difficulties involved in producing such a large amount of toxin, this route seems 
unlikely. Small-scale (personal-use) water filtration systems utilizing ceramic or 
membrane filters with a 0.2 to 0.4 m pore size were found to be insufficient to effectively 
remove BoNT/B introduced into drinking water. However, a reverse osmosis device was 
found to remove BoNT levels below the detection limit of the mouse bioassay (Hörman, et 
al. 2005).  
American agriculture has been described as being “concentrated, highly accessible, 
vertically integrated” and as such, susceptible to the malicious introduction of biological 
toxins or human pathogens at processing or distribution points that would reach consumers 
before a significant threat was realized (Parker, 2002). Wein and Liu published a 
mathematical model to predict the effects of the deliberate introduction of botulinum toxin 
at various points through the nine-stage milk collection, processing and distribution 
network in the US, as it is associated with a single processing facility (Wein and Liu 2005). 
The study has a number of variables such as the amount of toxin employed, the total 
volume of the milk, the specific effect of the pasteurization process on the toxin and variable 
delivery time and consumptions rates, but all scenarios support a significant outbreak of up 
to 100,000 individuals. The report generated considerable controversy but the editors of the 
publishing journal defended the release, citing its potential contribution to developing 
defensive counter-measures as well as informing federal and state governments of the 
putative threat (Alberts, 2005). The devastating potential of an intentional bioterrorism 
attack using this avenue was illustrated in 1985 when almost 200,000 people were infected 
with an antibiotic-resistant strain of Salmonella caused by an inadvertent contamination at a 
single northern Illinois dairy processing plant (Ryan, et al., 1987).  
The potential susceptibility of centralized food distribution platforms in the US can be 
illustrated by outbreaks attributed to improper processing of mass distributed 
consumable products. In September 2006, a total of 6 individuals from 2 US states and 1 
Canadian province were admitted to local hospitals with cranial neuropathies and 
flaccid paralysis necessitating mechanical ventilation (CDC, 2007). All of the individuals 
tested positive for BoNT/A and one patient eventually died. The outbreaks were traced 
to a commercially produced carrot juice manufactured in a single plant which was 
distributed under three different brand labels. The intoxications were attributed to a 
lapse in refrigeration during transport or storage and a lack of chemical barriers to C. 
botulinum germination during processing. In the summer of 2007, 8 cases of botulism in 3 
US states led to a massive recall of canned meat products. The outbreaks were traced to 
product from a single production line in a single plant that was packaged and 
distributed under 90 different labels (NCFPD, 2008) and which necessitated the recall of 
tens of millions of cans of suspect food. While these outbreaks represent unintentional 
distribution of BoNT, they do reveal the complexity of the food production and 
distribution network in the US and how it might be compromised by a BW attack using a 
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3. Microbiology and BoNT toxicity 
3.1 The organism and its toxins 
Clostridium spp. are gram-positive, spore-forming, obligate anaerobic bacteria that are 
ubiquitous in soil and both freshwater and marine sediment (Dunbar, 1990) . BoNTs are 
produced primarily in C. botulinum but may also be produced in the closely related C. 
butyricum, C. baratii and C. argentinense (Hatheway, 1993). C. botulinum strains are 
classified into four groups (denoted I to IV) based on metabolic activity (Hatheway, 1988) 
and genetic composition (Collins, 1998; Hill et al., 2007). Group I includes type A strains 
and proteolytic strains of types B and F; Group II includes type E strains and 
nonproteolytic strains of types B and F; Group III includes nonproteolytic strains of types 
C and D; and Group IV includes only strains that produce type G. There are seven 
immunologically distinct serotypes of BoNTs designated by the letters A through G 
(BoNT/A to BoNT/G) (Smith & Sugiyama, 1988). BoNT/A, based on animal studies, has 
a lethal human dose (LD50), assuming 70 kg weight, of approximately 0.09 - 0.15 g by 
intravenous administration, 0.7 – 0.9 g by inhalation, and 70 g by oral administration 
(Scott & Suzuki, 1988; Arnon et al., 2001). The toxicity for other serotypes is unknown but 
all have been shown to uniformly fatal in animals studies. Human botulism is caused 
primarily by BoNT/A, /B and /E (Arnon et al., 2001), and rarely by BoNT/F (Barash et 
al., 2005; Gupta et al., 2005). BoNT/C and /D primarily cause botulism in animals. 
BoNT/G, produced by C. argentinense, has been associated with sudden death but not 
neuroparalytic illness in a few patients in Switzerland (Sonnabend et al., 1981). All seven 
serotypes can cause inhalational botulism in primates (Middlebrook & Franz, 1997). 
Recent characterization of an increasing number of unique BoNT subtypes has revealed 
small to significant variations at the amino acid level (Smith, et al., 2005; Hill, et al. 2007; 
Smith, et al., 2007). These variations impact binding and protection of neutralizing 
antibodies (Smith, et al., 2005) and raise concerns that they may prove problematic to the 
development of prophylactic and therapeutic agents developed against a dissimilar 
subtype. 
BoNTs are produced as a part of a protein complex in which the toxin is non-covalently 
bound to two or more protein components. This includes the well characterized 
hemagglutinins (HA) and a nontoxin, nonhemagglutinin (NTNH). The complexes can be 
distinguished on the basis of their size and serotype association and include the M-(300 kDa 
in types A-F), L-(500 kDa in serotypes A, B, C, D and G) and LL-(900 kDa in serotype A) 
forms (Collins & East, 1988). Although neither accessory protein has been implicated in the 
toxin-mediated blockade of neurotransmitter release, they are believed to protect the toxin 
against the harsh environment of the gastro-intestinal tract (Simpson, 2004). The neurotoxin 
is initially produced as a 150-kDa single-chain protoxin that is proteolytically cleaved into 
an N-terminal 50-kDa light chain (LC) and a C-terminal 100-kDa heavy chain (HC) di-chain 
that is linked by a single disulfide bond (DasGupta, 1989). The BoNT HC is further 
delineated into two domains; the N-fragment or translocation domain (Hn) and the C-
fragment or receptor-binding domain (Hc). These three domains mediate intoxication of the 
neuron in a defined tripartite mechanism. The toxin is introduced into the nerve cell by 
receptor-mediated endocytosis through binding of the Hc domain to specific ectoreceptors 
on peripheral cholinergic nerve cells (Dong et al., 2006; Rummel et al., 2007). The acidic pH 





forming a protein channel that facilitates the translocation of the LC out of the endosomal 
lumen and into the cytosol. The LC is a zinc-containing endopeptidase that target SNARE 
(soluble N-ethylmaleamide sensitive factor attachment protein receptors) proteins that form 
the synaptonemal fusion complex in a serotype dependent fashion. The SNARE protein 
SNAP-25 (synaptosomal-associated protein of 25 kDa) is cleaved at different sites by 
BoNT/A, /C, and /E, synaptobrevin (also referred to as VAMP; vesicle-associated 
membrane protein), is cleaved at different sites by BoNT/B, /D, /F, and /G, and syntaxin is 
cleaved by BoNT/C (Simpson, 2004). Proteolytic cleavage of SNARE proteins prevents the 
release of acetylcholine across the synaptic cleft of the neuromuscular junction, resulting in a 
flaccid muscle paralysis which is the primary clinical sign of botulism. 
3.2 Epidemiology 
Botulism is typically reported in four clinical categories. Foodborne botulism is caused by the 
ingestion of the pre-formed toxin in contaminated food (CDC, 1998). Most outbreaks are 
associated with home-canned foods in which inadequate processing results in C. botulinum 
spores germinating, reproducing and producing the toxin (Shapiro, et al., 1998). These 
conditions include an anaerobic environment with temperatures ranging from 4ºC to 40°C, a 
pH range from 4.6 to 7.0, and water activity greater than 0.94 (aW is intensity with which 
water associates with various non-aqueous constituents and solids) (Baird-Parker & Freame, 
1967; Stringer, et al., 2005). Despite increased educational awareness of the non-permissive 
conditions for food preparation, foodborne botulism remains a persistent threat. There were, 
on average, approximately 24 reported cases per year from 1900-2000, but there have been a 
smaller number of cases (average of 18 year) reported from 2001-2009 (CDC-NBS). In the 
period from 1950-1996, there were 444 outbreaks in which one or more cases of botulism 
from a contaminated food source was implicated. Of these outbreaks, 37.6% were caused by 
type A, 13.7% by type B, 15.1% by type E and 0.7% by type F while 32.9% of the incidents 
were caused by unidentified serotype(s) (CDC, 1998). Improvements in both differential 
diagnostic methods and the technology utilized in serotyping have resulted in a decrease in 
unidentified serotypes. In the United Stated from 1990-2000 BoNT/A was responsible for 
50% of all cases of botulism, where types B and E were responsible for 10% and 37% of the 
intoxications, respectively; only 3.6% of the cases were from an unidentified strain (CDC, 
1998).  
Infant botulism is a toxicoinfection caused by inhalation or ingestion of clostridial spores that 
can colonize and produce toxin in the intestinal tract of infants less than 12 months of age 
(Shapiro, 1998). The ability of the bacteria to thrive and elicit toxin is thought to be 
attributed in part to a deficiency in protective gastrointesintal bacterial flora and the 
relatively low levels of inhibitory bile-aid found in children under 12 months (CDC, 1998). 
This form of the disease was officially recognized in a 1976 report in which two infants 
presenting with acute infantile hypotonoia and weakness were diagnosed with botulism 
(Pickett, et al., 1976). This has been the most commonly reported form of the disease in the 
United States since 1980, with an average of approximately 80-100 cases confirmed annually 
(Shapiro, 1998). In the US between 1976 and 1996, there were 1442 individual cases of infant 
botulism reported to the CDC (CDC, 1998). Of these, 46.5% were caused by type A, 51.9% by 
type B. Interestingly, the incidence of infant botulism in the US has a geographical 





3. Microbiology and BoNT toxicity 
3.1 The organism and its toxins 
Clostridium spp. are gram-positive, spore-forming, obligate anaerobic bacteria that are 
ubiquitous in soil and both freshwater and marine sediment (Dunbar, 1990) . BoNTs are 
produced primarily in C. botulinum but may also be produced in the closely related C. 
butyricum, C. baratii and C. argentinense (Hatheway, 1993). C. botulinum strains are 
classified into four groups (denoted I to IV) based on metabolic activity (Hatheway, 1988) 
and genetic composition (Collins, 1998; Hill et al., 2007). Group I includes type A strains 
and proteolytic strains of types B and F; Group II includes type E strains and 
nonproteolytic strains of types B and F; Group III includes nonproteolytic strains of types 
C and D; and Group IV includes only strains that produce type G. There are seven 
immunologically distinct serotypes of BoNTs designated by the letters A through G 
(BoNT/A to BoNT/G) (Smith & Sugiyama, 1988). BoNT/A, based on animal studies, has 
a lethal human dose (LD50), assuming 70 kg weight, of approximately 0.09 - 0.15 g by 
intravenous administration, 0.7 – 0.9 g by inhalation, and 70 g by oral administration 
(Scott & Suzuki, 1988; Arnon et al., 2001). The toxicity for other serotypes is unknown but 
all have been shown to uniformly fatal in animals studies. Human botulism is caused 
primarily by BoNT/A, /B and /E (Arnon et al., 2001), and rarely by BoNT/F (Barash et 
al., 2005; Gupta et al., 2005). BoNT/C and /D primarily cause botulism in animals. 
BoNT/G, produced by C. argentinense, has been associated with sudden death but not 
neuroparalytic illness in a few patients in Switzerland (Sonnabend et al., 1981). All seven 
serotypes can cause inhalational botulism in primates (Middlebrook & Franz, 1997). 
Recent characterization of an increasing number of unique BoNT subtypes has revealed 
small to significant variations at the amino acid level (Smith, et al., 2005; Hill, et al. 2007; 
Smith, et al., 2007). These variations impact binding and protection of neutralizing 
antibodies (Smith, et al., 2005) and raise concerns that they may prove problematic to the 
development of prophylactic and therapeutic agents developed against a dissimilar 
subtype. 
BoNTs are produced as a part of a protein complex in which the toxin is non-covalently 
bound to two or more protein components. This includes the well characterized 
hemagglutinins (HA) and a nontoxin, nonhemagglutinin (NTNH). The complexes can be 
distinguished on the basis of their size and serotype association and include the M-(300 kDa 
in types A-F), L-(500 kDa in serotypes A, B, C, D and G) and LL-(900 kDa in serotype A) 
forms (Collins & East, 1988). Although neither accessory protein has been implicated in the 
toxin-mediated blockade of neurotransmitter release, they are believed to protect the toxin 
against the harsh environment of the gastro-intestinal tract (Simpson, 2004). The neurotoxin 
is initially produced as a 150-kDa single-chain protoxin that is proteolytically cleaved into 
an N-terminal 50-kDa light chain (LC) and a C-terminal 100-kDa heavy chain (HC) di-chain 
that is linked by a single disulfide bond (DasGupta, 1989). The BoNT HC is further 
delineated into two domains; the N-fragment or translocation domain (Hn) and the C-
fragment or receptor-binding domain (Hc). These three domains mediate intoxication of the 
neuron in a defined tripartite mechanism. The toxin is introduced into the nerve cell by 
receptor-mediated endocytosis through binding of the Hc domain to specific ectoreceptors 
on peripheral cholinergic nerve cells (Dong et al., 2006; Rummel et al., 2007). The acidic pH 





forming a protein channel that facilitates the translocation of the LC out of the endosomal 
lumen and into the cytosol. The LC is a zinc-containing endopeptidase that target SNARE 
(soluble N-ethylmaleamide sensitive factor attachment protein receptors) proteins that form 
the synaptonemal fusion complex in a serotype dependent fashion. The SNARE protein 
SNAP-25 (synaptosomal-associated protein of 25 kDa) is cleaved at different sites by 
BoNT/A, /C, and /E, synaptobrevin (also referred to as VAMP; vesicle-associated 
membrane protein), is cleaved at different sites by BoNT/B, /D, /F, and /G, and syntaxin is 
cleaved by BoNT/C (Simpson, 2004). Proteolytic cleavage of SNARE proteins prevents the 
release of acetylcholine across the synaptic cleft of the neuromuscular junction, resulting in a 
flaccid muscle paralysis which is the primary clinical sign of botulism. 
3.2 Epidemiology 
Botulism is typically reported in four clinical categories. Foodborne botulism is caused by the 
ingestion of the pre-formed toxin in contaminated food (CDC, 1998). Most outbreaks are 
associated with home-canned foods in which inadequate processing results in C. botulinum 
spores germinating, reproducing and producing the toxin (Shapiro, et al., 1998). These 
conditions include an anaerobic environment with temperatures ranging from 4ºC to 40°C, a 
pH range from 4.6 to 7.0, and water activity greater than 0.94 (aW is intensity with which 
water associates with various non-aqueous constituents and solids) (Baird-Parker & Freame, 
1967; Stringer, et al., 2005). Despite increased educational awareness of the non-permissive 
conditions for food preparation, foodborne botulism remains a persistent threat. There were, 
on average, approximately 24 reported cases per year from 1900-2000, but there have been a 
smaller number of cases (average of 18 year) reported from 2001-2009 (CDC-NBS). In the 
period from 1950-1996, there were 444 outbreaks in which one or more cases of botulism 
from a contaminated food source was implicated. Of these outbreaks, 37.6% were caused by 
type A, 13.7% by type B, 15.1% by type E and 0.7% by type F while 32.9% of the incidents 
were caused by unidentified serotype(s) (CDC, 1998). Improvements in both differential 
diagnostic methods and the technology utilized in serotyping have resulted in a decrease in 
unidentified serotypes. In the United Stated from 1990-2000 BoNT/A was responsible for 
50% of all cases of botulism, where types B and E were responsible for 10% and 37% of the 
intoxications, respectively; only 3.6% of the cases were from an unidentified strain (CDC, 
1998).  
Infant botulism is a toxicoinfection caused by inhalation or ingestion of clostridial spores that 
can colonize and produce toxin in the intestinal tract of infants less than 12 months of age 
(Shapiro, 1998). The ability of the bacteria to thrive and elicit toxin is thought to be 
attributed in part to a deficiency in protective gastrointesintal bacterial flora and the 
relatively low levels of inhibitory bile-aid found in children under 12 months (CDC, 1998). 
This form of the disease was officially recognized in a 1976 report in which two infants 
presenting with acute infantile hypotonoia and weakness were diagnosed with botulism 
(Pickett, et al., 1976). This has been the most commonly reported form of the disease in the 
United States since 1980, with an average of approximately 80-100 cases confirmed annually 
(Shapiro, 1998). In the US between 1976 and 1996, there were 1442 individual cases of infant 
botulism reported to the CDC (CDC, 1998). Of these, 46.5% were caused by type A, 51.9% by 
type B. Interestingly, the incidence of infant botulism in the US has a geographical 





and Utah also experiencing high incidence (CDC, 1988). The correlation between the 
increased incidences of infant botulism outbreaks associated with certain geographical 
locations has not been elucidated.  
Wound botulism (WB) results from the growth of C. botulinum spores in a contaminated 
wound with in vivo toxin production. This form of the disease was first reported in 1951 as 
a relatively rare illness associated with post-operative complications (Davis et al., 1951). 
Historically, approximately 75% of the wound botulism cases in the US have been reported 
in California (Weber, et al., 1993) and this represents over 90% of the reported incidences in 
the world (Benson, 2001). There were 127 cases of wound botulism in California from 1951 
to 1998. Of these, 105 were attributed to intravenous drug users and all but one were 
admitted black-tar heroin users (Benson, 2001). The increased incidence of WB in California 
has not abated and between 1993 and 2006 an additional 17 cases were identified in 
intravenous drug users; 16 of which were diagnosed with one or more recurrent episodes 
(Yuan et al., 2011).  
Adult intestinal toxemia botulism is a rare toxicoinfection that occurs in older children and 
adults with abnormal gastrointestinal tract physiology, such as colitis or intestinal surgical 
procedures (Freeman et al., 1986; Fenecia et al., 1999). The disease has also been correlated 
with alteration of protective endogenous microflora by broad-spectrum antibiotics after 
inflammatory intestinal disease or surgery (Chia et al., 1986). 
In addition to the four naturally occurring forms of the disease described previously, there 
are two additional forms of inadvertent botulism that result from the application of the 
purified toxin. Iatrogenic botulism results from the injection of BoNT for either cosmetic or 
therapeutic purposes. Two adult patients developed symptoms of botulism when given 
therapeutic doses of BoNT/A drawn from two different production lots (Bakheit, 1997). 
These cases have since been attributed to either patient sensitivity to the drug or the 
inadvertent injection of the toxin directly into the vascular capillaries. An adolescent being 
treated for spastic quadriparesis with Myobloc (botulinum toxin serotype B) developed 
clinical signs of a systemic BoNT injection (Partikian, 2007). While there are no clear dosing 
guidelines for BoNT formulations for therapeutic interventions in children, the clinical 
diagnosis of botulism was again believed to have been the result of inadvertent injection 
into a blood vessel or diffusion from nearby muscle sites. In November of 2007, four adults 
were given cosmetic injections of undiluted BoNT/A intended for laboratory research 
(Chertow et al., 2006). Serial dilutions of two of the individual’s serum samples indicated 
they were given approximately 21 to 43 estimated human lethal doses. All four patients 
survived but only after prolonged hospitalization with anti-toxin treatment and ventilator 
support ranging from 40 to 104 days.  
Inhalational botulism is intoxication by an inhalational exposure of the aerosolized toxin. The 
only reported human inhalation incidence occurred in Germany in 1962 during a necropsy 
when three laboratory workers were exposed to animals subjected to aerosolization of a 
highly purified, lyophilized BoNT/A (Holzer, 1962). The patients were hospitalized five 
days postexposure, administered equine antitoxin, and discharged after 9 days. While not a 
naturally occurring form of the disease, inhalational botulism has implications as a potential 
weapon of bioterrorism (Middlebrook & Franz 1997; Zilinskas, 1997). An aerosol dispersion 
of BoNT could create a toxic gas cloud that could encompass a large area and is considered 





3.3 Clinical symptoms 
The clinical presentation of botulism is characterized by distinctive neurological symptoms 
of the voluntary motor and autonomic cholinergic-associated junctions in the infant, wound 
and intestinal forms of the disease (CDC, 1998). Foodborne botulism is often accompanied 
by acute gastrointestinal distress including nausea, abdominal cramps, vomiting and 
diarrhea that precede the neurological symptoms (Hughes et al, 1981), particularly in types 
B and E. The initial symptoms of food botulism can manifest anywhere from within a few 
hours to several days postintoxication. The time to onset of symptoms, the severity and the 
duration of the disease is largely dictated by the exposure dose and the serotype (Arnon, 
2001; Woodruff et al., 1992). Infant botulism may present with constipation, poor feeding, 
diminished suckling, neck and peripheral weakness, weak crying increased drooling 
(Corblath, et al., 1993) and ventilatory failure (Arnon, 1992; Long et al., 1985). Wound 
botulism does not display the gastrointestinal symptoms observed in the foodborne form. 
Fever, if present, is generally attributed to a wound infection rather than botulism.  
The neuroparalytic effects of botulism present as an acute, afebrile, descending, bilateral 
flaccid paralysis. The initial neurological symptoms generally involve cranial nerves III, IV 
and VI (Sobel, 2005) and include ocular disorders such as blurred vision, diplopia, ptosis 
and photophobia (Terranova et al., 1979). This is generally followed by dysfunction of 
cranial nerves VII and IX which cause, dysphagia, dysphonia and dysarthia. The 
neurological impairment may then spread to the upper extremities, the trunk and then the 
lower extremities. Respiratory distress can be caused by a weakened glottis that tends to 
obstruct the airway during attempted inspiration or from paralytic weakness of the 
diaphragm and parasternal and intercostas muscles. Fatigue, sore throat, dry mouth, 
constipation and dizziness have also been reported to be associated with botulinum 
intoxications (Hughes, 1981). Fatalities are most often the result of respiratory failure or 
secondary infections typically associated with prolonged mechanical ventilation. Bleck 
summarized the clinical findings of several published reports of foodborne botulism by 
symptom and serotype as shown in Table 1 (Bleck, 2000).  
The primary neurological disorders associated with botulism are common to the foodborne, 
intestinal, and wound forms of the disease (Sobel, 2005). The duration and severity of the 
neuroparalytic effects of the disease can be influenced by both the amount and serotype of 
the toxin introduced into the system. Insight into the impact of the different serotypes in 
humans has only recently been investigated and much of the data comes from studies 
involving the therapeutic applications of BoNTs. Of the three most prevalent serotypes 
involved in human incidences of botulism, BoNT/A has been shown to have the most 
persistent action and can last 12-16 weeks when used in therapeutic applications (Eleopra, 
2004). Serotype B has also been used in therapeutic applications but only exhibits the 
comparable efficacy to BoNT/A when used in higher doses (Sloop, et al., 1997; Settler, 2001). 
Electrophysiological studies conducted in juvenile monkeys using purified BoNT/A 
(BOTOX, Allergan, Irvine, CA) and BoNT/B (Neurobloc, Elan, Shannon, Ireland) indicated 
BoNT/A diffusion was more pronounced (Arezzo, 2001). The few studies pertaining to 
serotype C in humans (Eleopra et al., 1997; Eleopra et al., 1998a, Eleopra et al., 1998b) 
indicate that it is similar to BoNT/A in terms of the toxicity and duration of activity. A 2004 
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3.3 Clinical symptoms 
The clinical presentation of botulism is characterized by distinctive neurological symptoms 
of the voluntary motor and autonomic cholinergic-associated junctions in the infant, wound 
and intestinal forms of the disease (CDC, 1998). Foodborne botulism is often accompanied 
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involved in human incidences of botulism, BoNT/A has been shown to have the most 
persistent action and can last 12-16 weeks when used in therapeutic applications (Eleopra, 
2004). Serotype B has also been used in therapeutic applications but only exhibits the 
comparable efficacy to BoNT/A when used in higher doses (Sloop, et al., 1997; Settler, 2001). 
Electrophysiological studies conducted in juvenile monkeys using purified BoNT/A 
(BOTOX, Allergan, Irvine, CA) and BoNT/B (Neurobloc, Elan, Shannon, Ireland) indicated 
BoNT/A diffusion was more pronounced (Arezzo, 2001). The few studies pertaining to 
serotype C in humans (Eleopra et al., 1997; Eleopra et al., 1998a, Eleopra et al., 1998b) 
indicate that it is similar to BoNT/A in terms of the toxicity and duration of activity. A 2004 





      Type A (%)   Type B (%)   Type E (%) 
 
Neurological symptoms 
Dysphagia    96   97   82 
Dry mouth    83  100   93 
Diplopia    90   92   39 
Dysarthia    100   69   50 
Upper extremity weakness  86   64  NA 
Lower extremity weakness  76   64  NA 
Blurred vision    100   42   91 
Dyspnea    91   34   88 
Paresthesiae    20   12  NA 
Gastrointestinal Symptoms 
Constipation    73   73   52 
Nausea     73   57   84 
Vomiting    70   50   96 
Abdominal cramps   33   46  NA 
Diarrhea    35   8   39 
Miscellaneous symptoms 
Fatigue     92   69   84 
Sore throat    75   39   38 
Dizziness    86   30   63 
Neurological Findings 
Ptosis     96   55   46 
Diminished gag reflex   81   54  NA 
Ophthalmoparesis   87   46  NA 
Facial paresis    84   48  NA 
Tongue weakness   21   31   66 
Pupils fixed or dilated   33   56   75 
Nystagmus    44   4  NA 
 
Upper extremity weakness  91   62  NA 
Lower extremity weakness  82   59  NA 
Ataxia     24   13  NA 
DTRs diminished or absent  54   29  NA 
DTRs hyperactive   12   0  NA 
Initial mental status 
Alert     88   93   27 
Lethargic     4   4   73 
Obtunded     8   4   0 
 
DTRs, deep tendon reflexes; NA, not available. 
Table 1. Summary of Symptoms of Patients with Botulism Caused by Serotypes A, B an E. 





of BoNT/A, /B, /C or /F (Eleopra et al., 2004). The results were consistent with other 
research efforts in that BoNT/B, used in higher doses, and BoNT/C have a similar profile as 
BoNT/A. As reported in previous studies (Mezaki et al., 1995; Chen et al., 1998), BoNT/F 
was found to have a shorter duration compared to BoNT/A.  
3.4 Diagnosis of botulism 
A rapid and accurate identification of botulism is not difficult when the disease is strongly 
suspected, such as found in the setting of a large outbreak. But because cases of naturally 
occurring botulism most often occur singularly, the individual diagnosis may prove more 
challenging. Botulism is thought to be substantially underdiagnosed (CDC, 1988) and with 
low-level exposure, minor neurological manifestations of the disease may resolve without 
medical intervention. A differential diagnosis of botulism without concurrent knowledge of 
a confirmed outbreak can be difficult and other paralytic illnesses may need to be excluded. 
These include Guillain-Barre syndrome, myasthenia gravis, tick paralysis, and Eaton-
Lambert syndrome (Dembek, et al., 2007). Less likely conditions such as tetrodotoxin and 
shellfish poisoning, aminoglycoside toxicity and a variety of other neurotoxic products and 
neurological abnormalities may initially present with similar symptoms. However, a 
thorough medical examination of the patient and their medical history can generally 
exclude any competing diagnosis. A patient presenting with an acute, bilateral, descending 
flaccid paralysis that is afebrile and has normal sensorium should suggest a clinical case of 
botulism. 
The most reliable method for the detection of BoNTs and for diagnosing botulism is the 
mouse bioassay. This test can be performed by the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC) or state public health laboratories. The assay involves injecting mice with 
samples collected from patients displaying symptoms of botulism. Mice will typically begin 
showing signs of botulism within 8 h. The serotype of samples can also be ascertained in this 
manner by neutralizing the toxin with serotype-specific antibodies prior to injecting the 
mice (Shapiro et al., 1998). In cases of foodborne or infant botulism, stool samples can also 
be cultured to look for C. botulinum. Samples of the suspected food should also be cultured 
anaerobically with heat or alcohol treatment to select for spores.  
4. Medical countermeasures 
4.1 Current medical intervention 
Standard therapy for botulism involves administration of botulinum antitoxin in an 
attempt to prevent neurologic progression of a moderately progressive illness, or to 
reduce the duration of respiratory failure in individuals with a severe, rapidly progressive 
illness. This is done in conjuction with careful monitoring of respiratory vital capacity and 
aggressive ventilatory care for individuals that display respiratory failure. The only 
specific pharmacological treatment for botulism is administration of equine-derived 
botulinum antitoxin. On March 12, 2010, a new heptavalent botulinum antitoxin (HBAT, 
Cangene Corp.) became available through a US CDC-sponsored FDA Investigational New 
Drug (IND) protocol for the treatment of naturally acquired non-infant botulism (CDC, 
2010). This antitoxin replaced the previously FDA-approved equine bivalent botulinum 





      Type A (%)   Type B (%)   Type E (%) 
 
Neurological symptoms 
Dysphagia    96   97   82 
Dry mouth    83  100   93 
Diplopia    90   92   39 
Dysarthia    100   69   50 
Upper extremity weakness  86   64  NA 
Lower extremity weakness  76   64  NA 
Blurred vision    100   42   91 
Dyspnea    91   34   88 
Paresthesiae    20   12  NA 
Gastrointestinal Symptoms 
Constipation    73   73   52 
Nausea     73   57   84 
Vomiting    70   50   96 
Abdominal cramps   33   46  NA 
Diarrhea    35   8   39 
Miscellaneous symptoms 
Fatigue     92   69   84 
Sore throat    75   39   38 
Dizziness    86   30   63 
Neurological Findings 
Ptosis     96   55   46 
Diminished gag reflex   81   54  NA 
Ophthalmoparesis   87   46  NA 
Facial paresis    84   48  NA 
Tongue weakness   21   31   66 
Pupils fixed or dilated   33   56   75 
Nystagmus    44   4  NA 
 
Upper extremity weakness  91   62  NA 
Lower extremity weakness  82   59  NA 
Ataxia     24   13  NA 
DTRs diminished or absent  54   29  NA 
DTRs hyperactive   12   0  NA 
Initial mental status 
Alert     88   93   27 
Lethargic     4   4   73 
Obtunded     8   4   0 
 
DTRs, deep tendon reflexes; NA, not available. 
Table 1. Summary of Symptoms of Patients with Botulism Caused by Serotypes A, B an E. 





of BoNT/A, /B, /C or /F (Eleopra et al., 2004). The results were consistent with other 
research efforts in that BoNT/B, used in higher doses, and BoNT/C have a similar profile as 
BoNT/A. As reported in previous studies (Mezaki et al., 1995; Chen et al., 1998), BoNT/F 
was found to have a shorter duration compared to BoNT/A.  
3.4 Diagnosis of botulism 
A rapid and accurate identification of botulism is not difficult when the disease is strongly 
suspected, such as found in the setting of a large outbreak. But because cases of naturally 
occurring botulism most often occur singularly, the individual diagnosis may prove more 
challenging. Botulism is thought to be substantially underdiagnosed (CDC, 1988) and with 
low-level exposure, minor neurological manifestations of the disease may resolve without 
medical intervention. A differential diagnosis of botulism without concurrent knowledge of 
a confirmed outbreak can be difficult and other paralytic illnesses may need to be excluded. 
These include Guillain-Barre syndrome, myasthenia gravis, tick paralysis, and Eaton-
Lambert syndrome (Dembek, et al., 2007). Less likely conditions such as tetrodotoxin and 
shellfish poisoning, aminoglycoside toxicity and a variety of other neurotoxic products and 
neurological abnormalities may initially present with similar symptoms. However, a 
thorough medical examination of the patient and their medical history can generally 
exclude any competing diagnosis. A patient presenting with an acute, bilateral, descending 
flaccid paralysis that is afebrile and has normal sensorium should suggest a clinical case of 
botulism. 
The most reliable method for the detection of BoNTs and for diagnosing botulism is the 
mouse bioassay. This test can be performed by the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC) or state public health laboratories. The assay involves injecting mice with 
samples collected from patients displaying symptoms of botulism. Mice will typically begin 
showing signs of botulism within 8 h. The serotype of samples can also be ascertained in this 
manner by neutralizing the toxin with serotype-specific antibodies prior to injecting the 
mice (Shapiro et al., 1998). In cases of foodborne or infant botulism, stool samples can also 
be cultured to look for C. botulinum. Samples of the suspected food should also be cultured 
anaerobically with heat or alcohol treatment to select for spores.  
4. Medical countermeasures 
4.1 Current medical intervention 
Standard therapy for botulism involves administration of botulinum antitoxin in an 
attempt to prevent neurologic progression of a moderately progressive illness, or to 
reduce the duration of respiratory failure in individuals with a severe, rapidly progressive 
illness. This is done in conjuction with careful monitoring of respiratory vital capacity and 
aggressive ventilatory care for individuals that display respiratory failure. The only 
specific pharmacological treatment for botulism is administration of equine-derived 
botulinum antitoxin. On March 12, 2010, a new heptavalent botulinum antitoxin (HBAT, 
Cangene Corp.) became available through a US CDC-sponsored FDA Investigational New 
Drug (IND) protocol for the treatment of naturally acquired non-infant botulism (CDC, 
2010). This antitoxin replaced the previously FDA-approved equine bivalent botulinum 





Sanofi Pasteur). HBAT contains equine-derived antibody against all BoNT serotypes: 
7,500 U anti-A; 5,500 U anti-B; 5,000 U anti-C; 1,000 U anti-D; 8,500 U anti-E; 5,000 U anti-
F; and 1,000 U anti-G per vial. This antitoxin is composed of <2% intact immunoglobulin 
G (IgG) and ≥90% Fab and F(ab’)2 immunoglobulin fragments created by despeciation 
(CDC, 2010). The recommended adult dosing is one 20 mL vial of HBAT (McLaughlin and 
Funk, 2010). BabyBIG®, human botulism immune globulin intravenous (BIG-IV), is an 
FDA-approved drug for the treatment of infant botulism types A and B. Available 
through the California Infant Botulism Treatment and Prevention Program, BabyBIG® is 
obtained from the pooled plasma of adults vaccinated with the pentavalent (A-E) 
botulinum toxoid who displayed high titers of neutralizing antibodies against BoNT/A 
and /B. Because BabyBIG® is of human origin, it does not carry the risk for anaphylaxis 
inherent with equine products, nor does BabyBIG® demonstrate a risk for possible 
lifelong hypersensitivity to equine antigens. BabyBIG® has been shown to significantly 
shorten the hospitalization period and reduce treatment costs up to $75,000.00 per 
incident (Thompson et al., 2005; Fox, 2005).  
Antitoxin can neutralize toxin molecules that are not yet bound to nerve endings and may 
limit the progression of the disease and prevent further nerve damage by clearing them 
from circulation. Thus, the antitoxin should be administered immediately upon a 
definitive diagnosis of botulism, preferably within 24 h after the onset of symptoms 
(Tacket et al., 1984; Chang and Ganguly, 2003). Compared to standard care alone, 
immediate administration of antitoxin has been shown to shorten time on respiratory 
support, and also reduced the hospitalization period (Shapiro et al., 1997; Tacket et al., 
1984). It is not clear how long the toxin can persist in the bloodstream before clearance. 
Ravichandran reported that BoNT/A had a serum half-life of approximately 4 hours in 
small animal studies (Ravichandran et al., 2005). This study also suggested that blood 
does not sequester or modify the toxin in any detectable way. Thus, the blood may act as a 
reservoir for the toxin until it either enters the target cells or is eliminated from the body. 
Detectable levels of toxin were observed in one of the four patients in the Florida outbreak 
8 days after receiving a massive overdose of an unlicensed preparation of BoNT/A during 
a cosmetic procedure (Chertow et al., 2006). Under such circumstances, antitoxin 
administration, even if delayed, may still be effective in limiting the duration of the 
illness. The use of equine-based antitoxins, but not the human product, has been 
associated with symptoms of hypersensitivity (including urticaria, serum sickness, and 
anaphylaxis). Hence, dermal testing is required before antitoxin administration. Due to 
the risk of adverse reactions, prophylactic antitoxin is not recommended in patients who 
are exposed to BoNT but have no symptoms. These patients may undergo gastric lavage 
or induced vomiting in an attempt to eliminate the toxin before absorption (Chan-Tack & 
Bartlett, 2010). 
4.2 Prophylaxis  
In the United States, there is currently no FDA-licensed prophylactic product against 
botulism. Some of the earliest vaccine efforts were initiated during the second World War 
due to concerns that the toxin might be employed as an offensive biological weapon against 
the allied forces by Germany. A bivalent A/B toxoid vaccine was produced from 3-day 
culture autolysates of C. botulinum that were chemically neutralized with formaldehyde, 





neutralizing antibodies, it also displayed a number of localized and systemic reactogenic 
effects (Reames et al., 1947). An improved product in which the A and B toxins were 
purified to 10-15% homomgeneity by acid-precipitation of the culture supernatants and 
adjuvanted onto aluminum phosphate was found to be well-tolerated in humans, displayed 
only minor localized reactogenic effects and produced significantly improved antibody 
titers over the previous bivalent toxoid (Fiock et al., 1961). A pentavalent ABCDE toxoid 
vaccine with 1% thymerosol as a preservative prepared by Parke, Davis and Company was 
administered to approximately 400 individuals (Fiock et al., 1963). The vaccine displayed 
minor reactogenic effects and elicted detectable antibody titers to all five serotypes. This 
product was administered to over 1600 individuals from 1970 to 1981 under an 
Investigational New Drug (IND) application. The Michigan Department of Public Health 
produced a pentavalent botulism (ABCDE) toxoid (PBT) using similar procedures as the 
Parke Davis product, but which contained roughly 50% of the formaldehyde and only 0.01% 
thymerosol, that has been administered under an IND to at-risk laboratory workers and 
military personnel. However, the declining immunogenicity, dwindling supplies and local 
reactogenic effects of the PBT (Rusnak & Smith, 2009; CDC, 2009) have led to recent efforts 
to create new vaccines.  
More contemporary toxoid vaccines have been created by chemical neutralization of the 
purified toxin (Keller, 2008; Jones, et al., 2008). However, large scale production of these 
products would require a secure, CDC-licensed facility to both propagate large amounts the 
bacterium and manipulate the purified toxin. Subsequent efforts have largely relied on the 
expression of recombinant protein antigens encoding one or more of the BoNT domains.  
Codon optimized genes encoding the BoNT (Hc) antigens produced in a P. pastoris 
expression platform have been successfully developed as a recombinant subunit vaccine 
against serotypes A-F and have been demonstrated to elicit protective immunity in both 
rodent (Smith, 2009; Rusnak & Smith 2009) and non-human primates (Boles et al., 2006; 
Morefield, 2008). In February of 2011, the Dynport Vaccine Company announced that phase 
II clinical trials of a recombinant bivalent Hc vaccine against serotypes A and B (rBV A/B) 
had been completed and that full licensure would be sought. (CSC, 2011). Recombinant, 
catalytically inactive BoNT holoproteins made by mutagenesis of key amino acids residues 
have also been employed as potential vaccine candidates. A recombinant BoNT/C protein 
with active site mutations H229G, E230T and H223N produced in E. coli displayed no catalytic 
activity and elicited protective immunity against the parental toxin when delivered either 
subcutaneously or orally (Kiyatkin et al., 1997). Pier described the expression of a 
recombinant BoNT/A gene bearing R363A and Y365F mutations in the LNT01 nontoxigenic 
strain of C. botulinum (Pier et al., 2008). The recombinant protein was unable to cleave 
SNAP-25 and elicited protective immunity in mice when challenged with BoNT/A. 
Recombinant BoNT/A with active site mutations H223A, E224A and H227A produced in  
P. pastoris was found to be completely non-toxic and provided protective immunity in mice 
against 1000 MLD50 of not only the parental toxin, but against subtypes /A2 and /A3 as 
well (Webb et al., 2009).  
4.3 Post-intoxication interventions 
Once the neurotoxic LC is endocytosed within the cytosol of peripheral cholinergic 
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activity and ablating the toxicity. A number of recent research efforts have focused on the 
development of small-molecule inhibitors to reduce or eliminate the cleavage of SNARE 
proteins in neurons. The drawbacks associated with the use of peptides as drug 
candidates (e.g., poor tissue penetration, serum resistance, oral bioavailability, and quick 
elimination), and the potential usefulness of small molecules as pre- and post-exposure 
therapeutic agents have led many laboratories to instead pursue small-molecule 
approaches. To date, research has focused predominantly on developing small-molecule 
inhibitors that target the BoNT/A LC protease, due to the serotype’s persistence and 
highly toxic nature. A number of BoNT/A small-molecule inhibitors, identified using 
conventional and novel approaches, have been reported that exhibit varying degrees of 
inhibitory capacity (Burnett et al., 2003; 2009; Boldt et al., 2006; Park et al., 2006; Tang et 
al., 2007; Capkova et al., 2007; 2009; Moe et al., 2009; Roxas-Duncan et al., 2009; Burnett et 
al., 2010). Most of these studies were conducted in vitro using truncated forms of the LC 
which might not be structurally representative of the intracellular form of BoNT. The 
inhibitors reported by Roxas-Duncan et al (2009), identified via a hierarchical screening 
strategy, were evaluated in vitro using both forms of LC (truncated and full-length), and 
ex vivo using mouse phrenic nerve hemidiaphragm preparations. Despite intensive 
efforts on small-molecule inhibitor discovery and development, no compound has been 
identified that would be suitable for preclinical testing. At present, there are only two 
reports of BoNT/A small-molecule inhibitors that have been tested in vivo. Janda and co-
workers described a mouse toxicity bioassay in which two different inhibitors were 
injected intravenously immediately after an injection of 5-10 i.p. LD50 of BoNT/A. One 
compound, given at a 2.5 mM dose, showed a 36% increase in time to death, while the 
other, given at a 1 mM dose, resulted in a 16% overall survival rate (Eubanks et al., 2007). 
In another study, a single dose of three different inhibitors was administered i.p. at 2 
mg/kg 30 min prior to a challenge of 5 MLD50 of BoNT/A (Pang et al., 2010). The control 
mice died within 12 hrs. All 3 inhibitors provided 100% protection at 12 hrs and one 
compound provided 70% and 60% survival rates at 24 and 48 hrs; all three inhibitors 
provided a 10% overall survival rate with no signs of botulism at 5 days.  
Recently, other regions of the LC, in addition to the BoNT active site, generated attention as 
potential targets for inhibition. Merrino et al., (2006) has focused on a family of bis-
imidazole BoNT/A inhibitors targeting the peripheral sites of substrate binding. Silhar et al., 
(2010) reported on D-chicoric acid, a natural product isolated from Echinacea, that inhibits 
BoNT/A LC by binding to an exosite. 
4.4 Human recombinant monoclonal antibodies 
Currently, immunotherapy is deemed as the most effective immediate response to BoNT 
exposure. However, BabyBig® is exclusively approved for use in infants, and equine 
antisera can induce serum sickness and anaphylaxis (Arnon et al., 2001; Arnon, 2004). 
Monoclonal antibody (mAb) combinations (oligoclonal antibodies) may be viable substitutes 
for polyclonal antisera (Nowakowski et al., 2002; Razai et al., 2005). Construction of scFv 
phage Ab libraries has enabled the generation of large panels of high-affinity binding 
monoclonal antibodies. Mouse neutralization studies revealed that effective protection is 
observed only when combinations of three or more mAbs are used (Nowakowski et al., 





Diseases (NIAID), antibody combinations that effectively protect against multiple BoNT/A, 
/B, and /E subtypes are currently being produced and tested to support FDA licensure. 
Antibodies that protect against the four remaining toxin serotypes (BoNT/C, /D, /F, and 
/G) are also in development.  
4.5 Antibodies specific for the catalytic light chain 
While a majority of the BoNT immunotherapy research has been focused on antibodies that 
bind the HC, efforts were also directed to explore the potential for antibodies that bind the 
enzymatic LC. Using a novel hybridoma method for cloning human antibodies (Adekar et 
al., 2008; Dessain et al., 2004), a fully human antibody specific for the BoNT/A LC was 
isolated which potently inhibited BoNT/A in vitro and in vivo, via mechanisms not 
previously associated with BoNT-neutralizing antibodies (Adekar et al., 2008). In another 
study, Dong et al. (2010) created a library of non-immune llama single-domain VHH 
(camelid heavy-chain variable regions) displayed on the surface of the yeast Saccharomyces 
cerevisiae. Library selections against BoNT/A LC yielded 15 yeast-displayed VHHs, eight of 
which inhibited the cleavage of substrate SNAP-25 by BoNT/A LC. The most potent VHH 
(Aa1) had a solution K(d) of 1.47 x 10-10 M and an IC50 of 4.7 x 10-10 M. X-ray crystal structure 
of the BoNT/A LC-Aa1 VHH complex revealed that the Aa1 VHH binds the alpha-exosite 
region of BoNT/A LC. Recently, Tremblay et al. (2010) reported on the selection of small (14 
kDa) binding domains specific for the protease of BoNT serotypes A or B from libraries of 
VHHs or nanobodies cloned from vaccinated alpacas. Several VHHs were demonstrated to 
exhibit high affinity (KD near 1 nm) and were potent inhibitors of BoNT/A LC (Ki near 1 
nM); a VHH inhibitor of BoNT/A LC was able to protect BoNT/A-mediated SNAP25 
cleavage. 
4.6 Inhibitors of internalization and translocation  
Several compounds that inhibit the acidification process of endosomes by various 
mechanisms have been evaluated for both toxicity and ability to inhibit BoNT-induced 
synaptic failure. Lysosomotropic agents ammonium chloride and methylamine 
hydrochloride have been shown to antagonize the toxin internalization step by delaying the 
time-to-block of nerve-evoked muscle contractions after exposure to BoNT/A, /B, /C1, and 
TeNT (Simpson, 1983). However, these amines act by inhibiting the acidification process of 
endosomes; they do not selectively inactivate the toxins nor irreversibly modify tissue 
function at concentrations that inhibit the onset of BoNT-induced paralysis. Other 
candidates that have been examined were uncouplers of oxidative phosphorylation CCCP, 
FCCP (Adler et al., 1994), and vesicle H+-ATPase inhibitors including Bafilomycin A, which 
was shown to antagonize BoNTs A-G (Simpson et al., 1994). Some of these compounds were 
toxic or had low safety margins, hence they were deemed unsuitable as therapeutic 
candidates.  
Anti-malarial compounds chloroquine and hydroxychloroquine have also been evaluated 
for potentially inhibiting BoNT-mediated internalization (Simpson, 1982). The efficacy of 
these agents was found similar to that of ammonium chloride and methylamine 
hydrochloride; both groups also exhibited a comparable therapeutic window. Deshpande 
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group of 4- and 8-aminoquinolines. Unfortunately, these compounds failed to extend the 
therapeutic window. The most effective compounds were 4-aminoquinolines and quinacrine 
that delayed BoNT/A-induced neuromuscular block by more than threefold compared to 
the control (toxin only) values. Maximum protection was solely achieved when the tissues 
were exposed to the compounds before or at the same time as the toxin treatment; a delay of 
>20 min abolished the inhibitory capacity of these compounds.  
An additional approach to prevent or reduce BoNT internalization has been attempted by 
treating nerve-muscle preparations with the protein ionophores nigericin and monensin 
(Adler et al., 1994; Sheridan, 1996). These ionophores block vesicle acidification by acting as 
H+ shunts to neutralize pH gradients, thereby interfering with the delivery of active LC in 
the cytosol. Though the efficacy of these ionophores was observed to be comparable to other 
inhibitors of internalization, they were more toxic; high concentrations resulted in a 
depression of neuromuscular transmission (Adler et al., 1994; Sheridan, 1996).  
4.7 Compounds that restore neuronal function 
A known potassium channel blocker, 3,4-diaminopyridine (3,4-DAP) was evaluated for its 
ability to antagonize BoNT-induced depression of tension in rat diaphragm muscles (Adler 
et al., 1995). BoNT-induced paralysis was nearly completely inhibited after addition of 100 
uM of 3,4-DAP, and this effect was sustained even after 4 h of treatment. The antagonistic 
effects of 3,4-DAP was also demonstrated in vivo, provided its concentration in the plasma 
is maintained at ~30 M during the course of intoxication (Adler et al., 2000). However, 3,4-
DAP is generally toxic, thus, its high drug concentration requirement prohibits routine 
therapeutic use (Millard, 2006).  
Mastoparan, a phospholipase activator, was evaluated for its ability to attenuate BoNT 
intoxication. Addition of mastoparan and 80 mM K+ completely prevented BoNT inhibition 
of radiolabeled acetylcholine in PC12 cells, but this effect was blocked by either EGTA or the 
N-type calcium channel blocker ω-conotoxin (Ray et al., 1999). These findings imply that the 
effects of mastoparan are dependent on Ca2+ influx via the neuronal type voltage-sensitive 
Ca2+ channels. 
4.8 Drug delivery vehicle research 
One significant challenge in the development of BoNT small-molecule therapeutics is the 
delivery of the compounds to the cytosol of peripheral cholinergic nerve cells (PCNC), 
which are the sites of BoNT action. In combination with the discovery and development of 
BoNT small-molecule inhibitors, cell-specific intracellular targeting is critical to increase the 
therapeutic index and minimize potential systemic toxicity associated with the drug 
treatment. Several studies have examined the potential of using specific recombinant BoNT 
domains or a neutralized full-length BoNT holoprotein as drug delivery system. 
Goodnough et al. observed that BoNT/A and unlabeled rHC were able to compete for 
binding, implicating specific neuronal targeting (Goodnough et al., 2002). The efficiency of 
neuron-specific cargo delivery into the cytosol was evaluated by coupling labeled dextran to 
a recombinant BoNT/A HC using a 3-(2-pyridylthio)-propionyl hydrazide linker (Zhang et 
al., 2009). A florescent tracking dye was conjugated to the dextran moiety and incubated in 





internalization into the endosomes were observed, but minimal levels were detected in the 
cytosol. The movement of a small, membrane-permeable dye from the endosome into the 
cytosol is hypothesized to be due to passive diffusion instead of an active translocation 
event. Ho et al (2010) reported on a recombinant BoNT/A HC with an amino terminal GFP 
fusion that was internalized into mouse neurons; however, the GFP cargo was observed to 
be almost exclusively limited to endocytotic vesicles, with little detectable translocation into 
the cytosol. 
Although the of BoNT heavy chain comprises the domains necessary for binding and 
internalization into endosomes, recent studies suggest that all or part of the LC is essential 
to translocate a ligated cargo into the cytosol. 
Recombinant BoNT/D fusion proteins bearing amino terminal GFP, luciferase, 
dihydrofolate reductase or BoNT/A LC protein were found to promote translocation of 
cargo proteins into the cytosol in an enzymatically active form (Bade et al., 2004). A 
recombinant neutralized BoNT/A bearing an E224A E262A double mutation, labeled with 
Alexa-488, has been shown to specifically bind and internalize into human SH-SY5Y 
neuroblastoma cells (Sing et al., 2010). Additionally, this protein was found to marginally 
bind to the surface of human rhabdomyosarcoma cells with a toxicity limit of 1 µg in mice. 
No additional information is available regarding the drug conjugation study on this protein. 
Moreover, recombinant versions of full-length BoNT/A holotoxin devoid of catalytic 
activity were recently developed (Pier et al., 2008; Webb et al., 2009; Yang et al., 2008) which 
could be potentially used to deliver conjugated therapeutic cargoes. 
5. Emergency preparedness and public response 
The 2007 anthrax attacks in the United States illustrated the need to develop a 
comprehensive preparedness plan for identifying and managing healthcare resources in the 
event of a biological attack. Anthrax, plague, botulinum toxins, smallpox, tularemia, and 
viral hemorrhagic fever viruses have been identified as having a significant potential for use 
in a bioterrorism attack because they can be easily disseminated or transmitted, have high 
morbidity or mortality rates and would cause widespread social disruption (Rotz et al., 
2002). A bioterrorism attack involving dissemination of BoNT by existing food or water 
distribution networks is theoretically possible but this route is associated with significant 
logistical difficulties (Franz, et al., 1997; Zilinskas, 1999) and most experts believe that an 
aerosol dispersion poses the greatest threat (Arnon, 2002). Because botulism is a relatively 
rare disease, clinicians and the healthcare infrastructure in general have limited experience 
in diagnosis of any form of the disease. A 2005 study reported that of 631 physicians 
participating in a mock bioterrosim event, slightly less than half provided an accurate 
diagnosis and plan of management for botulism (Cosgrove, 2005). In the event of a 
biological attack with BoNT, a rapid and accurate diagnosis of the agent by physicians and 
clinical laboratories would be crucial to an equally rapid response and mobilization of 
equipment and biological agents for management. Health care providers who suspect 
botulism should immediately call their state health department's emergency 24-hour 
emergency telephone number. The state health department will contact the CDC to report 
suspected botulism cases, arrange for a clinical consultation by telephone and, if indicated, 
request release of botulinum antitoxin. State health departments should call the CDC 24-
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et al., 1995). BoNT-induced paralysis was nearly completely inhibited after addition of 100 
uM of 3,4-DAP, and this effect was sustained even after 4 h of treatment. The antagonistic 
effects of 3,4-DAP was also demonstrated in vivo, provided its concentration in the plasma 
is maintained at ~30 M during the course of intoxication (Adler et al., 2000). However, 3,4-
DAP is generally toxic, thus, its high drug concentration requirement prohibits routine 
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aerosol dispersion poses the greatest threat (Arnon, 2002). Because botulism is a relatively 
rare disease, clinicians and the healthcare infrastructure in general have limited experience 
in diagnosis of any form of the disease. A 2005 study reported that of 631 physicians 
participating in a mock bioterrosim event, slightly less than half provided an accurate 
diagnosis and plan of management for botulism (Cosgrove, 2005). In the event of a 
biological attack with BoNT, a rapid and accurate diagnosis of the agent by physicians and 
clinical laboratories would be crucial to an equally rapid response and mobilization of 
equipment and biological agents for management. Health care providers who suspect 
botulism should immediately call their state health department's emergency 24-hour 
emergency telephone number. The state health department will contact the CDC to report 
suspected botulism cases, arrange for a clinical consultation by telephone and, if indicated, 
request release of botulinum antitoxin. State health departments should call the CDC 24-





Operations Center, which will page the Foodborne and Diarrheal Diseases Branch medical 
officer on call. The CDC established the Laboratory Response Network (LRN) in 1999; a 
national network of about 150 federal, state, local and military labs that can respond to 
biological and chemical terrorism, and other public health emergencies (CDC-EPR). The 
LRN hierarchy also includes reference labs that can perform tests to detect and confirm the 
presence of a threat agent to ensure a rapid local response in the event of a bioterrorism 
incident without having to rely on confirmation from CDC labs. Sentinel labs are comprised 
of thousands of hospital-based labs that have direct contact with patients. These labs might 
well be the first facility to spot a suspicious specimen and refer it to the appropriate 
reference lab (Sentinel, ASM).  
The ability of the government and healthcare infrastructure to respond to a bioterroism 
attack using BoNT in a densely populated urban environment would largely dictated be by 
the ventilator and antitoxin supplies and how quickly they could be mobilized to the 
outbreak area. Approximately 120,000 of the 200,000 doses of the HBAT contracted by the 
Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA) have been delivered 
for use in the US national strategic stockpile and the remaining 80,000 doses are scheduled 
for delivery by 2014. A 2010 study estimated that there are approximately 63,066 full-
featured mechanical ventilators in the US, 46.4% of which were capable of ventilating 
pediatric and neonatal patients (Rubinson et al, 2010). Additionally, there was an estimated 
82,775 additional positive pressure ventilators (PPV) that could be brought on-line in 
response to an acute respiratory failure (ARF) surge event. This study may represent a 
conservative estimate as it only accounted for survey responders and it did not consider the 
various units rented by hospitals, those facilities who failed to respond to the survey or 
those at nursing facilities or schools.  
6. Conclusion  
BoNT has been investigated as a BW by a number of different state-sponsored initiatives 
and terrorist organizations and is considered a biological threat to both our military and the 
public. Effective medical countermeasures against BoNT intoxication are limited. Currently, 
the only available treatment other than supportive care is a new investigational botulinum 
heptavalent equine-based antitoxin. However, antitoxin cannot intervene in the 
pathogenesis of the disease once the toxin enters the nerve cell, and cannot support all those 
infected in the event of a biological terrorist attack. Hence, there is a critical need for 
postintoxication therapy that can be administered rapidly and effectively to a large infected 
population. Because small molecules provide an opportunity to treat botulism both before 
and after cellular intoxication has occurred, considerable research efforts have been devoted 
to the development of these types of inhibitors. A number of strong contributions to the 
field have been made, yet no small molecule inhibitor was identified that possesses the 
appropriate characteristics (safety, efficacy, solubility) required to be a pharmaceutical 
intervention.  
Research studies addressing these obstacles are underway. Continuing efforts will be 
facilitated particularly by the availability of structural information and by knowledge of the 
mechanism of the BoNT LC-mediated proteolysis of SNARE proteins. Additionally, 





targeting pathways involved in the cellular response to BoNT intoxication, are being 
explored. An understanding of these mechanisms may provide insight into the design and 
development of innovative and effective therapeutic strategies to counteract BoNT 
intoxications.  
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reference lab (Sentinel, ASM).  
The ability of the government and healthcare infrastructure to respond to a bioterroism 
attack using BoNT in a densely populated urban environment would largely dictated be by 
the ventilator and antitoxin supplies and how quickly they could be mobilized to the 
outbreak area. Approximately 120,000 of the 200,000 doses of the HBAT contracted by the 
Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA) have been delivered 
for use in the US national strategic stockpile and the remaining 80,000 doses are scheduled 
for delivery by 2014. A 2010 study estimated that there are approximately 63,066 full-
featured mechanical ventilators in the US, 46.4% of which were capable of ventilating 
pediatric and neonatal patients (Rubinson et al, 2010). Additionally, there was an estimated 
82,775 additional positive pressure ventilators (PPV) that could be brought on-line in 
response to an acute respiratory failure (ARF) surge event. This study may represent a 
conservative estimate as it only accounted for survey responders and it did not consider the 
various units rented by hospitals, those facilities who failed to respond to the survey or 
those at nursing facilities or schools.  
6. Conclusion  
BoNT has been investigated as a BW by a number of different state-sponsored initiatives 
and terrorist organizations and is considered a biological threat to both our military and the 
public. Effective medical countermeasures against BoNT intoxication are limited. Currently, 
the only available treatment other than supportive care is a new investigational botulinum 
heptavalent equine-based antitoxin. However, antitoxin cannot intervene in the 
pathogenesis of the disease once the toxin enters the nerve cell, and cannot support all those 
infected in the event of a biological terrorist attack. Hence, there is a critical need for 
postintoxication therapy that can be administered rapidly and effectively to a large infected 
population. Because small molecules provide an opportunity to treat botulism both before 
and after cellular intoxication has occurred, considerable research efforts have been devoted 
to the development of these types of inhibitors. A number of strong contributions to the 
field have been made, yet no small molecule inhibitor was identified that possesses the 
appropriate characteristics (safety, efficacy, solubility) required to be a pharmaceutical 
intervention.  
Research studies addressing these obstacles are underway. Continuing efforts will be 
facilitated particularly by the availability of structural information and by knowledge of the 
mechanism of the BoNT LC-mediated proteolysis of SNARE proteins. Additionally, 





targeting pathways involved in the cellular response to BoNT intoxication, are being 
explored. An understanding of these mechanisms may provide insight into the design and 
development of innovative and effective therapeutic strategies to counteract BoNT 
intoxications.  
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1. Introduction 
Ricin is one of the most toxic and easily produced plant toxins. It is derived from the castor 
plant, Ricinus communis (Fig. 1), a shrub native to Africa but currently is being cultivated in 
many areas of the world for its co mmercial products, primarily castor oil. The seeds of R. 
communis, commonly called beans (although not a true bean) (Fig. 2), are oblong, brown, 
and have a thick mottled shell sometimes used to make decorative necklaces and bracelets. 
Castor seeds contain 40 to 60% vegetable oil that is rich in triglycerides, mainly ricinolein 
(McKeon et al., 1999). Castor oil is used in a number of products. For many years, purified 
castor oil has been ingested as a human nutritional supplement, emetic, or purgative 
worldwide (Scarpa and Guerci, 1982; Caupin, 1997; Olsnes, 2004). In addition to castor oil 
production, castor plants are also being grown for aesthetic (ornamental garden bush) and 
ecological values. It is used extensively as a decorative plant in parks and other public areas. 
Ecologically, despite the ricin being poisonous to humans and many animals, R. communis is 
the host plant of insects including moths and butterflies, and is also used as a food plant by 
some Lepidopteran larvae and birds.  
 
Fig. 1. Castor plant, Ricinus communis, a large shrub having large palmate leaves and spiny 
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Castor seeds contain large amounts of ricin, which is also present in lower concentrations 
throughout the plant. Ricin content significantly varies among cultivars/accessions and may 
range from 0.1 to 4% of the weight of the seed (Auld et al., 2003; Baldoni et al., 2011; 
Pinkerton et al., 1999). Ricin is one of the most potent poisons in the plant kingdom (Lee & 
Wang, 2005). Because of the wide availability of its source plants, ease of production, 
stability, and lethal potency, ricin toxin is considered to be a bioterrorism threat. Ricin is the 
most common biological agent used in biocrimes, and has also been reported as one of the 
most prevalent agents involved in WMD (weapons of mass destructions) investigations 
(FBI, n.d.). Recent attempted uses of ricin by various extremists and radical groups have 
heightened concerns regarding ricin’s potential for urban terrorism.  
 
Fig. 2. Castor seeds (Adapted from 
http://www.ars.usda.gov/is/AR/archive/jan01/plant0101.htm) 
2. History, biological warfare and terrorism 
The castor plant belongs to the genus Ricinus of the Euphorbiaceae or spurge family 
(Atsmon, 1985). R. communis is indigenous to the southeastern Mediterranean region, 
eastern Africa, and India, but is now widespread throughout temperate and subtropical 
regions (McKeon et al., 2000; Phillips & Rix, 1999). The gourd mentioned in the Book of 
Jonah (Jon 4:6-9; Old Testament), bears the Hebrew name kikayon, and is presumed to be 
the kiki of the Egyptians, the castor-oil plant (Easton’s Bible Dictionary, n.d.). It is commonly 
known as “Palm of Christ” or Palma Christi, that derives from castor oil's ability to heal 
wounds and cure ailments. Castor seeds have been found in Egyptian tombs dating back to 
4000 BC, and were used in folk medicines against a wide variety of diseases. The plant has 
been cultivated for its commercial products, primarily castor oil, for at least 4000 years 
(Olsnes, 2004). Castor oil was used in rituals of sacrifice to please the gods in early 
civilizations. In Ancient Egypt and in Europe, it has been used for lighting, body ointments, 
improving hair growth and texture, and medicinal purposes, where it was regarded as a 
folk medicine. In India, castor oil has been documented since 2000 BC and was mainly used 
in lamps and in local medicine as a laxative, purgative, cathartic and other ethnomedical 
systems. In China, castor seed and its oil have been prescribed for centuries in local 
medicine for internal use. In Italy, castor oil was used as an instrument of coercion by the 
Squadristi, the Fascists armed squads of dictator Benito Mussolini; this idea originated from 
Gabriele D‘ Annunzio, a controversial nationalist, poet and war veteran (MacDonald, 1999). 
Political dissidents and regime opponents were forced to ingest the oil in large amounts, 
triggering severe diarrhea and dehydration that oftentimes led to death (New World 
Encyclopedia, n.d.).  
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In recent centuries, however, natural castor oil was at first identified as a laxative and as a 
lubricant for the wheels of wagons and carts, as well as aircrafts during World War I (WWI). 
Today, castor oil (extracted minus the ricin) has a wide variety of commercial applications 
(International Castor Oil Association, ICOA, 1992). It is used for medicinal purposes both 
internally, as a strong and effective purgative or cathartic, and externally to treat corns, 
among other purposes (Sims & Frey, 2005). Castor oil and its derivatives also have 
numerous industrial merits, being used in a wide variety of products, such as the basic 
ingredient in racing motor oil for high-performance engines, a fuel additive for two-cycle 
engines, a primary raw material in the production of nylons and other resins and fibers, and 
a component in paint and varnish, insulation, fabric coatings, soap, ink, plastics, hydraulic 
fluids, lubricants, guns, insecticidal oils, cosmetics, and antifungal compounds (Brugsch, 
1960; Caupin, 1997; McKeon et al., 1999; Sims & Frey, 2005). Because of its economic benefits 
and myriads of uses, castor seeds are currently being produced in more than 30 countries in 
the world. In 2008, world’s production of castor oil totaled to 1,605,362 metric tons (MT) 
(Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations Statistical Database, FAOSTAT, 
2011); the leading producers include India (1,171,000 MT), China (190,000 MT), and Brazil 
(122,140 MT). After oil extraction and inactivation of ricin, the defatted waste “mash“ (also 
called castor bean meal) is used as animal feed while the seed husks are used as high 
nitrogen fertilizer (Kole, 2011).  
Ricin toxin was discovered in 1888 by Hermann Stillmark, a student at the Dorpat 
University in Estonia (Stillmark, 1888, as cited in Franz and Jaax, 1997). During Stillmark‘s 
extensive research, he also observed that ricin caused agglutination of erythrocytes and 
precipitation of serum proteins (Olsnes, 2004). Olsnes and Phil (1972) demonstrated that 
ricin inhibited protein synthesis, and suggested that the effects resulted from restricted 
elongation of nascent polypeptide chain. Subsequent studies revealed that the molecular 
target of the toxin was the 60S ribosomal subunit (Olsnes and Phil, 1982). 
In the last decade, immunotoxins using the ricin A-chain chemically-linked to monoclonal 
antibodies have been used as an alternative in therapies against cancer, AIDS and other 
illnesses (Engert et al., 1997; Schnell et al., 2003; Youn et al., 2005). Ricin-based 
immunotoxins, some of which contained deglycosylated ricin A chain conjugated to either 
the anti-CD22 antibody RFB4 (Amlot et al., 1993; Sausville et al., 1995), or its Fab fragment 
(Vitetta et al., 1991) have also been shown to provide enhanced therapeutic efficacy and 
resulted in improved antitumor activity (Li et al., 2005; Kreitman et al., 2005; Vitetta, 2006). 
However, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has placed a hold on the clinical 
testing of RTA-based immunotoxins because they caused vascular leak syndrome (VLS) in 
humans.  
2.1 Biological warfare and terrorism 
2.1.1 History of ricin as a biological weapon 
During WWI, ricin was investigated as a potential offensive biological weapon. Two 
methods of weaponizing the toxin were explored, i.e., bullets and shrapnel coated with 
ricin, or a 'dust cloud' of toxin inhaled into the lungs (Smart, 1997). Nonetheless, the thermal 
instability of ricin constrained its initial use in exploding shells, and ethical and treaty issues 
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2.1 Biological warfare and terrorism 
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methods of weaponizing the toxin were explored, i.e., bullets and shrapnel coated with 
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LeClaire, 2007). WWI ended before the toxin could be weaponized and tested. During 
WWII, ricin was produced in hundreds of kilograms and armed into W bombs (ricin-
containing bombs), but apparently was never used in battle (Franz & Jaax, 1997). Although 
its toxicity made it marginally better over existing agents, ricin was surpassed by the even 
more potent biological agents of the time. Interest in ricin continued for a short period after 
WWII, but soon subsided when the U.S. Army Chemical Corps began a program to 
weaponize sarin. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union also studied ricin as a possible 
biological weapons agent. Ken Alibek, a former top official involved in Russia’s biological 
weapons program who defected to the U.S. in 1991, claimed that Russia developed ricin 
toxin as a weapon, and that the ricin toxin used against the Bulgarian dissident Georgi 
Markov, as well Vladimir Kostov (another Bulgarian exile in Paris), was concocted in 
Russian laboratories (Maman & Yehezkelli, 2005). During 1989, approximately 10 L of 
concentrated ricin solution was reportedly manufactured at Salman Park just south of 
Baghdad, some of which were used in animal testing and as payload in artillery shells 
(Zilinskas, 1997). More recently, ricin has been used by terrorist organizations (CDC, 2008). 
In 2002, a report emerged that Ansar al-Islam, a Sunni Islamic group allegedly linked to 
Osama Bin Laden's al-Qaeda organization, had been testing biological weapons including 
ricin at a small facility in northern Iraq (BBC News, 20 August 2002). A news item 
documented evidence of the manufacture of ricin and botulinum toxin in Iraq (Mendenhall, 
2003). Syria was also believed to have produced unknown quantities of the toxin. Iran 
allegedly procured 120 tons of castor beans in 1992, presumably for ricin production 
(Croddy & Wirtz, 2005). Ricin was also found in Afghanistan after the collapse of the 
Taliban Government in 2001 (GlobalSecurity.org, n.d.; Barceloux, 2008).  
Ricin is currently monitored as a Schedule 1 toxic chemical under the Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and 
on Their Destruction (CWC). Also, the intentional use of ricin or related toxins as weapons is 
prohibited under the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production 
and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction 
(BTWC) (Millard & Le Claire, 2007; Poli, 2007). The possession or transfer of ricin, abrin, or 
genes encoding functional forms of these toxins is also regulated in the U.S. by the Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) Select Agents and Toxins Program.  
Although ricin’s potential use as a military weapon was investigated, its utility over 
conventional weaponry remains disputed. Despite its toxicity, ricin is less potent than 
other agents such as botulinum neurotoxin or anthrax. Kortepeter & Parker (1999) 
estimated that eight metric tons of ricin would have to be aerosolized over a 100 km2 area 
to achieve about 50% casualty, whereas only kilogram quantities of anthrax spores would 
cause the same effect. Furthermore, dispersal of ricin on a wide scale is logistically 
impractical. Thus, while ricin is easy to produce, it is not as likely to cause as many 
casualties as other agents (Schep et al., 2009). However, it has been the agent of choice in 
numerous biocrimes (see below). 
2.1.2 Ricin as a terrorist weapon 
Ricin has been classified by the CDC as a Category B agent. Category B agents are 
moderately easy to disseminate, can cause morbidity and low mortality, and include Coxiella 
burnetii, Brucella spp, Burkholderia mallei, B. pseudomallei, alphaviruses (VEE, EEE, WEE), 
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Rickettsia prowazekii, toxins (e.g., ricin, Staphylococcal enterotoxin B, epsilon toxin of 
Clostridium perfringens), Chlamydia psittaci, food safety threats (e.g., Salmonella spp., 
Escherichia coli O157:H7, Shigella), and water safety threats (e.g. Vibrio cholerae, 
Cryptosporidium parvum) (Rotz et al., 2002). Though ricin is not considered an effective 
weapon of mass destruction, its potential as a weapon of terror cannot be discounted. 
Further, ricin’s notoriety is likely driven by the ready availability of castor beans, press 
coverage, and popularization on the internet. In the U.S. for example, the use of ricin as a 
biological agent in bioterrorism and homicides is of particular concern especially after the 
events of September 11, 2001. Worldwide, numerous cases involving the possession, 
experimentation, or planned misuse of ricin by bioterrorists and extremist groups have been 
investigated or prosecuted by law enforcement agencies (Franz and Jaax, 1997; James Martin 
Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS), 2004; Research International, Inc. (RII), 2011). 
The following incidents have reportedly involved the use and/or possession of ricin.  
 On September 7, 1978 while waiting at a bus stop in London, a Bulgarian dissident, 
Georgi Markov, felt a jab in the back of his right thigh and saw a man picking up an 
umbrella (Crompton & Gall, 1980). Markov, a 49-year-old novelist and playwriter had 
published and broadcasted anticommunist views. An assassin reportedly injected a 
small pellet of ricin (believed to have been supplied by the KGB), into Markov’s right 
thigh using a weapon in the shape of an umbrella (Maman & Yehezkelli, 2005). He 
subsequently developed severe gastroenteritis, high fever, and died 3 days later 
(discussed in detail later in this chapter). At autopsy, a small 1.53-mm metallic sphere 
that had 2 tiny holes and could hold a volume of 0.28 mm3, was found at the wound 
site. No specific isolation of any poison was possible. Because of the small volume and 
rapid demise of the patient, ricin was believed to be the only capable inciting agent. The 
coroner recreated the scenario by injecting a pig with a somewhat greater dose than 
Markov had received (Crompton & Gall, 1980). With an illness similar to Markov’s, the 
animal died 26 hours later. Thereafter the coroner was satisfied that Markov had been 
unlawfully killed by a tiny pellet containing 0.2 to 0.5 mg dose of ricin (Musshoff & 
Madea, 2009). The KGB denied any involvement although high-profile defectors Oleg 
Kalugin and Oleg Gordievsky have since confirmed the KGB's involvement (Pearce, 
2011). 
 In 1981, exposed CIA double agent Boris Korczak was reportedly shot with a ricin-laced 
pellet (Carus, 2002). He survived this assassination attempt which was thought to be the 
work of the KGB.  
 In 1982, William A. Chanslor, a Texas attorney was sentenced to jail for 3 years and 
fined $5,000 for plotting to kill his 39-year-old wife with ricin. He claimed that he 
wanted the ricin to assist his wife, paralyzed from the waist down due to a stroke, in 
committing suicide (Time Magazine, 16 August 1982).  
 In 1983, two brothers were arrested by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for 
producing an ounce of pure ricin (RII, 2011).  
 In 1983 and 1985, Montgomery Todd Meeks, a high school senior was tried and 
convicted of attempted murder and solicitation to murder in connection with a plot to 
kill his father using ricin (Trager, 1985, as cited in Carus (2002). He claimed that the act 
was motivated by his father's abuse (RII, 2011).  
 In 1991, four members of the Minnesota Patriots Council, a radical tax-protesting militia 
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sheriffs, U.S. Marshals, and IRS agents. Despite having no specific expertise in 
biological warfare, they extracted about 0.7 g of 5% ricin, which was enough to kill 
about 100 people. Two members were convicted in 1994, and the other two in 1995 
under the Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act (BWATA) law (RII, 2011). 
 On April 21, 1992, the Washington Post published an article regarding the unsuccessful 
attempt to poison the famous Soviet dissident Alexander Solzhenitsyn with the same 
lethal chemical (thought to be ricin) used to kill Bulgarian dissident Georgi Markov in 
London in 1978 (Remnick, 21 April 1992). 
 In December 1995, Thomas Lewis Lavy, an electrician from Valdez, Alaska was arrested 
in Onia, Arkansas for possession of ricin (Kifner, 2005). In April 1993, he was caught 
while trying to smuggle 130 g of ricin and other materials from Alaska into Canada, and 
was then charged under BWATA with possession of a biological toxin with intent to 
kill. Lavy killed himself in his prison cell several days after his arrest (RII, 2011). 
 In 1995, a federal case was brought against Dr. Ray W. Mettetal, Jr., a neurologist at 
Rockingham Memorial Hospital in Harrisonburg, Virginia, after ricin was discovered in 
his possession and also of providing false information (Carus, 2002).  
 In 1995, Deborah Green, a non-practicing oncologist from Prairie Village, Kansas, 
attempted to murder her husband, Michael Farrar, a cardiologist, with ricin (Musick, 
25 May 2000; Carus 2002). Green had purchased the castor beans through a special 
order from a garden center in Kansas City, Missouri, and placed them in Farrar’s 
food. It is unclear if she extracted the ricin or merely added the beans to the food. 
Later, Farrar had to undergo multiple heart and brain surgeries related to the 
poisoning (CNS, 2004). 
 In 1997, a man was indicted under the provisions of BWATA for possessing ricin and 
nicotine sulfate. He pled guilty to manufacturing ricin and was sentenced to more than 
12 years in prison (Cordesman, 2002). 
 On August 25, 1998, Dwayne Lee Kuehl was arrested in Escanaba, Michigan, for 
producing ricin with intent to use it against an Escanaba city housing inspector (RII 
2011).  
 In November 1999, FBI agents apprehended James Kenneth Gluck in Tampa, Florida, 
for threatening to kill court officials in Jefferson County, Colorado with ricin (The New 
York Times, 08 November 1999). 
 In August 2001, the FSB (Russian Federal Security Service) told the Itar-Tass news 
service it had intercepted a recorded conversation between two Chechen field 
commanders (Brigadier General Rizvan Chitigov and field commander Hizir 
Alhazurov) about instructions on the homemade production of poisons against Russian 
troops (RII, 2011). Russian authorities reportedly raided Chitigov's home and seized 
materials, including instructions on how to produce ricin from castor beans, a small 
chemical laboratory, three homemade explosives, two land mines, and 30 grenades 
(Gad, 2007).  
 In June 2002, Ken Olson, an Agilent software engineer, was convicted of ricin 
possession (Tizon, 2004). He was given a 13-year, 9-month sentence in April 2004.  
 In August 2002, the Sunni miltant group Ansar al-Islam was reported to be involved in 
testing biological agents including ricin on barnyard animals and perhaps even an 
unwitting human subject (BBC News, 20 August 2002).  
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 In December 2002, six terrorist suspects were arrested in Manchester, England. Their 
apartment was serving as a “ricin laboratory.” Among them was a 27-year-old chemist 
who was producing the toxin (CDC, 2003a). 
 In January 2003, authorities discovered traces of ricin in the apartment of six 
Algerians in Wood Green, northern London (Hopkins & Branigan, 08 January 2003). 
They also discovered castor beans and equipment for crushing the beans. Those 
arrested are believed to be part of a terrorist cell known as the “Chechen network“ 
which may have ties to the Algerian group behind the millennium bomb plots in the 
U.S. All but one of the suspects was acquitted of charges in April, 2005 (Research 
International, 2011).  
 In October 2003, an envelope with a threatening note and a sealed container that had 
ricin in it was discovered at a mail processing and distribution facility in Greenville, 
South Carolina. The note threatened to poison water supplies if demands were not met 
(CDC, 2003b). 
 In February 2004, traces of ricin were discovered on an automatic mail sorter in the 
mailroom of the Dirksen Senate Office building in Washington, D.C which handled 
mail addressed to Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist (CNN.com, 04 February 2004). 
 In January 2005, the FBI arrested an Ocala, Florida man after agents found ricin and 
other products in the home he lives in with his mother (CNN.com, 14 January 2005). 
 On October 3, 2006, a survivalist from Phoenix, Arizona was sentenced to 7 years in 
prison for attempting to manufacture ricin (Martens, 2006). 
 In 2007, traces of ricin had been found at Limerick Prison (Lally, 2007). The ricin was 
smuggled into Ireland from the U.S. in a contact lens case, to be used in an assassination 
plot. An arrest was made before the ricin could be used (RII, 2011).  
 In November 2008, Roger Von Bergendorff was fined and sentenced to 3.5 years in 
prison for having ricin and unregistered firearm silencers. In February 2008, 
Bergendorff was living in a motel room in Las Vegas, Nevada when he was taken to a 
hospital in critical condition. Authorities recovered castor beans, a weapons cache, a 
copy of "The Anarchist Cookbook" with a page about ricin marked, and 4 crude grams 
of ricin in his room. Investigators also found respirators, gloves and chemicals that 
could be used in the production of ricin in one of Bergendorff's storage units in Utah 
(Powers, 18 November 2008). 
 In June 2009, a father and son, Ian and Nicky Davison were arrested after the 
discovery of ricin at a house in County Durham (BBC News, 06 June 2009). Ian 
Davidson was sentenced to 10 years in May 2010 for preparing acts of terrorism, three 
counts of possessing material useful to commit acts of terrorism and possessing a 
prohibited weapon; his son was given 2 years youth detention for possessing material 
useful to commit acts of terrorism (Wainwright, 2010).In January 2011, The FBI has 
arrested the owner of a Coventry Township, Ohio home for unlawful possession of 
ricin (Sharma, 29 January 2011).  
 In June 2011, Michael Crooker, a former Agawam man, was sentenced to 15 years in 
federal prison for illegally possessing ricin and threatening a prosecutor (Associated 
Press, AP, 22 June 2011). In another report during the same period, a British citizen, 
Asim Kauser, was brought to court on charges including possessing instructions for 
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The above events clearly demonstrate that ricin is readily available or accessible, relatively 
easy to produce, and seemingly, a biological weapon of choice by extremist groups and 
individuals. Hence, it should be seriously considered as a potential bioterrorism threat 
agent. 
3. Description of the agent 
3.1 Overview of ribosome-inactivating proteins 
Ricin belongs to a diverse family of ribosome-inactivating proteins (RIPs) that include 
numerous other toxins from a wide variety of plants, as well as potent bacterial Shiga and 
Shiga-like toxins (Endo et al., 1988). RIPs possess N-glycosidase activity that depurinates a 
highly conserved adenine residue within the specific 14 nucleotide region (also known as α-
sarcin/ricin loop) of the 28S ribosomal RNA (rRNA) subunit of 60S ribosome (Endo et al., 
1987; Endo & Tsurugi, 1987). There are three types of RIPs. Type 1 RIPs are monomeric N-
glycosidase enzymes of approximately 30 kDA molecular mass, and are frequently found in 
higher plants, e.g., pokeweed antiviral protein, trichosanthin, saporin, and luffin (Nielsen & 
Boston, 2001). In general, type I RIPs are not cytotoxic because they lack the means of 
entering the cell (B chain) to inactivate ribosomes (Lord et al., 1994).  
Type 2 RIPs are glycosylated heterodimers possessing an N-glycosidase enzyme (denoted A 
chain) linked through a disulfide bond to a galactose-binding lectin (denoted B-chain) that 
facilitates endocytosis (Lord et al., 1994; Stirpe & Battelli, 2006). Type 2 RIPs include potent 
toxins such as ricin, abrin (isolated from the seeds of rosary pea, Abrus precatorius), modeccin 
(from the fruits and roots of Adenia digitata), volkensin (from the roots of A. volkensii), and 
viscumins (from mistletoe, Viscum album; Lord et al., 1994). Some type 2 RIPs possess an 
aberrant or non-functional B-chain, hence are relatively nontoxic. These include nigrin b 
from the elderberry plant (Sambucus nigra), lectins from winter aconite (Eranthis hyemalis), 
and ebulin lectins from dwarf elder (S. ebulus). 
Type 3 RIPs are the least common class and resemble type I plant RIPs in catalytic activity 
and overall net charge (Nielsen & Boston, 2001). They are synthesized as inactive precursor 
molecules with a polypeptide insert in the active site region of the A chain domain 
(Chaudhry et al., 1994). 
3.1.2 Biochemistry of ricin 
Ricin is the most well-characterized member of the type 2 RIPs. It consists of two 
glycoprotein subunits, designated A chain (RTA) and B chain (RTB), of approximately 
equal molecular mass (~32 kDa) linked by a single disulfide bond (Fig. 3). The ricin toxin 
is stored in the matrix of the castor seed, together with a 120 kDa lectin called R. communis 
agglutinin I (RCA). RCA is composed of two ricin-like dimers. Although the nucleotide 
sequences of ricin and RCA are similar, these proteins are products of distinct genes 
(Kole, 2011); it has been suggested that the ricin gene evolved first and then duplicated to 
give rise to the RCA gene (Ready et al., 1984). Compared with ricin, RCA is virtually 
nontoxic (Olsnes et al., 1974) but is a powerful red blood cell agglutinin (Hegde & Podder, 
1992). 
 




Fig. 3. Three-dimensional representation of ricin. The A chain (RTA) is depicted in red, the B 
chain (RTB) in blue, and the disulfide bond in yellow. (Image courtesy of Dr. Mark A. Olson, 
Integrated Toxicology Division, USAMRIID, Fort Detrick, MD). 
3.1.2.1 Primary structure of ricin/RCA 
The ricin protein’s coding region consists of a 24 amino acid N-terminal signal sequence 
preceding a 266 amino acid RTA. The RTB has 262 amino acids. A 12-amino acid linker joins 
the two chains. The nontranslated mRNA regions of ricin and RCA are identical (Roberts, et 
al., 1985; Lamb et al., 1985). The signal peptide preceding the RTA in both lectins and the linker 
peptide joining the RTA and RTB are also alike in size and amino acid sequence. Overall, the 
RCA and RTA chains are 93% homologous (18 amino acid variants) while the corresponding B 
chains differ in 41 amino acids, and are 84% homologous (Lamb et al., 1985). 
3.1.2.2 Ricin secondary structure 
The carboxyl-terminal end of the RTA folds into a domain that interacts between the two 
domains of the B chain (Montfort et al., 1987). A disulfide bond is formed at amino acid 259 of 
the RTA and amino acid 4 of the RTB (Robertus, 1988; 1991; Lord et al., 1994). Thirty percent of 
the RTA protein is helical (Fig. 4). The RTA folds into three somewhat arbitrary domains. The 
active site cleft of the RTA is located at the interface between all three domains. A 
conformational change occurs in the active site when the RTA is released from the RTB.  
 
Fig. 4. Ribbon representation of RTA. The RTA has three structural domains and exhibits a 
substantial amount of secondary structure. Color schemes: cyan = helix; magenta = strands; 
red = coil regions. (Image courtesy of Dr. Mark A. Olson, Integrated Toxicology Division,  
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Ricin is a toxalbumin, a biological toxin whose mechanism of action is inhibition of protein 
synthesis in eukaryotic cells which results in cell death (CDC, 2006a). The dimeric A-B chain 
structure is crucial to cellular internalization and subsequent toxicity. Cell entry by ricin 
involves a series of steps, summarized as follows: 1) the RTB portion of the ricin molecule 
binds to cell surface glycolipids or glycoproteins possessing 1,4-linked galactose residues; 2) 
once bound to the cell surface, the toxin is internalized by endocytosis and routed to the 
cytosol. The presence of the B-chain facilitates transport of the A-chain into the cytosol; 3) 
toxin entry into early endosomes; 4) ricin vesicular transport from early endosomes to the 
trans-Golgi network; 5) retrograde vesicular transport through the Golgi network to reach 
the endoplasmic reticulum; 6) reduction of the disulfide bond connecting RTA and RTB; 7) 
partial unfolding of the RTA to render it translocationally competent to cross the 
endoplasmic reticulum (Endo et al., 1987; Olsnes & Koslov, 2001; Lord et al., 1994; 2003). 
Transport to the cytosol is the rate-limiting step during the decline in protein synthesis 
(Hudson and Neville, 1987). 
Once transported from the ER to the cytoplasm, the RTA can interact with the ribosome, 
which acts as a suicidal chaperone stimulating proper refolding and resumption of catalytic 
activity (Lord et al., 2003). Ricin has a Michaelis constant (KM) of 0.1 μmol/L for ribosomes 
and an enzymatic constant (Kcat) of 1,500/min. It depurinates a specific adenosine residue 
(A4324) near the 3’ end of 28S ribosomal RNA subunit in the 60S ribosome subunit 
(Robertus, 1991). This halts the binding of elongation factor-2, which then results in the 
inhibition of protein synthesis in eukaryotic cells (Endo et al., 1987). Catalytic studies 
showed that single ricin molecule in the cytosol can inactivate over 1500 ribosomes per 
minute and eventually kills the cell (Olsnes et al.,1975; Cawley and Houston, 1979).  
Ricin is more active against animal than plant or bacterial ribosomes (Cawley and Houston, 
1979). Ribosomes which lack the specific 28S subunit containing the GAGA tetranucleotide 
sequence are generally not susceptible to the toxin. 
3.3 Toxicity 
Ricin’s toxicity is dependent on a number of factors including route of exposure (inhalation, 
parenteral (injection), ingestion, dermal contact, or ocular contact), amount of toxin 
administered, and animal species.  
3.3.1 Route of administration 
Ricin is extremely toxic by inhalation, and least potent by the oral route. In mice, the 
approximate dose that is lethal to 50% of the exposed population (LD50) and time to death 
are, respectively, 3-5 μg/kg (Franz and Jaax, 1997) and 60 hours by inhalation (Kortepeter et 
al., 2001a), 20 mg/kg and 85 hours by ingestion (Franz and Jaax, 1997), 5 μg/kg and 90 
hours by intravenous injection (Franz and Jaax, 1997), and 24 μg/kg and 100 hours by 
subcutaneous injection (Franz and Jaax, 1997). Low oral toxicity is possibly due to poor toxin 
absorption and partial degradation in the gut. Higher toxicities by other routes may be 
related to accessibility of target-cell populations and the availability of toxin receptors 
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among cell types. Skin testing in mice showed no dermal toxicity, indicating poor 
absorption across the skin (Wannemacher & Anderson, 2005). 
3.3.2 Amount of toxin administered 
Ingestion and mastication of 3-6 castor beans is the estimated fatal dose in adults; the fatal 
dose in children is not known, but is likely less (CDC, 2006a). Most cases of castor bean 
ingestion do not result in poisoning, because: a) it is difficult for ricin to be released from 
ingested castor beans; b) ricin release requires mastication, and the degree of mastication is 
likely to be important in determining the extent of poisoning; and c) ricin is not as well 
absorbed through the gastrointestinal tract when compared to injection or inhalation (CDC, 
2006a).  
3.3.3 Animal species 
The lethality of ricin by different routes in several animal species was summarized by 
Millard & LeClaire (2007). By ingestion, the hens were the least sensitive to the toxin (LD50 = 
14 g/kg), and the horses were the most sensitive (LD50 = 0.1 g/kg). By injection, rabbits had 
an LD50 = 0.1 μg/kg (i.m.), and 0.5 μg/kg (i.v.), while guinea pigs had <1.1 μg/kg (i.v.) and 
0.8 μg/kg (i.m.) (Millard & LeClaire, 2007). 
3.4 Human toxicity 
Limited information is available regarding human toxicity. Based on animal experiments 
and accidental human exposures, the approximate LD50 and time to death for humans are, 
respectively, 3 μg/kg and 36-72 hours by inhalation, 30 μg/kg and 6-8 days by ingestion, 3 
μg/kg and 36-72 hours by intravenous injection, and 500 μg and 3-6 days by subcutaneous 
injection (based on Georgi Markov’s assassination) (Franz & Jaax, 1997; Maman & 
Yehezkelli, 2005; Mirarchi, 2010). 
The vulnerability of certain populations (e.g., children, pregnant women, the elderly, those 
with immunosuppression, or underlying respiratory or gastrointestinal tract disease) to the 
health effects of ricin exposure is unknown; however, persons with pre-existing tissue 
irritation or damage may sustain further injury upon ricin exposure (CDC, 2006a). 
3.5 Transmission 
Ricin may adhere to skin, nonetheless, person-to-person transmission through casual 
contact has not been reported. Ricin is transmitted by the airborne route through release of 
the toxin in the form of a powder, or a mist, or reaerosolization of ricin into the air from 
disturbed surfaces (CDC, 2006a). However, to be effective, the toxin would need to be 
dispersed in particles smaller than 5 microns (CDC, 2006a).  
4. Clinical symptoms, signs and pathology 
The clinical signs, symptoms, and pathological manifestations of ricin toxicity vary with the 
dose and route of exposure, as detailed below. For symptomatic patients, the clinical course 
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bleeding, anuria, diarrhea, cramps, and vascular collapse can also occur (Challoner & 
McCarron, 1990). Most symptoms develop less than 6 hours after ingestion, although the lag 
time from ingestion of castor seeds to onset of symptoms has ranged from 15 minutes to 
almost 10 hours. Progression to death occurs within 36 to 72 hours of exposure, depending 
on the route of exposure and the dose received (CDC, 2008).  
4.1 Injection 
In humans, subcutaneous or intramuscular injection of high doses of ricin results in severe 
local lymphoid necrosis, gastrointestinal hemorrhage, liver necrosis, diffuse nephritis, and 
diffuse splenitis. Ricin injection leads to necrosis at the injection site, which may predispose 
one to secondary infection (Passeron et al., 2004). Crompton & Gall (1980) summarized the 
clinical signs and symptoms for the Bulgarian dissident Georgi Markov, whose well-
publicized assassination was attributed to intramuscular injection of ricin (~500 μg), as 
follows: there was an immediate local pain, followed by general weakness within about 5 
hours. This was followed by elevated temperature, nausea, and vomiting 15 to 24 hours 
later. Thirty-six hours after the incident, the patient was admitted to the hospital feeling 
very ill. He exhibited fever, tachycardia, normal blood pressure, swollen and sore lymph 
nodes in the affected groin, and and a 6-cm diameter area of induration and inflammation 
was observed at the injection site on his thigh. Over the next 48 hours, he became suddenly 
hypotensive and tachycardic; developed GI hemorrhage, hypovolemic shock, and renal 
failure. His white blood count was 26,300/mm3. Early on the third day after the attack, he 
became anuric and began vomiting blood. An electrocardiogram demonstrated complete 
atrioventricular conduction block. He died shortly thereafter; at the time of death, his white 
blood count was 33,200/mm3. The autopsy revealed pulmonary edema that was thought to 
have been secondary to Markov’s cardiac failure, hemorrhagic necrosis of the small bowel, 
and hemorrhages in lymph nodes near the injection site, myocardium, testicles, and 
pancreas (Crompton and Gall, 1980). 
A case of a 20-year-old male who allegedly committed suicide by injecting (s.c.) castor bean 
extract was reported to show severe weakness, nausea, dizziness, headache, chest, back, and 
abdominal pain 36 hours after the injection (Targosz et al., 2002). This patient subsequently 
developed a bleeding diathesis, liver failure, and renal failure. He succumbed to cardiac ar-
rest. Postmortem examination revealed hemorrhagic foci in the brain, myocardium, and the 
pleura (Targosz et al., 2002).  
A 36-year-old chemist who allegedly injected (i.m.) himself with an unknown amount of 
ricin prepared from homogenized castor seeds reportedly experienced headache and rigors 
10 hours after exposure. He then developed anorexia, nausea, sinus tachycardia, 
lymphadenopathy at the injection sites, and erythematous areas around the puncture 
wounds (Fine et al., 1992). 
In a clinical study involving cancer patients, intravenous administration of 40 low doses (18–
20 μg/m2 of estimated body surface area) of ricin was well tolerated (Fodstad et al., 1984). 
Flu-like symptoms with fatigue and muscular pain were common, and sometimes nausea 
and vomiting occurred. The symptoms began 4 to 6 hours after administration and lasted 
for 1 to 2 days. Phase I/II clinical trials of two experimental immunotoxins containing 
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deglycosylated RTA (RFT5.dgA and Ki-4.dgA) administered i.v. to Hodgkins’ lymphoma 
patients revealed maximum tolerated doses (MTDs) of 15 and 5 mg/m2 of estimated body 
surface area for RFT5.dgA and Ki-4.dgA, respectively (Schnell et al., 2003). 
4.2 Oral intoxication 
Ricin is less toxic by oral ingestion than by other routes (Rauber & Heard, 1985), probably 
due to poor absorption of the toxin and possibly partial enzymatic degradation in the di-
gestive tract. The effects of oral intoxication vary among individuals, are dose dependent, 
and have different signs and symptoms. Rauber & Heard (1985) reviewed 751 cases of castor 
bean ingestion and reported 14 fatalities (1.9% death rate). The number of beans ingested by 
patients who died greatly varied. For instance, of the two lethal cases of oral intoxication 
documented since 1930, one involved a 24-year-old man who ate 15 to 20 beans, and the 
other was a 15-year-old boy who had 10 to 12 beans. All of the described serious, or fatal 
cases of castor bean ingestion have the same general clinical history: rapid (less than a few 
hours) onset of nausea, vomiting, and abdominal pain followed by diarrhea, hemorrhage 
from the anus, anuria, cramps, dilation of the pupils, fever, thirst, sore throat, headache, 
vascular collapse, and shock. Death occurred on the third day or later. The most common 
autopsy findings in oral intoxication were multifocal ulcerations and hemorrhages of gastric 
and small-intestinal mucosa, which may be quite severe; lymphoid necrosis in the 
mesenteric lymph nodes, gut-associated lymphoid tissue (GALT), and spleen; Kupffer cell 
and liver necrosis; diffuse nephritis; and diffuse splenitis (Rauber & Heard, 1985; Bradberry 
et al., 2003). 
4.3 Inhalation 
There are no documented cases of aerosol exposure to ricin in humans. Lesions induced by 
oral and parenteral exposure are consistent with those from animal studies, suggesting that 
the same would hold true for aerosol exposures. An allergic syndrome has been reported in 
workers exposed to castor bean dust in or around castor oil-processing plants (Brugsch, 
1960). The clinical picture is characterized by the sudden onset of congestion of the nose and 
throat, itchiness of the eyes, urticaria, and tightness of the chest. In more severe cases, 
wheezing can last for several hours, and may lead to bronchial asthma. Affected individuals 
respond to symptomatic therapy and removal from the exposure source.  
5. Diagnosis 
Ricin poisoning can be diagnosed based on clinical and epidemiological information, e.g., 
ingestion of castor beans, or occurrence of multiple cases during a short period, suggesting a 
common-source etiology (Wortmann, 2004). Ricin intoxication should be suspected if 
clinicians are presented with a number of patients having acute lung injury. A covert 
dispersion of aerosolized ricin is expected to be diagnosed, post factum, only after clinical 
symptoms occur (Kortepeter et al., 2001b). One common problem encountered in patients 
treated with ricin immunotoxins is the VLS, in which fluids leak from blood vessels leading 
to hypoalbumina, weight gain and pulmonary edema (Ghetie & Vitetta, 1994a). In patients 
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deglycosylated RTA (RFT5.dgA and Ki-4.dgA) administered i.v. to Hodgkins’ lymphoma 
patients revealed maximum tolerated doses (MTDs) of 15 and 5 mg/m2 of estimated body 
surface area for RFT5.dgA and Ki-4.dgA, respectively (Schnell et al., 2003). 
4.2 Oral intoxication 
Ricin is less toxic by oral ingestion than by other routes (Rauber & Heard, 1985), probably 
due to poor absorption of the toxin and possibly partial enzymatic degradation in the di-
gestive tract. The effects of oral intoxication vary among individuals, are dose dependent, 
and have different signs and symptoms. Rauber & Heard (1985) reviewed 751 cases of castor 
bean ingestion and reported 14 fatalities (1.9% death rate). The number of beans ingested by 
patients who died greatly varied. For instance, of the two lethal cases of oral intoxication 
documented since 1930, one involved a 24-year-old man who ate 15 to 20 beans, and the 
other was a 15-year-old boy who had 10 to 12 beans. All of the described serious, or fatal 
cases of castor bean ingestion have the same general clinical history: rapid (less than a few 
hours) onset of nausea, vomiting, and abdominal pain followed by diarrhea, hemorrhage 
from the anus, anuria, cramps, dilation of the pupils, fever, thirst, sore throat, headache, 
vascular collapse, and shock. Death occurred on the third day or later. The most common 
autopsy findings in oral intoxication were multifocal ulcerations and hemorrhages of gastric 
and small-intestinal mucosa, which may be quite severe; lymphoid necrosis in the 
mesenteric lymph nodes, gut-associated lymphoid tissue (GALT), and spleen; Kupffer cell 
and liver necrosis; diffuse nephritis; and diffuse splenitis (Rauber & Heard, 1985; Bradberry 
et al., 2003). 
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the same would hold true for aerosol exposures. An allergic syndrome has been reported in 
workers exposed to castor bean dust in or around castor oil-processing plants (Brugsch, 
1960). The clinical picture is characterized by the sudden onset of congestion of the nose and 
throat, itchiness of the eyes, urticaria, and tightness of the chest. In more severe cases, 
wheezing can last for several hours, and may lead to bronchial asthma. Affected individuals 
respond to symptomatic therapy and removal from the exposure source.  
5. Diagnosis 
Ricin poisoning can be diagnosed based on clinical and epidemiological information, e.g., 
ingestion of castor beans, or occurrence of multiple cases during a short period, suggesting a 
common-source etiology (Wortmann, 2004). Ricin intoxication should be suspected if 
clinicians are presented with a number of patients having acute lung injury. A covert 
dispersion of aerosolized ricin is expected to be diagnosed, post factum, only after clinical 
symptoms occur (Kortepeter et al., 2001b). One common problem encountered in patients 
treated with ricin immunotoxins is the VLS, in which fluids leak from blood vessels leading 
to hypoalbumina, weight gain and pulmonary edema (Ghetie & Vitetta, 1994a). In patients 





are signs of rapid onset of symptoms similar to VLS. Ricin ingestion should be suspected if 
patients with gastrointestinal hemorrhage and hypotension have eaten from the same food 
source.  
Because ricin is immunogenic, acute as well as convalescent sera should be obtained from 
patients 2 weeks after exposure for measurement of antibody response (Franz & Jaax, 1997). 
Immunoassay (for blood or other body fluids) or immunohistochemistry techniques (for 
direct analysis of tissues) may be useful for confirming ricin intoxication (Poli et al., 2007). 
However, identification of the toxin in body fluids or tissues is challenging because ricin is 
bound very quickly, and is also metabolized before excretion (Ramsden et al., 1989).  
Currently, two types of laboratory testing are available for suspected ricin exposures. For 
environmental cases (determined by the CDC for suspected exposures from the 
environment, or by the FDA for suspected exposures from food or medication), ricin can be 
detected qualitatively by time-resolved fluorescence immunoassay (TRFIA), and polymerase 
chain reaction (PCR) in specimens (e.g., filters, swabs, or wipes). For biologic samples, 
selected specimens can be assessed for urinary ricinine, a marker of ricin exposure, using 
HPLC-ESI-MS (CDC, 2006b).  
The differential diagnoses of aerosol exposure to ricin include staphylococcal enterotoxin B 
(SEB), community-acquired pneumonia, inhalational anthrax, Q fever, tularemia, plague, 
and exposure to pyrolysis by-products of organofluorine polymers, or other chemical 
warfare agents such as phosgene (Eitzen et al., 1998). For ingested ricin, differential 
diagnoses include enteric pathogens, enterotoxins, and other toxins, including caustic 
agents, mushroom species, hydrocarbons, and pharmaceuticals such as salicylates and 
colchicine. Several factors discriminate ricin intoxication from other agents, such as: 1) 
clinical progression despite antibiotics (as opposed to infectious agents); 2) lack of 
mediastinitis (as seen with pulmonary anthrax); 3) progressive decline in clinical status 
(patients exposed to SEB tend to stabilize), and a slower progression than patients exposed 
to phosgene (Eitzen et al., 1998; Kortepeter et al., 2001a; 2001b). 
5.1 Prognosis and cause of death 
Death from ricin exposure could occur within 36 to 72 hours (CDC, 2008). If death has not 
occurred within 3-5 days, the patient usually survives. A mortality rate of 1.9% (14 of 751 
patients) was reported after castor bean ingestion (Rauber & Heard, 1985). Even with little 
or no effective supportive care, the death rate in symptomatic patients has been 
approximately 6%. No information is available regarding human mortality rate after ricin 
inhalation.  
The exact cause of death from ricin poisoning possibly varies with route of exposure. Ricin 
ingestion results in ulceration and hemorrhage of the stomach and small intestine mucosa, 
necrosis of the mesenteric lymphatics, liver necrosis, nephritis, and splenitis (Poli et al., 2007). 
Injection of the toxin may lead to severe local lymphoid necrosis, gastrointestinal hemorrhage, 
liver necrosis, diffuse nephritis, and diffuse splenitis. Intravenous administration of ricin in 
rats resulted in diffuse damage to Kupffer cells within 4 hours, followed by endothelial cell 
damage, formation of thrombi in the liver vasculature, and finally, hepatocellular necrosis 
(Bingen et al., 1987; Derenzini et al., 1976). In mice, rats, and primates, high doses by inhalation 
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apparently produce lethal pulmonary damage, probably due to hypoxemia resulting from 
massive pulmonary edema and alveolar flooding (Poli et al., 2007). 
6. Medical management 
Currently, there is no FDA-approved therapeutic for ricin exposure. Countermeasures 
that have demonstrated capability to disrupt the ricin intoxication process include 
vaccines and antibody therapy. Both rely on the ability of antibody to prevent the 
binding of ricin to cell receptors. To ensure maximum protection, the vaccine must be 
given before exposure, and sufficient antibody must be produced. Similarly, 
administration of preformed antibodies affords maximum protection if antibody is 
present before exposure. 
Treatment is largely symptomatic and basically supportive to minimize the effects of the 
poisoning. Because ricin acts rapidly and irreversibly (directly on lung parenchyma after 
inhalation or is distributed rapidly to vital organs after parenteral exposure), postexposure 
therapy is more challenging than with slowly processed, peripherally acting agents that can 
be treated with antibiotics (Franz & Jaax, 1997).  
6.1 Vaccination and passive protection 
Inhalational exposure is best countered with active vaccination or prophylactic 
administration of aerosolized specific antibody (Franz and Jaax, 1997). However, there is 
currently no licensed vaccine available. Development of a ricin vaccine previously focused 
on either a deglycosylated ricin A chain or formalin-inactivated toxoid (Hewetson et al., 
1996). Both vaccines confer protection against aerosolized ricin. Nevertheless, ricin is not 
completely inactivated by formalin and may retain some of its enzymatic activity (albeit 
approximately 1,000-fold lower than native ricin). Deglycosylated ricin A chain may lead to 
local or systemic VLS.  
Recent research has focused on developing recombinant RTA subunit vaccines devoid of 
cytotoxicity and other potential deleterious activities. Several ricin vaccines candidates that 
are based on engineered RTA molecules have shown protection with different animal 
models, but demonstration of their human protection proved to be more challenging 
(Vitetta et al., 2005). USAMRIID has engineered a recombinant ricin vaccine 1-33/44-198 
(rRTA 1-33/44-198) (RVEc), with increased protein stability over the parent RTA subunit 
and devoid of enzymatic (N-glycosidase) activity (Olson et al., 2004), lacking vascular leak 
activity (Porter et al., 2011) described in RTA-based immunotoxins, and fully protected 
vaccinated animals against supralethal aerosol challenges (McHugh et al., 2004; Carra et al., 
2007). A cGLP pre-clinical toxicity study of RVEc in New Zealand white rabbits 
demonstrated that no treatment-related or toxicologically significant effects were observed 
with RVEc during this study (McClain et al., 2011). A phase I clinical study is ongoing at 
USAMRIID to evaluate the safety and immunogenicity of RVEc in humans (USAMRIID, 13 
April 2011; AP, 13 April 2011).  
A recombinant protein RTA vaccine, RiVax, has been developed based on mutations of both 
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protective immunity in mice, and had sufficient pre-clinical safety data (Smallshaw et al., 
2005). Results from the initial Phase I human trial showed that RiVax appeared to be 
immunological and well tolerated in humans (Vitetta et al., 2006). However, while such 
results were encouraging, vaccine formulation and stability remain problematic. Hence, a 
lyophilized formulation that retained immunogenicity when stored at 4ºC was developed 
(Smallshaw & Vitetta, 2010; Marconescu et al., 2010).  
Passive protection with aerosolized anti-ricin immunoglobulin (IgG) has also been 
evaluated as prophylaxis before aerosol challenge. Administration of nebulized anti-ricin 
IgG effectively protected against lung lesions and lethality in mice when challenged with an 
aerosol exposure to ricin (Poli et al., 1996). Extrapolation of these data to clearance rates of 
IgG from the airways of rabbits suggests that anti-ricin–specific antibodies may provide 
protection for up to 2 to 3 days or longer. These findings imply that inhaling protective 
antibody from a portable nebulizer just before an attack might provide some protection in 
nonimmune individuals (Poli et al., 1996). However, the window of opportunity for 
treatment by intravenous administration or inhalation of specific antibody after exposure is 
probably minimal at best.  
Recent pre-clinical studies have shown the powerful protection afforded by neutralizing 
monoclonal antibodies (administered singly or in combination) against a lethal dose 
challenge of ricin, demonstrating proof of concept for passive immunotherapy for the 
treatment of ricin poisoning or for preexposure prophylaxis (Neal, 2010; 2011; Prigent, 
2011). 
6.2 Supportive and specific therapy 
Supportive medical care depends on the route of exposure and clinical manifestations. For 
oral intoxication, supportive therapy includes intravenous fluid, electrolyte replacement, 
monitoring of liver and renal functions, gastric emptying/lavage, syrup of ipecac, cathartics, 
and, activated charcoal (Ellenhorn, 1997; Franz & Jaax, 1997). Patients who have ingested 
beans and presented asymptomatic should remain under observation for 4-6 hours after 
ingestion. For inhalational intoxication, respiratory support is given as needed. Aerosol-
exposed patient may require the use of positive-pressure ventilator therapy, fluid and elec-
trolyte replacement, antiinflammatory agents, and analgesics (Kortepeter et al., 2001b). 
Dermal exposures require supportive treatment. Percutaneous exposures would necessitate 
judicious use of intravenous fluids and monitoring for symptoms associated with VLS, 
including hypotension, edema, and pulmonary edema (Poli et al., 2007). Supportive care 
includes correction of coagulopathies, respiratory support, and monitoring for liver and 
renal failure .  
Several research groups have engaged in the development of RTA active site inhibitors or 
RTB receptor antagonists as clinical antidotes against ricin poisoning, or as therapeutic 
adjuncts to vaccination. Small molecules that exhibited modest IC50 values (Bai et al., 2010; 
Wahome et al., 2010; Pang et al., 2011), including a compound that showed in vivo efficacy 
(Stechmann et al., 2010) have been described. An effective and essentially irreversible RTA 
inhibitor is thought to be practically useful as a pretreatment for military forces or civilian 
first-responders (Millard & LeClaire, 2007).  
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7. Medical therapy of ricin 
In addition to studies pertaining to the natural toxicity of the protein, ricin has also been 
used extensively in the design of therapeutic immunotoxins. In such, ricin, RTA, or a related 
toxin is chemically or genetically linked to a binding ligand such as an antibody or growth 
factor that recognizes cancer cells, then it may be taken up by the cancer cells and ultimately 
kill them (Frankel, 1988). Immunotoxins using RTA or blocked ricin, have been evaluated in 
phase I clinical trials for control of several cancers (Ghetie & Vitetta, 1994b; Lynch et al., 
1997; Schnell et al., 2003; Vitetta, 2006).  
8. Summary 
Ricin is a potent toxin derived from the seeds of the castor plant, R. communis. Because of its 
potency, stability, worldwide availability, and relative ease of production, ricin is 
considered a significant biological warfare or terrorism threat. Ricin was developed as an 
aerosol biological weapon by the U.S. and its allies during WWII, although it was never 
used in battle. As a biological or chemical weapon, ricin has not been considered as very 
powerful in comparison with other agents such as botulinum neurotoxin or anthrax. 
However, its effectiveness as a discrete weapon of terror-targeted assassinations, biocrimes, 
or small-scale operations does raise potential concern. Ricin’s popularity as well as its track 
record in actually being exploited by extremists groups and individuals highlight the need 
to be vigilant of its latent misuse. Clinical manifestations of ricin poisoning vary depending 
on the routes of exposure. Diagnosis is based upon both epidemiological and clinical 
parameters. Laboratory confirmation of clinical samples is possible by immunoassay but 
complicated by pharmacokinetic factors. Currently, there is no U.S. FDA-approved drug or 
vaccine against ricin poisoning. Treatment is purely supportive. Prophylaxis will be best 
accomplished by vaccination. Ricin vaccine candidates are currently in advanced 
development in laboratory and clinical trials. 
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1. Introduction 
Concern over bio-terrorism has led to a demand for automated methods for the surveillance 
of disease counts with the ability to rapidly detect outbreaks of disease. While traditional 
statistical process control methods such as control charts have been found to have early 
detection properties when monitoring univariate disease counts, these are often inadequate 
for detecting bio-terrorism events. 
There are two principal impediments in statistical process control methods for the detection 
of bio-terrorism events: firstly, these methods aggregate over space by examining total 
counts and thus ignore the spatial dimension of the task and secondly they fail to adjust for 
the usual (seasonal) behaviour of diseases (e.g., Steiner et al., 2011 where the focus is early 
detection of the start of influenza outbreak). If disease outbreaks were expected to be spread 
relatively uniformly in space, then the former reason is unimportant. However, since bio-
terrorism attacks are likely to be introduced to specifically targeted locations, then the 
resulting disease instances are likely to cluster in space. Consequently, monitoring total 
counts is likely to reduce the signal-to-noise ratio of this outbreak by aggregating over 
regions where there is no outbreak. Exploiting the spatial clustering should be able to 
provide additional power and efficiency in detecting the outbreak.  
There is much ongoing work in developing methods that are efficient at detecting outbreaks 
in a spatial context but these methods may still fail to deal with the latter fault mentioned 
above. When surveillance for bio-terrorism involves the monitoring of diseases or 
syndromes already present in the population then the detection of an attack may be delayed 
if it is introduced during a period of normal seasonal increased activity. For example, 
respiratory complaints are often much more frequent in the cooler months so detecting an 
intentional disease outbreak with respiratory symptomatology would need to differentiate 
between the usual and an unusual increase in cases. Therefore, it is often necessary to 
remove the influence of the expected behaviour of a disease to detect the signal of an 
introduced strain early.  
Before presenting the method we are proposing in this chapter to deal with both of the 
above concerns, we begin by outlining some of the existing spatial disease detection 
methods. The current benchmark in spatio-temporal surveillance is the spatial SCAN 
statistic (Tango, 1995, Kulldorff, 1995, 1997, 2001, 2005). This method is a spatio-temporal 
moving average plan that systematically scans the target space applying a test to all 
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methods. The current benchmark in spatio-temporal surveillance is the spatial SCAN 
statistic (Tango, 1995, Kulldorff, 1995, 1997, 2001, 2005). This method is a spatio-temporal 
moving average plan that systematically scans the target space applying a test to all 
windows of data up to a given fixed size in time and space. This presents an intuitive 
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approach but has received some criticisms by Woodall et al. (2008) and Han et al. (2008), 
including: firstly that it is not as efficient as the cumulative SUM (CUSUM) (see Raubertas, 
1989, and Rogerson and Yamada, 2004) for outbreak detection and secondly that its ability 
to detect outbreaks most effectively is dependent on the choice of shape and size of the 
scanning window. In addition, in some of the literature on the SCAN statistic, the focus is on 
whether diseases cluster rather than on early detection.  
Some control chart methods have also been proposed such as the Multivariate Exponentially 
Weighted Moving Average (MEWMA) control chart method proposed by Joner et al. (2008). 
This approach could be extended to the lattice structure of counts discussed below but 
involving all cell counts in the lattice making it a high dimensional application of the 
MEWMA plan which is difficult to implement. Exponential weighted moving averages 
(EWMA) have also proved valuable in the early detection of persistent disease outbreaks 
(Steiner et al, 2010 and Sparks et al 2010a). However these methods are frequently unable 
to account for underlying changes that occur in the observation of disease instances 
through health services such as day-of-the-week or holiday effects. The removal of known 
trends, called nuisance variables, would reduce the noise in the departures of counts from 
expected, and as such provides the surveillance plans with a increased chance of early 
detection.  
A bio-terrorist attack is likely to be initiated at several simultaneous disconnected locations 
causing clustered outbreaks of different size and shape. Having a technology that has the 
flexibility of finding outbreaks started at several disconnected locations is essential in this 
setting. 
In this chapter, we explore the method EWMA Surveillance Trees that addresses the concerns 
outlined above and that has this flexibility. The approach taken here is to divide the 
geographical regions into a lattice structure so that the expected numbers of cases within the 
cells are as similar as possible. Expected counts are achieved by firstly building a model that 
describes the usual behaviour of disease counts (including any usual seasonal increases) and 
then using this model to produce a one day-ahead forecast for the expected counts (see 
Sparks, et al. 2010a). The method proposed then: 
 Builds temporal memory of the disease process by smoothing the time series of cell 
counts using MEWMAs.  This allows the method to build up memory of the process to 
detect slowly evolving changes. 
 Uses exponentially weighted spatially smoothing of these temporal EWMA cell counts 
by smoothing across both the rows and columns of the lattice (very similar to 
MEWMA).   
 Detects departures from expected value in the spatio-temporally smoothed lattice 
counts using a binary recursive partitioning approach that focuses in on specific areas 
of concern. 
 Prunes these partitions in a way that leaves only the outbreaks, that is areas of 
significant departure from expected.  
So this method should be able to detect outbreaks of varying size and shapes and 
incorporate the benefits of EWMA smoothing for early detection. Its performance will be 
measured against an implementation of the SCAN statistic. 
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The EWMA Surveillance Tree method proposed here also applies a smoothing in the spatial 
sense. If smoothing has the advantage of reducing spatial noise and more easily exposes 
spatial trends in disease outbreaks, then this could translate into earlier detection properties. 
This chapter will also evaluate when it is beneficial to spatially smooth counts for the early 
detection of diseases. 
We will continue by giving a detailed overview of the spatial SCAN statistic. We will then 
propose the EWMA Surveillance Tree methodology in more detail and discuss the results of 
some simulation studies comparing this method to the SCAN statistic. Lastly we will briefly 
discuss the extension of these methods to a broader multivariate context which is the key in 
applications of these methods to syndromic surveillance for emerging diseases. 
2. The SCAN statistic 
Scan statistics are so described because they arise from the scanning of time and/or space 
looking for clusters of events. This section will present the details for an implementation of 
the spatial SCAN statistic that will be used as the benchmark in the simulation studies to 
follow. The SCAN statistic is similar to a spatio-temporal moving average plan that looks at 
the number of observations in cylinders of spatio-temporal space (e.g., see Figure 1), where 
the height of the cylinder is time. The SCAN plan used in this chapter is indistinguishable 
from the approaches used in Glaz et al. (2001) in the spatial dimension but uses a moving 
window for the temporal dimension. As such the results from Chen and Glaz can be used to 
get efficient starting estimates for the threshold used in the surveillance plan. For other 
literature on the SCAN plan see Tango (1995), Kulldorff and Nagarwalla (1995), Kulldorff 
(1997), and Kulldorff, M. (2001), Kulldorff et al. (2005), Woodall et al (2008) and Han et al. 
(2008).  
 
Fig. 1. Example of the scanned region – circular area is scanned and the depth is the number 
of days that counts are aggregated over. 
The SCAN plan in this chapter is applied to a fixed lattice structure over the target area of 
the data for reasons which will become obvious later. Although this lattice structure may 
not be regular as in Figure 2 below, it is convenient at this stage to make it regular. In other 
words, in this lattice, individual cells are not taken to have a fixed volume; they are 
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constructed so that the marginal total across each row/column spatial dimension has 
approximately the same expected number of counts. In addition the horizontal and vertical 
dividers of cells may be curved giving the design greater flexibility.  
The lattice structure reduces the amount of multiple testing by forcing the scanned area to 
always include complete spatial (“square”) cells. However, if a bio-terrorism event spans 
parts of some cells then some information about its signal is lost. The time window is 
arbitrarily taken as 10 days in this chapter, but could be taken as 7 days or 14 days to do 
away with the need for accounting for the influence of day-of-the-week effects. 
The SCAN plan counts the number of disease cases within the scanned space-time 
window and compares this count to its expected count, assuming a Poisson distribution. 
Often autocorrelation of counts is ignored in this process which does cause inefficiencies 
in the inference of detecting bio-terrorism events. In this chapter we will also ignore the 
autocorrelation in the temporal counts. Since the SCAN plan involves significant amounts 
of multiple testing, we need to establish the false alarm rates for the level of multiple 
testing. 
 
Fig. 2. The target region for assessing outbreaks is 20 by 20 cells by time and the scanned 
area is all 5 by 5 cells by time volumes - one example of which is illustrated in grey. 
In this paper, we use a 40 by 40 cell target region. We examined two levels of spatial 
memory in the SCAN plans applied later in the chapter. The spatial cells scanned are 
either 5 by 5 or 10 by 10 both with a moving time window of 10 days. The 5 by 5 cell scan 
involves 36x36=1296 different (but overlapping) scanned regions, and the 10 by 10 cell 
scan involves 961 different (but overlapping) scanned regions. Clearly, the 10 by 10 cell 
scan involves fewer tests and so its level of significance for the fixed false alarm rate is 
larger than the 5 by 5 cell scan. This means that it should detect an outbreak close to 10 by 
10 in dimensions earlier than the 5 by 5 cell scan. Therefore if the dimension of a future 
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bio-terrorism outbreak is known in advance then it is best to use these dimensions 
precisely in designing the scanning window, unless the outbreak is sparse within the 
region. In this case a smaller window is needed (see Sparks, 2011c) to exploit this sparsity. 
Unfortunately, we seldom know the dimension of bio-terrorism outbreaks, and therefore 
we need methodology that is flexible enough for detecting unknown outbreaks quickly. 
The next section discusses such flexible technology that is not as dependent on the shape 
and size of the outbreak. 
3. EWMA surveillance trees 
The EWMA Surveillance Tree method proposed here for comparison against the SCAN 
plan uses an EWMA approach by smoothing counts first temporally to build in temporal 
memory of the process, and then spatially to average counts locally in space. Smoothing 
can also be viewed as an approach that reduces the noise in counts without reducing the 
signal too much. This makes the signal-to-noise ratio larger and therefore has early 
detection advantages. There are many examples of EWMA temporal smoothing of counts 
data aimed at early detection of diseases, for example see Sparks et al. (2010a) and Stiener 
et al. (2010) for Poisson counts, and Sparks et al. (2010b) and Sarka (2011) for negative 
binomial counts. There is no literature on spatial exponentially weighted moving 
average smoothing although there is some work by Rogerson et al (2006) using 2 
dimensional kernel smoothers. The smoothed counts are then used in an outbreak 
detection procedure.  
The EWMA smoothing process has computational advantages because only the last 
temporally smoothed cell counts are retained rather than the last 10 days as is necessary in 
the SCAN plan discussed in the previous section. Areas are searched for outbreaks by 
comparing their smoothed observed counts to their respective smoothed expected counts. 
An outbreak is signalled when the difference between observed and expected counts in a 
window exceeds a threshold. The value of the threshold is chosen to control the false alarm 
rate.  Note that EWMA smoothed counts are no longer Poisson distributed, however EWMA 
smoothing (spatial and temporal) helps improve the approximation to a normal distribution 
of the smoothed counts. 
The method consists of three major steps: 
1. EWMA based smoothing of observed and expected counts, first temporally then 
spatially; 
2. Growing a surveillance tree of departures from expected value in the spatio-temporally 
smoothed counts using a binary recursive partitioning approach 
3. Pruning the surveillance tree to reveal outbreaks and control the false alarm rate. 
Each of these steps is detailed in subsections 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 respectively. 
3.1 EWMA temporal and spatial smoothing 
Define 40 by 40 matrices of counts and expected values for day t by ( , , ){ }t k tY y   and 
( , , ){ }t k t    respectively. Temporal smoothing examines the exponentially weighted 
moving average (EWMA) to the counts according to 
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bio-terrorism outbreak is known in advance then it is best to use these dimensions 
precisely in designing the scanning window, unless the outbreak is sparse within the 
region. In this case a smaller window is needed (see Sparks, 2011c) to exploit this sparsity. 
Unfortunately, we seldom know the dimension of bio-terrorism outbreaks, and therefore 
we need methodology that is flexible enough for detecting unknown outbreaks quickly. 
The next section discusses such flexible technology that is not as dependent on the shape 
and size of the outbreak. 
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plan uses an EWMA approach by smoothing counts first temporally to build in temporal 
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et al. (2010) for Poisson counts, and Sparks et al. (2010b) and Sarka (2011) for negative 
binomial counts. There is no literature on spatial exponentially weighted moving 
average smoothing although there is some work by Rogerson et al (2006) using 2 
dimensional kernel smoothers. The smoothed counts are then used in an outbreak 
detection procedure.  
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temporally smoothed cell counts are retained rather than the last 10 days as is necessary in 
the SCAN plan discussed in the previous section. Areas are searched for outbreaks by 
comparing their smoothed observed counts to their respective smoothed expected counts. 
An outbreak is signalled when the difference between observed and expected counts in a 
window exceeds a threshold. The value of the threshold is chosen to control the false alarm 
rate.  Note that EWMA smoothed counts are no longer Poisson distributed, however EWMA 
smoothing (spatial and temporal) helps improve the approximation to a normal distribution 
of the smoothed counts. 
The method consists of three major steps: 
1. EWMA based smoothing of observed and expected counts, first temporally then 
spatially; 
2. Growing a surveillance tree of departures from expected value in the spatio-temporally 
smoothed counts using a binary recursive partitioning approach 
3. Pruning the surveillance tree to reveal outbreaks and control the false alarm rate. 
Each of these steps is detailed in subsections 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 respectively. 
3.1 EWMA temporal and spatial smoothing 
Define 40 by 40 matrices of counts and expected values for day t by ( , , ){ }t k tY y   and 
( , , ){ }t k t    respectively. Temporal smoothing examines the exponentially weighted 
moving average (EWMA) to the counts according to 
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1(1 )t t tY Y Y      
( 0 1Y   ) and similarly smooths the matrix of expected values of these counts using 
1(1 )t t t         
where 0 1   , and 0<<1 is a constant that determines how much memory to retain in the 
averages. Larger values of  retain less temporal memory.  
Once the counts have been smoothed temporally, we then smooth over space to average 
counts locally. So the temporal smoothed counts and temporal smoothed expected values of 
tY  and t  respectively are now spatially smoothed using smoothing matrix defined by 40| | | |
1{ } {(1 ) / (1 ) }
i j i j
ij jA  
 

   . The spatial smoothing of counts is defined by 
t
t tY AY A  
and the spatial smoothing of their expected values is defined by 
t
t tA A   . 
This EWMA spatial smoothing has the advantage over other smoothers of computational 
simplicity and is efficient in terms of early outbreak detection. Alternative spatial smoothing 
involving two dimensional kernel smoothers (Riedel, 1993, Rogerson et al. 2006) or splines 
(Currie et al. 2003, Lee and Durban, 2009) are more complex computationally. The EWMA 
smoother is similar to a kernel smoother using a double exponential distribution. The main 
reason for this choice is computational speed. We ignore the boundary problems with this 
EWMA smoothing approach. It is clear that the spatial smoothing employed here smooths 
boundary cell counts less. In addition, the recursive partitioning approach does not adjust 
for the differential smoothing. Therefore the surveillance trees detect outbreaks that hug a 
boundary very quickly. For this reason no clusters are considered that hug boundaries in the 
simulation section, because this would exaggerate the performance of surveillance trees.  
3.2 Growing the surveillance trees 
The recursive partitioning approach applied in this paper is very similar to that in Yu (2009) 
and identical to Sparks and Okugami (2010b). Surveillance trees generate offspring by 
recursively partitioning either longitudinal cells or latitudinal cells into rectangular regions. 
We start by finding the best partition of longitudinal cells in terms of having the highest 
signal to noise ratio, and then the best partition of latitudinal cells. Thereafter, select the 
partition with the highest signal-to-noise ratio between the best longitudinal cell partition 
and the best latitudinal cell partition.   
The choice of the signal-to-noise ratio as the measure of departure from expected value was 
decided based on the fact that the square root of the smooth counts has roughly a constant 
variance and its mean is equal to the square root of the smoothed mean.  
The mathematical summary of this process for the first generation of offspring is as follows: 
denote .i ijj PY Y  and . j iji PY Y  where P defines the parent space, e.g., at the root 
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node the parent space is { : 1,2,..., 40}P k k   for both i and j ( .i  and . j  are similarly 
defined) 
1. Latitudinal (row oriented) partitions: Calculate . .1 1
k k
k i ii ir Y       and 
40 40
` . .1 1k i ii k i kr Y        for 1,2,...,39.k   
2. Longitudinal (column oriented) partitions: Calculate . .1 1j jj jc Y    
 

   or 
40 40
~ . .1 1j jj jc Y           for 1,2,...,39.  
3. Select the best partition:  Partition on  
a.  Row 1 to k and k+1 to 40 if ~ ~max( , ) max( , )k kr r c c    for all  and  
~ ~max( , ) max( , )k k i ir r r r for all i k . 
b. Column 1 to   and  +1 to 40 if ~ ~max( , ) max( , )k kc c r r   for all k and
~ ~max( , ) max( , )j jc c c c   for all j   . 
4. Define 1 ~ ~max( , , , )k kz c c r r    as partition score for the right-hand partition and let the 
other offspring have signal-to-noise ratio ~1z .  If 1 ~z c   then ~1z c   ;  if 1z c   then 
~1 ~z c   ; 1 kz r  then ~1 kz r ; and if 1 kz r then ~1 kz r . 
Now we repeat the process for the next generation of offspring by considering each 
offspring of the partition above as a parent space made up of p rows and q columns defined 
by rows 1 1, 1,..., pi i i  and columns 1 1, 1,..., qj j j . Then a further two offspring are 
generated by the following steps: 




k i ii i i ir Y       and 
~ . .1 1
p pi i
k i ii k i kr Y        for 1 1, 1,..., 1.pk i i i    
2. Longitudinal partitions: Calculate
1 1
. .j jj j j jc Y    
 

   or 
. .1 1
q qj j
j jj jc Y           for 1 1, 1,..., 1.qj j j    
3. Select the best partition: Partition on: 
a. Row 1i to k and k+1 to pi if ~ ~max( , ) max( , )k kr r c c    for all  and 
~ ~max( , ) max( , )k i ir r r r  for all 1 1( , 1,..., )pi k i i i   . 
b. Column 1j  to   and  +1 to qj  if ~ ~max( , ) max( , )k kc c r r   for all k and 
~ ~max( , ) max( , )j jc c c c   for all 1 1( , 1,..., )qj j j j   . 
4. Define ~ ~max( , , , )g k kz c c r r    as partition score for the right-hand partition and let the 
other offspring have signal-to-noise ratio
 ~g
z . 
The process is repeated for each new generation and only stops when the smooth counts are 
either 
 Too small to alarm an unusually high count (this is discussed in more detail later). 
 All cells in the parent space are less than expected.   
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 The best longitudinal partition and best latitudinal partition are both the parent space. 
 
Fig. 3. An example of in-control counts when cell means are correlated. 
 
Fig. 4. An example of a hypothetical bio-terrorism event. 
An example, of the recursive partitioning when there is no smoothing of counts is now used 
to demonstrate the growing process for a 20 20  grid. Assume that the in-control Poisson 
counts for each cell in the grid (except boundary cells) have a mean of 2,5. An example of in-
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control counts is presented in Figure 3. Latitude (La) cells are numbered from the bottom of 
row as 1 to the top row as 20. Longitude (Lo) cells are numbered 1 (left) to 20 (right). 
Correlated cell counts are noted from Figure 3 by higher than expected cell counts (greater 
than 2,5) clumping together even when in-control, e.g., latitude number rows 18, 19 and 20 
(La>17) and longitude columns 7, 8, 9 and 10 (6<Lo<11). This makes it more difficult to 
identify bio-terrorism events.  
 
Fig. 5. Presenting offspring for 5 generations using recursive partitioning 
We use transitional Poisson regression models to forecast the expected counts one day 
ahead. We assume that these forecasts, when no bio-terrorism event is present, produce 
unbiased estimates of the cell means. Therefore, in our application, the in-control count 
departures from the forecasts are assumed uncorrelated because the dependence is removed 
by the model forecasts, and the forecast errors are assumed spatially uncorrelated when in-
control. The assumption here is that all the spatial correlation is in the mean of the Poisson 
counts, and the day ahead forecast is an unbiased estimate of this mean. As such, the 
differences between functions of counts and forecasts will be assumed to be uncorrelated. 
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Even if this is not true; provided the bootstrap population used to estimate the threshold is 
accurate, the simulation process will produce an unbiased estimate of the threshold (see 
Sparks et al. 2010b). 
Figure 4 presents another representation of counts illustrated in Figure 3, except in Figure 4 
a bio-terrorism event is simulated by adding additional (out-of-control) counts at Latitudes 
16, 17, 18 and 19 (15 20)La   and longitude 10, 11,…, 19 (10 20)Lo  . The additional 
counts were assumed to have a mean of 2 per cell.  Red is used to highlight the simulated 
bioterrorism outbreak region in Figure 4. It is clear that the counts in red are higher than the 
counts for any other part of the 20 20  target region. We now demonstrate the recursive 
partitioning process in trying to find this outbreak.  
The recursive partitioning starts by searching for the best partition of longitude and latitude 
in terms of maximizing the departure of the region’s total counts from their expected value, 
i.e., maximising kr and c  values, respectively. These are defined by rules La>15 and Lo>9, 
respectively. Generally the region with the greatest fraction of red will be the one with the 
highest departure from expected and this is true in this case. The best first partition of La>15 
is represented by the black line in the top left-hand table in Figure 5. This first generation of 
offspring become parents for the next generation of offspring. Each region now grows two 
offspring by finding the partition that is best for each parent. For the parent region with 
La>15, it is clear that the best partition is Lo>9 (see the black line in top right-hand table of 
Figure 5 that separates the red counts from the black counts as best as possible). For the 
region with La<16, the best partition is less obvious – it turns out to be Lo>17. The bottom 
left-hand table in Figure 5 gives the next generation of offspring, and the bottom right-hand 
table in Figure 5 gives the generation that completely specifies the simulated outbreak. The 
z-score for the red region is gz 10,6  
which is higher than any other partitioned region in 
the table of Figure 5. An exhaustive search of all regions of all different shapes and sizes in 
 
Fig. 6. Surveillance tree representation of the recursive partitions in Figure 5. 
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Figure 5 revealed that this gave the highest z-score of target region. Recursive partitioning 
is like stepwise variable selection when building parsimonious regression models – it does 
not always produce the same result as an exhaustive search. In this example, we have 
demonstrated that recursive partitioning found the largest outbreak area using 
significantly smaller number of computations than for example the SCAN statistic with 
multiple size windows. This balance between computational and detection efficiency is 
the most attractive feature of the recursive partitioning approach besides its ability to 
adapt with size and shape of the outbreak. 
Figure 6 is a tree based representation of the recursive partitions made in Figure 5. Note that 
the terminal node defined by rules La>15, Lo<10 and Lo>7 does not have any offspring. The 
gz  for this node is ( 36 25) 1   where 36 3 5 3 4 3 3 4 4 4 3           and 
25 2,5 10  . No partition of this space produces a higher z-score than the parent node’s z-
score of 1. The closest to this is ( 5 4 3 4 3 5 2,5 0,825       . Ideally we would like to 
stop recursive partitioning at this node. In practice, the decision to stop unnecessarily 
growing of the tree is difficult. Generally we would keep partitioning until some stopping 
rule applies. 
Once partitioning has stopped, then recursive pruning of the terminal nodes commences. 
The pruning process is outlined in the next section.  
3.3 Pruning the surveillance tree to deliver a particular false alarm rate 
The aim of pruning is to recursively trim away all terminal nodes with smoothed counts that 
do not differ significantly from their expected values. If all nodes in the tree are pruned 
away to leave no tree, then no outbreak is signalled. However, if terminal nodes remain 
after pruning, then an alarm is given. The geographical location of the outbreak is diagnosed 
by the set of partitioning rules for the remaining terminal nodes. This could involve several 
non-overlapping locations.   
Pruning only starts after growing the tree has stopped. The pruning process is very simple. 
We prune terminal nodes recursively starting with the last generation offspring in the tree, 
and then repeat the process recursively with each remaining generation.  Only branches 
with significantly higher than expected counts survive pruning. We prune the least 
significant offspring if ~g zz h  and prune and the generation if g zz h  where zh  is a 
positive constant designed to deliver a specified false alarm. Pruning is used to control the 
false alarm rate measured by either specifying an in-control Average Run Length (ARL) or 
an in-control Recurrence Interval (RI). The Recurrence Interval (RI) is used to indicate the 
steady state false alarm rate. ARL and RI are defined more clearly in the simulation section 
(see Section 4). Pruning starts with the highest values of g (generations) and stops when 
either all generations are pruned or when at least one generation (terminal node) survives 
the pruning process.  
The pruning process leaves only generations with smoothed counts significantly higher 
than expected, e.g., if we started pruning from generation 4 in Figure 5 then only two 
offspring containing the outbreak regions plus their parents, grandparents, etc would 
survive the pruning process. If pruning was applied to a tree for the data in Figure 3 with 
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not always produce the same result as an exhaustive search. In this example, we have 
demonstrated that recursive partitioning found the largest outbreak area using 
significantly smaller number of computations than for example the SCAN statistic with 
multiple size windows. This balance between computational and detection efficiency is 
the most attractive feature of the recursive partitioning approach besides its ability to 
adapt with size and shape of the outbreak. 
Figure 6 is a tree based representation of the recursive partitions made in Figure 5. Note that 
the terminal node defined by rules La>15, Lo<10 and Lo>7 does not have any offspring. The 
gz  for this node is ( 36 25) 1   where 36 3 5 3 4 3 3 4 4 4 3           and 
25 2,5 10  . No partition of this space produces a higher z-score than the parent node’s z-
score of 1. The closest to this is ( 5 4 3 4 3 5 2,5 0,825       . Ideally we would like to 
stop recursive partitioning at this node. In practice, the decision to stop unnecessarily 
growing of the tree is difficult. Generally we would keep partitioning until some stopping 
rule applies. 
Once partitioning has stopped, then recursive pruning of the terminal nodes commences. 
The pruning process is outlined in the next section.  
3.3 Pruning the surveillance tree to deliver a particular false alarm rate 
The aim of pruning is to recursively trim away all terminal nodes with smoothed counts that 
do not differ significantly from their expected values. If all nodes in the tree are pruned 
away to leave no tree, then no outbreak is signalled. However, if terminal nodes remain 
after pruning, then an alarm is given. The geographical location of the outbreak is diagnosed 
by the set of partitioning rules for the remaining terminal nodes. This could involve several 
non-overlapping locations.   
Pruning only starts after growing the tree has stopped. The pruning process is very simple. 
We prune terminal nodes recursively starting with the last generation offspring in the tree, 
and then repeat the process recursively with each remaining generation.  Only branches 
with significantly higher than expected counts survive pruning. We prune the least 
significant offspring if ~g zz h  and prune and the generation if g zz h  where zh  is a 
positive constant designed to deliver a specified false alarm. Pruning is used to control the 
false alarm rate measured by either specifying an in-control Average Run Length (ARL) or 
an in-control Recurrence Interval (RI). The Recurrence Interval (RI) is used to indicate the 
steady state false alarm rate. ARL and RI are defined more clearly in the simulation section 
(see Section 4). Pruning starts with the highest values of g (generations) and stops when 
either all generations are pruned or when at least one generation (terminal node) survives 
the pruning process.  
The pruning process leaves only generations with smoothed counts significantly higher 
than expected, e.g., if we started pruning from generation 4 in Figure 5 then only two 
offspring containing the outbreak regions plus their parents, grandparents, etc would 
survive the pruning process. If pruning was applied to a tree for the data in Figure 3 with 
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no outbreaks, then each generation in turn would be pruned away until no offspring 
remain. Even the target region (the original parent) would be pruned indicating no 
significant outbreak.  
3.4 Using the example to demonstrate the stopping rules for the tree growing process 
It is useful to stop partitioning when it is known that the threshold will not be exceeded 
with further partitions. Assume that the threshold is 4,45zh  then the node defined by 
rules La>15, Lo<10 and Lo>7 should be terminal because ( 36 2.5) 4, 4  . No partition of 
this parent space is going to be greater than the threshold of 4,45. Two other nodes would 
terminate in generation three Figure 5 using 4,45zh  . These would be: 
a. Lo>9 and La>19 where  
( 4 3 2 2 3 2 2 1 0 0 1 2,5 ) 2,9 4, 45             . 
b. La<3 and Lo>17 where 
( 3 2 1 4 2 1 2,5) 2,0 4, 45        . 
Such a stopping rule stops the unnecessary growing of the surveillance tree, because all 
offspring will be pruned later. Generally this rule can be defined as stopping when the 
square root of the total of cell counts for a region is smaller than the threshold plus square 
root of the smallest cell mean in the region. If the threshold is quite low, then having a 
threshold on the lower limit for the smoothed count is sensible. Assume that our 
threshold turns out to be 1,15zh  then the above stopping rule does not help much in 
reducing the partitioning complexity. In the above example, it is sometimes helpful to 
specify when you would fail to respond, e.g., no response is made for any outbreak with 
counts less than 5 above expected per day. We would then stop if smoothed counts were 
below 7,5.  
3.5 Lattice with cell means that are spatially non-homogeneous 
Until now, we have assumed that all cells follow the same model. What if the same time 
trends persist across cells, e.g., the seasonal trend remains the same for each cell but the 
mean counts change from cell to cell? How does this influence the threshold for when the 
model is not homogeneous across all cells? Here we examined the in-control ARL and RI 
properties as we move the cell mean rate from an average of 0,7 to the current value used of 
1,2 by examining its in-control ARL and RI using the same threshold of zh  1,15. The results 
are recorded in the Table 1 for counts generated using the R function in Appendix A with 
overall mean mu=0,1, day-of-the-week influences given by bweekday=( -0,025, -0,025, -
0,025, -0,025, -0,025,0,05,0,075), seasonal influences given by bcos=0,1, bsin=-0,1, transitional 
influences of blags=(0,1,0,06,0,02,0,01), and k=-4. 
This plan is also reasonably robust to changes in spatial non-homogeneity in means whereas 
other plans are not. From Table 1 it is clear that the in-control RI values are reasonably stable 
across a range of mean values. If these mean changes are not systematic as in table above, 
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but random in space then these changes are expected to be ironed out by the spatial 
smoothing. Adaptive plans can be derived using the results in Table 1 based on Sparks 
(2000) and Sparks et al (2010a). 


























































Table 1. In-control ARLs and RIs for specified thresholds of 1,15, 1,2 and 1,25 
4. Simulation study 
This section provides the results of simulation studies comparing the performance of the 
SCAN statistic with that of the EWMA Surveillance Trees for two outbreak shapes and 
locations using Average Time to Signal and Average Run Length as the measures of 
performance. When the size and shape of the scanning window matches that of the outbreak 
in the SCAN plan, then it remains optimal. However, the flexible partitions of EWMA 
Surveillance Trees result in robust performance across a range of outbreak dimensions, 
without being optimal for any specific outbreak size or shape.  
We simulate uncorrelated Poisson counts on a 40x40 spatial grid using the R function in 
Appendix A as described in Section 3.4, with the exception that the mean value is bounded 
at a minimum of one (i.e., k=0) which makes the counts more homogeneous. Denote these 
counts by ,i jc  for row i and column j. These counts are then aggregated locally as follows 
for non-boundary cells: 
, i,j i-1,j i,j-1 i 1,j i,j 1 i-1,j-1 i-1,j 1 i 1,j 1 i 1,j 1floor(c +0,3 (c +c +c +c )+0,1 (c +c +c +c ) )i jc           
where floor means round down to the nearest whole number. Boundary cells have smaller 
means and their counts are defined as in Table 2. 
This generates more realistic spatially correlated in-control counts for infectious or 
contagious diseases. Note that these counts are not expected to be Poisson distributed, but 
tend to be under-dispersed counts relative to the Poisson distribution. We assume no 
knowledge of this under-dispersion in trying to forecast counts. We model the trends in the 
counts using transitional Poisson regression model and assume that if the counts are in-
control then the one day ahead forecast errors are uncorrelated. In situations where spatial 
correlation persists in the forecast errors for in-control situations, an alternative approach is 
models which account for this spatial correlation, such as seeming unrelated Poisson 
regression models (King, 1989, and Grijalva, T., Bohara, et al. 2003), and multivariate Poisson 
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no outbreaks, then each generation in turn would be pruned away until no offspring 
remain. Even the target region (the original parent) would be pruned indicating no 
significant outbreak.  
3.4 Using the example to demonstrate the stopping rules for the tree growing process 
It is useful to stop partitioning when it is known that the threshold will not be exceeded 
with further partitions. Assume that the threshold is 4,45zh  then the node defined by 
rules La>15, Lo<10 and Lo>7 should be terminal because ( 36 2.5) 4, 4  . No partition of 
this parent space is going to be greater than the threshold of 4,45. Two other nodes would 
terminate in generation three Figure 5 using 4,45zh  . These would be: 
a. Lo>9 and La>19 where  
( 4 3 2 2 3 2 2 1 0 0 1 2,5 ) 2,9 4, 45             . 
b. La<3 and Lo>17 where 
( 3 2 1 4 2 1 2,5) 2,0 4, 45        . 
Such a stopping rule stops the unnecessary growing of the surveillance tree, because all 
offspring will be pruned later. Generally this rule can be defined as stopping when the 
square root of the total of cell counts for a region is smaller than the threshold plus square 
root of the smallest cell mean in the region. If the threshold is quite low, then having a 
threshold on the lower limit for the smoothed count is sensible. Assume that our 
threshold turns out to be 1,15zh  then the above stopping rule does not help much in 
reducing the partitioning complexity. In the above example, it is sometimes helpful to 
specify when you would fail to respond, e.g., no response is made for any outbreak with 
counts less than 5 above expected per day. We would then stop if smoothed counts were 
below 7,5.  
3.5 Lattice with cell means that are spatially non-homogeneous 
Until now, we have assumed that all cells follow the same model. What if the same time 
trends persist across cells, e.g., the seasonal trend remains the same for each cell but the 
mean counts change from cell to cell? How does this influence the threshold for when the 
model is not homogeneous across all cells? Here we examined the in-control ARL and RI 
properties as we move the cell mean rate from an average of 0,7 to the current value used of 
1,2 by examining its in-control ARL and RI using the same threshold of zh  1,15. The results 
are recorded in the Table 1 for counts generated using the R function in Appendix A with 
overall mean mu=0,1, day-of-the-week influences given by bweekday=( -0,025, -0,025, -
0,025, -0,025, -0,025,0,05,0,075), seasonal influences given by bcos=0,1, bsin=-0,1, transitional 
influences of blags=(0,1,0,06,0,02,0,01), and k=-4. 
This plan is also reasonably robust to changes in spatial non-homogeneity in means whereas 
other plans are not. From Table 1 it is clear that the in-control RI values are reasonably stable 
across a range of mean values. If these mean changes are not systematic as in table above, 
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but random in space then these changes are expected to be ironed out by the spatial 
smoothing. Adaptive plans can be derived using the results in Table 1 based on Sparks 
(2000) and Sparks et al (2010a). 


























































Table 1. In-control ARLs and RIs for specified thresholds of 1,15, 1,2 and 1,25 
4. Simulation study 
This section provides the results of simulation studies comparing the performance of the 
SCAN statistic with that of the EWMA Surveillance Trees for two outbreak shapes and 
locations using Average Time to Signal and Average Run Length as the measures of 
performance. When the size and shape of the scanning window matches that of the outbreak 
in the SCAN plan, then it remains optimal. However, the flexible partitions of EWMA 
Surveillance Trees result in robust performance across a range of outbreak dimensions, 
without being optimal for any specific outbreak size or shape.  
We simulate uncorrelated Poisson counts on a 40x40 spatial grid using the R function in 
Appendix A as described in Section 3.4, with the exception that the mean value is bounded 
at a minimum of one (i.e., k=0) which makes the counts more homogeneous. Denote these 
counts by ,i jc  for row i and column j. These counts are then aggregated locally as follows 
for non-boundary cells: 
, i,j i-1,j i,j-1 i 1,j i,j 1 i-1,j-1 i-1,j 1 i 1,j 1 i 1,j 1floor(c +0,3 (c +c +c +c )+0,1 (c +c +c +c ) )i jc           
where floor means round down to the nearest whole number. Boundary cells have smaller 
means and their counts are defined as in Table 2. 
This generates more realistic spatially correlated in-control counts for infectious or 
contagious diseases. Note that these counts are not expected to be Poisson distributed, but 
tend to be under-dispersed counts relative to the Poisson distribution. We assume no 
knowledge of this under-dispersion in trying to forecast counts. We model the trends in the 
counts using transitional Poisson regression model and assume that if the counts are in-
control then the one day ahead forecast errors are uncorrelated. In situations where spatial 
correlation persists in the forecast errors for in-control situations, an alternative approach is 
models which account for this spatial correlation, such as seeming unrelated Poisson 
regression models (King, 1989, and Grijalva, T., Bohara, et al. 2003), and multivariate Poisson 
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regression model (Karlis and Meligkotsidou, 2005, and Bermudez and Karlis, 2011). 
However, here we model each of the 1600 cells separately using Poisson regression models 
very similar to that used in Sparks et al. (2010a) and Sparks et al. (2011a) that use explanatory 
variables: logarithm of lag counts plus 1, day-of-the-week, public holidays and harmonics. 
These models are used to produce one-day ahead forecasts which estimate the “Poisson” 
means for the next day.  
 
1i  , 1 40j   1, 1,j 1,j 1 1,j-1 2,j 2,j 1 2,j 1floor(c +0,3 (c +c +c )+0,1 (c +c ) )jc       
40i   , 1 40j   40, 1,j 40,j 1 40,j-1 39,j 39,j 1 39,j 1floor(c +0,3 (c +c +c )+0,1 (c +c ) )jc       
1 40i  , 1j   ,1 i,1 i 1,1 i-1,1 i,2 i-1,2 i 1,2floor(c +0,3 (c +c +c )+0,1 (c +c ) )ic      
1 40j   , 40j   ,40 i,1 i 1,40 i-1,40 i,39 i-1,39 i 1,39floor(c +0,3 (c +c +c )+0,1 (c +c ) )ic      
1i  , 1j   1,1 1,1 2,1 1,2 2,2floor(c +0,3 (c +c )+0,1 c )c     
40i  , 40j   40,40 40,40 39,40 40,39 39,39floor(c +0,3 (c +c )+0,1 c )c     
Table 2. The process used to simulate cells counts that are spatially correlated. 
The recursive partitioning process is then applied to the temporal or spatio-temporal 
smoothed counts. The gz  statistic is used to assess the departure of smoothed counts from 
smoothed day ahead forecasted counts. When in-control, gz  has mean zero and 
approximately a constant variance. The convenience of the statistic is discussed in Sparks et 
al. (2010b) and has been demonstrated to compare very well with the SCAN statistic. 
The simulation process generated in-control counts. Simulated bio-terrorism outbreaks are 
generated by adding to these in-control counts additional Poisson counts for a fixed 
rectangular region. The outbreak region is then hidden and we examined how early the 
plans alarm this outbreak. Rectangular outbreak regions were generated involving either 
10x4 cells or 20x2 cells. Zero-state in-control ARLs and the Recurrent Interval (RI) were 
estimated as follows: 
 Start the Run Length (RL) at 1. Generate in-control cell counts for the first day, and 
perform the surveillance tree process. If no tree results after pruning then go to the next 
step. 
 Increase the RL by 1. Generate in-control cell counts for the next day, perform the 
surveillance tree process, and if no tree results after pruning, then go to the next step. 
 Repeat the previous step until some branches of the surveillance tree survive the 
pruning process. Record the RL (denote this 1RL ) and go to the next step. 
 Generating in-control cell counts for the several consecutive days until there are at least 
7 consecutive days with no tree surviving, then set RI=7.  
 Increase the RI by 1. Generate in-control cell counts for the next day, perform the 
surveillance process, and if no tree results after pruning, then go to the next step. 
 Repeat the previous step until some branches of the surveillance tree survive the 
pruning process. Record the RI (denote this 1RI ) and go to the next step. 
 Repeat all steps above 1600 times to give ( , ), 1,2,...,1600i iRL RI i  . Average these to give 
the in-control ARL and an estimate of the expected RI. 
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The 1600 simulations were selected balancing both computational effort and estimation 
accuracy. Traditionally, the standard deviation for RL with an in-control ARL=100 is about 
100. The standard deviation from the in-control ARL is expected to be roughly 
100 / 1600 2,5 .  
The out-of-control ARL are calculated in the same way as the in-control ARL, except with 
each run additional counts with the same mean are added to the outbreak region. The 
results are reported in Table 1. The recurrence interval for out-of-control situations was not 
very interesting because generally when a plan signalled it did not stop signalling. The  
out-of-control ARLs are therefore the zero state out-of-control ARLs. Reporting the in-
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 108,9 / 37,5 108,9 / 37,5 201,5/70,6 201,5/70,6 108,3 / 69,6 108,3 / 69,6 
1 11,88 11,95 13,25 12,00 15,42 16,26 
2 6,78 4,86 7,96 4,91 5,61 6,39 
3 4,51 3,55 5,12 4,11 3,94 3,95 
4 3,72 2,76 3,80 3,20 2,94 2,93 
5 3,02 2,35 3,24 2,55 2,65 2,44 
6 2,51 2,12 2,72 2,19 2,10 2,11 
7 2,44 1,70 2,50 1,77 1,97 1,79 
8 2,40 1,55 2,41 1,60 1,70 1,53 
9 2,34 1,45 2,36 1,50 1,56 1,45 
10 2,10 1,31 2,12 1,32 1,20 1,30 
11 2,02 1,12 2,04 1,16 1,15 1,16 
12 1,91 1,05 1,91 1,07 1,04 1,08 
Table 3. ARL performance of the surveillance tree plans when the outbreak spans regions of 
40 cells δ is the increase in mean for cells in the outbreak region. 
Recursive partitioning does well when the outbreak is located on the boundary of the target 
region, partially because fewer partitions are necessary to find it. Another reason is that the 
boundary cells are where counts are smoothed less and the mean rates are lowest on the 
boundary, and therefore the signal is the highest. In other words, boundary outbreaks are 
easier to find using recursive partitioning because fewer generations are needed to find 
them and the signal-to-noise ratio on the boundary in this simulation process is higher. 
The robust performance of plans, i.e., when nothing is known about the shape and size of 
the outbreak, is an important consideration because in bio-terrorism nothing is known about 
the size or shape of the outbreak. Therefore, Table 3 looks at a variation in rectangular 
shaped outbreaks. The recursive partitioning plan’s flexibility in partitions strengthens its 
robust performance across a range of outbreak sizes (see Sparks et al. 2011c). In other words, 
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regression model (Karlis and Meligkotsidou, 2005, and Bermudez and Karlis, 2011). 
However, here we model each of the 1600 cells separately using Poisson regression models 
very similar to that used in Sparks et al. (2010a) and Sparks et al. (2011a) that use explanatory 
variables: logarithm of lag counts plus 1, day-of-the-week, public holidays and harmonics. 
These models are used to produce one-day ahead forecasts which estimate the “Poisson” 
means for the next day.  
 
1i  , 1 40j   1, 1,j 1,j 1 1,j-1 2,j 2,j 1 2,j 1floor(c +0,3 (c +c +c )+0,1 (c +c ) )jc       
40i   , 1 40j   40, 1,j 40,j 1 40,j-1 39,j 39,j 1 39,j 1floor(c +0,3 (c +c +c )+0,1 (c +c ) )jc       
1 40i  , 1j   ,1 i,1 i 1,1 i-1,1 i,2 i-1,2 i 1,2floor(c +0,3 (c +c +c )+0,1 (c +c ) )ic      
1 40j   , 40j   ,40 i,1 i 1,40 i-1,40 i,39 i-1,39 i 1,39floor(c +0,3 (c +c +c )+0,1 (c +c ) )ic      
1i  , 1j   1,1 1,1 2,1 1,2 2,2floor(c +0,3 (c +c )+0,1 c )c     
40i  , 40j   40,40 40,40 39,40 40,39 39,39floor(c +0,3 (c +c )+0,1 c )c     
Table 2. The process used to simulate cells counts that are spatially correlated. 
The recursive partitioning process is then applied to the temporal or spatio-temporal 
smoothed counts. The gz  statistic is used to assess the departure of smoothed counts from 
smoothed day ahead forecasted counts. When in-control, gz  has mean zero and 
approximately a constant variance. The convenience of the statistic is discussed in Sparks et 
al. (2010b) and has been demonstrated to compare very well with the SCAN statistic. 
The simulation process generated in-control counts. Simulated bio-terrorism outbreaks are 
generated by adding to these in-control counts additional Poisson counts for a fixed 
rectangular region. The outbreak region is then hidden and we examined how early the 
plans alarm this outbreak. Rectangular outbreak regions were generated involving either 
10x4 cells or 20x2 cells. Zero-state in-control ARLs and the Recurrent Interval (RI) were 
estimated as follows: 
 Start the Run Length (RL) at 1. Generate in-control cell counts for the first day, and 
perform the surveillance tree process. If no tree results after pruning then go to the next 
step. 
 Increase the RL by 1. Generate in-control cell counts for the next day, perform the 
surveillance tree process, and if no tree results after pruning, then go to the next step. 
 Repeat the previous step until some branches of the surveillance tree survive the 
pruning process. Record the RL (denote this 1RL ) and go to the next step. 
 Generating in-control cell counts for the several consecutive days until there are at least 
7 consecutive days with no tree surviving, then set RI=7.  
 Increase the RI by 1. Generate in-control cell counts for the next day, perform the 
surveillance process, and if no tree results after pruning, then go to the next step. 
 Repeat the previous step until some branches of the surveillance tree survive the 
pruning process. Record the RI (denote this 1RI ) and go to the next step. 
 Repeat all steps above 1600 times to give ( , ), 1,2,...,1600i iRL RI i  . Average these to give 
the in-control ARL and an estimate of the expected RI. 
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The 1600 simulations were selected balancing both computational effort and estimation 
accuracy. Traditionally, the standard deviation for RL with an in-control ARL=100 is about 
100. The standard deviation from the in-control ARL is expected to be roughly 
100 / 1600 2,5 .  
The out-of-control ARL are calculated in the same way as the in-control ARL, except with 
each run additional counts with the same mean are added to the outbreak region. The 
results are reported in Table 1. The recurrence interval for out-of-control situations was not 
very interesting because generally when a plan signalled it did not stop signalling. The  
out-of-control ARLs are therefore the zero state out-of-control ARLs. Reporting the in-
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Table 3. ARL performance of the surveillance tree plans when the outbreak spans regions of 
40 cells δ is the increase in mean for cells in the outbreak region. 
Recursive partitioning does well when the outbreak is located on the boundary of the target 
region, partially because fewer partitions are necessary to find it. Another reason is that the 
boundary cells are where counts are smoothed less and the mean rates are lowest on the 
boundary, and therefore the signal is the highest. In other words, boundary outbreaks are 
easier to find using recursive partitioning because fewer generations are needed to find 
them and the signal-to-noise ratio on the boundary in this simulation process is higher. 
The robust performance of plans, i.e., when nothing is known about the shape and size of 
the outbreak, is an important consideration because in bio-terrorism nothing is known about 
the size or shape of the outbreak. Therefore, Table 3 looks at a variation in rectangular 
shaped outbreaks. The recursive partitioning plan’s flexibility in partitions strengthens its 
robust performance across a range of outbreak sizes (see Sparks et al. 2011c). In other words, 
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if the outbreak dimensions are known, then the SCAN plan can always be trained to be 
more efficient than the recursive partitioning plan, and therefore it is preferred in these 
circumstances. But when nothing is known about its size and shape recursive partitioning is 
a more flexible and robust approach than the SCAN plan. 
Table 3 demonstrates that spatial smoothing prior to applying recursive partitioning of 
temporally smoothed counts has early detection advantages for the same in-control RI 
values of approximately 70, e.g., for large shift in mean counts of 12 per cell the ARL is 1,04 
as opposed to 1,91 (almost a day later). The spatial smoothing also closes the gap between 
the in-control ARL and in-control RI, and therefore it is likely to have equivalent steady state 
early detection advantages.  
The future research challenges are to investigate what levels of spatial smoothing are best 
for early detection. In these studies we only tried 0,7.   In addition, there may be an 
interaction between the temporal smoothing and spatial smoothing. Therefore this needs to 
be investigated in future work.  
The SCAN plan was applied using two separate scanning window sizes: 5 by 5 cells and 10 
by 10 cells.  As nothing is known about future outbreaks, therefore we consider square m by 
m scans – for at least the first outbreak considered in Table 4 the 5 by 5 cells scans is close to 
the m by m scanning plan with the smallest out-of-control ARLs. Unlike the recursive 
partitioning for the scan plans the expected values were taken as known, and therefore this 
gives an advantage to the SCAN plan in this comparison. Note that there was less of a 
difference between the in-control ARL and in-control RI for the scan plans than the 
surveillance tree plan. This mostly occurs because of the way we estimated the RI. In 
addition, by not allowing a signal in the first 7 values after a outbreak signal means that 
there are only a correlation of 0,3 between the signalled time point and the start of the RI for 
the scan plan, whereas in plans using the temporal EWMA smoothing with 0,1  this is 
0,48. Hence the way we estimated RI is going to be more influenced by the previous signal 
in the surveillance tree plan and therefore its RI is smaller. Clearly, the more the outbreak 
matches the scanning region the earlier the SCAN plan detects outbreaks, but it is clear that 
it lacks the flexibility in terms of detecting outbreaks of unknown shape and size. It is worth 
noting that when the SCAN plan does perform better than the surveillance trees (comparing 
Tables 3 and 4), the surveillance trees are not far behind in performance whereas the reverse 
is not true. Figure 7 provides a graphical comparison of the ARL properties. From Figure 7, 
the SCAN plan 5 by 5 by 10 days is best on average for detecting a 10 by 4 outbreak which is 
near the centre of the target region but significantly worse for the 2 by 20 outbreak. The 2 by 
20 outbreak is quite feasible, e.g., this shaped outbreak would result if the outbreak was 
started in railway carriages travelling along a specific route. 
5. Conclusions 
The recursive partitioning approach can easily be extended to deal with more than two or 
three dimensions. It is ideal for finding disease outbreaks which cluster in multivariate space 
that could also include variables such as triage category (severity), age or gender, whereas the 
SCAN plans become computationally infeasible in higher dimensions. However further 
research is required to determine whether we can extend the benefit found from spatial 
smoothing to other dimensions that are not spatial, for example smoothing over age groups.  
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An advantage of the ability to extend to higher dimensions is that Surveillance Trees could 
be used to monitor several related diseases or symptoms jointly using disease category as a 
variable searched over in the recursive partitioning process. This would mean having one 
false alarm rate for all disease groups being monitored. Such planning may be beneficial in 
terms of managing the effort an epidemiological unit can devote to investigating false 
alarms. Similarly the method could also be used for syndromic surveillance – the 
surveillance of public health records such as Emergency Department visits. Detecting 
increases in ill-defined syndromes that may indicate the use of new and unknown biological 
agents.  
Because of the efficiency of computation, another advantage of recursive partitioning is that 
it could be implemented using a hand-held mini-computer in the field to assess whether say 
counts have increased more than expected for any cluster of a target region. It does not need 
a sophisticated computer, as opposed to the SCAN plan.  
Ultimately the EWMA Surveillance Tree methodology is a promising tool for detecting 
spatio-temporal outbreaks when the size and location of the outbreak is unknown.  
By incorporating the benefits of temporal and spatial smoothing with a tool for efficiently 
locating outbreaks, the method is well suited for the surveillance of bioterrorism events. 
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Fig. 7. In-control and out-of-control ARL for the SCAN plan and Surveillance Tree plan 
6. Appendix 
Inputs to the function are mu=overall mean; bweekday=day-of-the-week influence; bcos 
and bsin = influence of the season; blags = is the influence of previous counts; nob= number 
of counts generated; k is the threshold specifying the lowest expected count allowed 
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1. Introduction 
Rickettsia prowazekii and R. rickettsii are HHS and USDA select agents 
(http://biosafety.utk.edu/pdfs/salist.pdf), and R. prowazekii is a category B bioterrorism 
agent as determined by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
(http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/agentlist-category.asp). The criteria for CDC category B 
bioterrorism agents are that the organisms are moderately easy to disseminate, cause 
diseases with moderate morbidity and low mortality and require specific enhancements of 
diagnostic capacity and enhanced disease surveillance. However, the case fatality ratios of 
both R. prowazekii and R. rickettsii may exceed the CDC bioterrorism agent category B level. 
Epidemic typhus caused by R. prowazekii and Rocky Mountain spotted fever (RMSF) caused 
by R. rickettsii can reach up to 60% fatalities without antibiotic treatment and 4% even with 
antibiotic treatment (Raoult et al., 2004). Rickettsia had been explored for biowarfare use.  
The former Soviet Union developed R. prowazekii as a biologic weapon in the 1930s (Alibek 
K and Handelman S, 2009). During World War II, the Japanese performed human 
experiments with rickettsial agents for purposes of biologic weapon development during 
their occupation of China (Harris S, 1992).  
Epidemic typhus, also known as louse-borne typhus, has been distributed worldwide, 
was one of the man’s major scourges and frequently played a decisive role in wars in 
Europe from the 15th through 20th centuries, thus affecting the course of European history 
(Conlon JM, 2007). It killed millions of people through this period. Although worldwide 
epidemics of typhus may not occur again, the threat of louse-borne typhus is still real as 
small scale epidemics or large scale epidemics in settings of extreme poverty and natural 
and manmade disasters. Louse-borne typhus occurs in epidemics when social, economic, 
or political systems are disrupted exposing a large population such as refugees to louse 
infestation due to lack of hygiene. This situation has been observed in recent outbreaks of 
typhus in Burundi, Algeria, Peru, and Russia. In 1997, it was estimated that as many as 
100,000 cases of typhus occurred in the refugee camps of Burundi during a civil war 
(Raoult et al., 2004).  
RMSF originated as an emerging infectious disease on the western frontier in the Rocky 
Mountains. Now the disease is found all over the United States, and over half of the cases 
occur in the southeastern and south-central regions of the United States and in South 
America (Center for Disease Control and prevention[CDC], 2010).  
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2. Etiologic agents  
Rickettsia are small (0.3 – 0.5 x 0.8 – 1.0 µm) gram-negative obligately intracellular bacterial 
parasites of eukaryotic cells. The genus is subdivided into the typhus group (TG) and 
spotted fever group (SFG) based on lipopolysaccharide (LPS) antigens. The TG rickettsiae 
include louse-borne R. prowazekii that causes epidemic typhus and flea-borne R. typhi that 
causes murine typhus. The SFG rickettsiae consist of more than 20 named species, which are 
transmitted by tick bite except for R. akari (mite-borne) and R. felis (flea-borne). Antibodies 
to LPS antigens cross-react among organisms within the same biogroup, but do not cross-
react between the two groups (Vishwanath, 1991). There are two major outer membrane 
proteins in Rickettsia OmpA (Sca 0) and OmpB (Sca5). OmpB exists in all Rickettsia and 
OmpA exists only in SFG rickettsiae. Genomic sequencing identified additional 14 surface 
cell antigens (Scas) among Rickettsia (Blanc et al., 2005). However, most sca genes are 
degenerated in Rickettsia, and only two Scas (Sca4 and Sca5 also called OmpB) present in all 
Rickettsia. Scas of gram-negative bacteria belong to the autotransporter protein family which 
are usually associated with virulence functions.  
2.1 Pathogenesis and pathophysiology 
In vitro experiments showed that Rickettsia attaches to the host cell through its surface 
proteins, OmpB, OmpA, Sca1, and Sca2, and host cell receptors (Martinez et al., 2005). 
After attachment, Rickettsia induces non-phagocytic endothelial cells to engulf it. Once it 
enters the host cell, Rickettsia immediately lyses the phagosomal membrane and escapes 
into the cytoplasm. Rickettsia multiplies by binary fission with a doubling time of 8 hours. 
Both TG and SFG rickettsiae multiply in the cytoplasm of host cells, but SFG rickettsiae 
can also invade and multiply in the nucleus of host cells. TG rickettsiae accumulate in 
cytoplasm until the host cell bursts, but SFG rickettsiae seldom accumulate in host cells. 
The difference in the quantity of organisms that accumulate in host cells between TG and 
SFG rickettsiae is believed to be caused by the facts that SFG rickettsiae move by actin-
based mobility inside the cytoplasm and can spread to adjacent cells, but TG rickettsiae do 
not move and cannot spread. SFG rickettsiae hijack the cell's actin which they stimulate to 
polymerize at one bacterial pole to facilitate their own movement (Teysseire et al., 1992). 
Due to the actin-based movement, SFG rickettsiae spread from cell to cell eventuating in 
cell death and thus the formation of large plaques in cell culture. In contrast, typhus 
group rickettsiae accumulate in the host cell and form very small plaques when the 
heavily infected cells burst.  
The target cell of Rickettsia in vivo is microvascular endothelium. The crucial 
pathophysiologic effect of rickettsial endothelial infection is increased microvascular 
permeability resulting from discontinuities in interendothelial adherens junctions. The 
pathogenic mechanisms of endothelial injury include endothelial cell production of toxic 
reactive oxygen species, damage to the cell membrane upon rickettsial exit, and cytotoxic T 
lymphocyte-induced apoptosis of infected endothelial cells. Rickettsial infections cause a 
procoagulant state, but only very rarely disseminated intravascular coagulation. Thrombi 
comprise non-occlusive hemostatic plugs that are appropriately located at foci of severe 
endothelial damage to mitigate hemorrhage (Walker DH, 2011). 
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2.2 Epidemiology and ecology 
A part or the entire life cycle of rickettsiae is usually associated with one species of 
arthropod, including lice, fleas, ticks and mites. Arthropods are the vectors and, in most 
cases, the reservoir of rickettsiae. The distribution of tick-borne SFG rickettsioses are 
restricted to areas where their tick reservoirs are present, such as Rocky Mountain spotted 
fever in the Americas, Mediterranean spotted fever in Europe, Africa and Asia, and 
Japanese spotted fever in Japan and eastern Asia (Table 1). Human louse-, flea-, and mouse 
 
Disease Rickettsial agent Vector Geographic Distribution 
SFG rickettsiae 
African tick- bite fever Rickettsia africae Ticks Sub-Saharan Africa, Caribbean 
islands (Mediannikov et al., 2010) 
Far eastern spotted fever Rickettsia 
heilongjiangensis 
Ticks Far East of Asia (Mediannikov et 
al., 2004) 
Flinders Island spotted 
fever 
Rickettsia honei Ticks Australia and southeastern Asia 
(Graves S & Stenos J, 2003) 
Mediterranean spotted 
fever 
Rickettsia conorii Ticks Southern Europe, southern and 
western Asia, and Africa (Rovery et 
al., 2008) 






Ticks Asia, Europe, and Africa (Fournier 
et al., 2005) 
Japanese spotted fever Rickettsia japonica Ticks Japan and eastern Asia (Chung et 
al., 2006) 
Queensland tick typhus Rickettsia australis Ticks Australia (Sexton et al., 1991) 
Rocky Mountain spotted 
fever 
Rickettsia rickettsii Ticks North, Central and South America 
(Galvao MA et al., 2003) 
Tick-borne 
lymphadenopathy 
Rickettsia slovaca Ticks Europe (Selmi et al., 2008) 
Unnamed Rickettsia parkeri Ticks North and South America (Nava et 
al., 2008) 
Unnamed Rickettsia massiliae Ticks Europe and North and South 
America (Labruna MB, 2009) 
Unnamed Rickettsia 
aeschlimannii 




Ticks Europe (Jado et al., 2007) 
Unnamed Rickettsia helvetica Ticks Europe and Asia (Fournier et al., 
2004) 
Rickettsialpox R. akari Mite Worldwide 
Cat flea rickettsiosis R. felis Flea Worldwide 
TG rickettsiae 
Epidemic typhus R. prowazekii Louse Worldwide 
Murine typhus R. typhi Flea Worldwide 
Table 1. Distribution of rickettsioses 
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2. Etiologic agents  
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enters the host cell, Rickettsia immediately lyses the phagosomal membrane and escapes 
into the cytoplasm. Rickettsia multiplies by binary fission with a doubling time of 8 hours. 
Both TG and SFG rickettsiae multiply in the cytoplasm of host cells, but SFG rickettsiae 
can also invade and multiply in the nucleus of host cells. TG rickettsiae accumulate in 
cytoplasm until the host cell bursts, but SFG rickettsiae seldom accumulate in host cells. 
The difference in the quantity of organisms that accumulate in host cells between TG and 
SFG rickettsiae is believed to be caused by the facts that SFG rickettsiae move by actin-
based mobility inside the cytoplasm and can spread to adjacent cells, but TG rickettsiae do 
not move and cannot spread. SFG rickettsiae hijack the cell's actin which they stimulate to 
polymerize at one bacterial pole to facilitate their own movement (Teysseire et al., 1992). 
Due to the actin-based movement, SFG rickettsiae spread from cell to cell eventuating in 
cell death and thus the formation of large plaques in cell culture. In contrast, typhus 
group rickettsiae accumulate in the host cell and form very small plaques when the 
heavily infected cells burst.  
The target cell of Rickettsia in vivo is microvascular endothelium. The crucial 
pathophysiologic effect of rickettsial endothelial infection is increased microvascular 
permeability resulting from discontinuities in interendothelial adherens junctions. The 
pathogenic mechanisms of endothelial injury include endothelial cell production of toxic 
reactive oxygen species, damage to the cell membrane upon rickettsial exit, and cytotoxic T 
lymphocyte-induced apoptosis of infected endothelial cells. Rickettsial infections cause a 
procoagulant state, but only very rarely disseminated intravascular coagulation. Thrombi 
comprise non-occlusive hemostatic plugs that are appropriately located at foci of severe 
endothelial damage to mitigate hemorrhage (Walker DH, 2011). 
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A part or the entire life cycle of rickettsiae is usually associated with one species of 
arthropod, including lice, fleas, ticks and mites. Arthropods are the vectors and, in most 
cases, the reservoir of rickettsiae. The distribution of tick-borne SFG rickettsioses are 
restricted to areas where their tick reservoirs are present, such as Rocky Mountain spotted 
fever in the Americas, Mediterranean spotted fever in Europe, Africa and Asia, and 
Japanese spotted fever in Japan and eastern Asia (Table 1). Human louse-, flea-, and mouse 
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et al., 2005) 
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al., 2006) 
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Unnamed Rickettsia 
aeschlimannii 




Ticks Europe (Jado et al., 2007) 
Unnamed Rickettsia helvetica Ticks Europe and Asia (Fournier et al., 
2004) 
Rickettsialpox R. akari Mite Worldwide 
Cat flea rickettsiosis R. felis Flea Worldwide 
TG rickettsiae 
Epidemic typhus R. prowazekii Louse Worldwide 
Murine typhus R. typhi Flea Worldwide 
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mite-borne Rickettsia such as R. prowazekii, R. typhi, R. felis, and R. akari are distributed 
worldwide with their hosts and vectors.  
Non-virulent or low virulence SFG rickettsiae may be maintained in nature largely via 
transovarian transmission in the arthropod hosts. However, highly virulent SFG rickettsiae 
such as R. rickettsii and R. conorii are pathogenic for the Dermacentor and Rhipicephalus ticks, 
respectively (Niebylski et al., 1999; Santos et al., 2002). Virulent rickettsiae such as R. 
rickettsii need an animal host to amplify the organisms for establishing new lines of 
transovarian rickettsial maintenance (e.g., D. variabilis ticks acquire R. rickettsii while feeding 
on rickettsemic cotton rats) (Niebylski et al., 1999). Each species of pathogenic SFG 
rickettsiae may have one or multiple tick vector species. The vectors of Rocky Mountain 
spotted fever are D. variabilis (American dog tick) in the eastern two-thirds of the US and 
regions of the Pacific coast states, D. andersoni (wood tick) in the Rocky Mountain states, 
Rhipicephalus sanguineus (brown dog tick) in the southwestern US, northern Mexico, and 
South America and Amblyomma cajennense and A. aureolatum in South America. The seasonal 
and geographic distribution of each rickettsiosis reflects the months of activity of the vector 
and its contact with humans. Over 90% of cases with Rocky Mountain spotted fever occur 
during April through September. Approximately 250-2000 cases of Rocky Mountain spotted 
fever have been reported annually in the United States (CDC, 2010).   
Epidemic typhus is transmitted primarily by the human body louse, Pediculus humanus 
corporis. However, the louse is only a vector and not a reservoir because infected lice die 5-7 
days after they become infected with R. prowazekii. Rickettsia prowazekii multiplies in louse 
gut epithelium, which detaches, ruptures and releases rickettsiae into the feces. The louse 
feces containing rickettsiae are scratched into the skin, rubbed into mucous membranes such 
as the conjunctiva, or inhaled. Humans can develop latent infection after acute louse-borne 
typhus and serve as reservoirs of R. prowazekii. R. prowazekii can be reactivated causing 
recrudescent typhus fever (Brill-Zinsser disease) when latently infected persons’ immunity 
wanes.  Rickettsia prowazekii is also maintained in a zoonotic cycle involving flying squirrels 
(Glaucomys volans) and their specific flea and louse in the United States. Sporadic epidemic 
typhus occurring in the United States is transmitted by fleas of flying squirrels (Duma et al., 
1981). Murine typhus is transmitted by fleas including rat fleas and cat fleas. 
3. Virulence determinants of Rickettsia 
Rickettsia has no exotoxin, and rickettsial LPS is not toxic and apparently is not associated 
with the pathogenesis of Rickettsia infections. Since Rickettsia are obligately intracellular 
bacteria, their survival mechanisms involve proteins related to the attachment, to entry into 
and exit from host cells, and enzymes for protein and DNA modification and obtaining 
nutrition from the host.    
Adhesins: The first step for obligately intracellular Rickettsia to establish infection is to adhere 
to and invade the host endothelium. These processes require the interaction of rickettsial 
surface proteins with mammalian host cell receptors. Three outer membrane proteins of 
Rickettsia OmpA, OmpB, and Sca2 have been identified as adhesins of Rickettsia(Li & 
Walker, 1998; Martinez et al., 2005; Cardwell & Martinez, 2009). OmpB has been 
demonstrated to interact with its mammalian receptor, Ku70. However, in Ku70–/– mouse 
embryonic fibroblasts R. conorii invasion is reduced only 50 to 60%, suggesting that Rickettsia 
may use multiple adhesins and receptors.  
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Membranolytic enzymes: Internalized rickettsiae are initially bound within a phagosome 
(Teysseire et al., 1995). Rickettsia quickly (<10 min) lyse the phagosomal membrane to escape 
from phagosomal vacuoles before phagolysosomal fusion occurs, which would result in the 
death of the Rickettsia through the activity of the lysosomal enzymes (Teysseire et al., 
1995;Hackstadt, 1996;Feng & Walker, 2000;Walker et al., 2001a). Rickettsia are also required 
to exit the host cell by lysis of the host cell membrane. The mechanism of lysis of the 
phagosomal membrane and the host cell membrane has been hypothesized to be mediated 
by a phospholipase enzyme (Radulovic et al., 1999;Renesto et al., 2003). The genomic 
sequences of Rickettsia have revealed four proteins with potential membranolytic activities: 
patatin B1 precursor (pat-1 gene), hemolysin A (tlyA), hemolysin C (tlyC), and 
phospholipase D (pld) (Andersson et al., 1998;Ogata et al., 2001;McLeod et al., 2004). TlyC 
has been demonstrated to have hemolytic activity, (Radulovic et al., 1999) and can mediate 
escape by S. enterica serovar Typhimurium from phagosomes (Whitworth et al., 2005). 
Patatin B of R. typhi (RT0522) has been implicated as a phospholipase A2. However, 
knockout of R. prowazekii pld gene does not prevent R. prowazekii escape from the phagosome 
or exit from host cells. Patatin B is truncated by an ISRpe 1 transposon in R. peacockii, which 
apparently does not affect the release of R. peacockii from phagosomes (Felsheim RF). These 
observations suggest that the multiple membranolytic enzymes of Rickettsia may be 
functionally redundant.  
Actin-based mobility: Like other intracytosolic bacteria such as Listeria monocytogenes and 
Shigella flexneri, SFG rickettsiae exploit the host cell actin cytoskeleton to promote 
intracellular mobility and cell-to-cell spread by assembling distinctive 'comet tails' that 
consist of long, unbranched actin filaments(Tilney and Portnoy, 1989;Bernardini et al., 
1989;Teysseire et al., 1992;Heinzen et al., 1993). The molecular mechanisms of actin 
polymerization by L. monocytogenes and S. flexneri primarily involve activation of the Arp2/3 
complex, an actin nucleator that can initiate the polymerization of new actin filaments and 
organize filaments into Y-branched arrays (Mullins et al., 1998;Welch et al., 1998;Blanchoin 
et al., 2000). In host cells, the Arp2/3 complex is activated by nucleation-promoting factors 
including members of the Wiskott–Aldrich syndrome protein (WASP) family of 
proteins(Higgs & Pollard, 2001;Welch & Mullins, 2002). The mechanisms of activation of the 
Arp2/3 complex by intracellular pathogens are that they express surface proteins that 
recruit host WASP family proteins (e.g., S. flexneri IcsA), or they express functional mimics 
of WASPs (e.g., L. monocytogenes ActA) (Goldberg, 2001). It was proposed that actin in 
Rickettsia comet tails is nucleated by the host Arp2/3 complex, and the bacterial protein 
RickA has been shown to assemble branched actin networks in vitro(Jeng et al., 2004;Gouin 
et al., 2004) . Coincidently, RickA is inactivated by an ISRpe1 transposon in R. peacockii, 
which does not have actin-based mobility(Simser et al., 2005). However, a new discovery 
suggests that besides RickA Sca2 is also involved in the actin-based mobility of Rickettsia. 
Knocking out the sca2 gene completely aborts actin-based mobility of R. rickettsii. Sca2 
mimics eukaryotic formins to determine the unique organization of actin filaments in 
Rickettsia tails and to drive bacterial mobility, independently of host nucleators. Actin-based 
mobility is important for the virulence of some rickettsiae such as R. rickettsii, but it is not 
important for the virulence of TG rickettsiae because TG rickettsiae do not have actin-based 
mobility or have only erratic mobility. Even SFG rickettsiae with actin-based mobility are 
not all virulent such as R. bellii, a tick symbiont, which has actin-based mobility but has not 
yet been shown to cause disease in humans or animals.  
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mite-borne Rickettsia such as R. prowazekii, R. typhi, R. felis, and R. akari are distributed 
worldwide with their hosts and vectors.  
Non-virulent or low virulence SFG rickettsiae may be maintained in nature largely via 
transovarian transmission in the arthropod hosts. However, highly virulent SFG rickettsiae 
such as R. rickettsii and R. conorii are pathogenic for the Dermacentor and Rhipicephalus ticks, 
respectively (Niebylski et al., 1999; Santos et al., 2002). Virulent rickettsiae such as R. 
rickettsii need an animal host to amplify the organisms for establishing new lines of 
transovarian rickettsial maintenance (e.g., D. variabilis ticks acquire R. rickettsii while feeding 
on rickettsemic cotton rats) (Niebylski et al., 1999). Each species of pathogenic SFG 
rickettsiae may have one or multiple tick vector species. The vectors of Rocky Mountain 
spotted fever are D. variabilis (American dog tick) in the eastern two-thirds of the US and 
regions of the Pacific coast states, D. andersoni (wood tick) in the Rocky Mountain states, 
Rhipicephalus sanguineus (brown dog tick) in the southwestern US, northern Mexico, and 
South America and Amblyomma cajennense and A. aureolatum in South America. The seasonal 
and geographic distribution of each rickettsiosis reflects the months of activity of the vector 
and its contact with humans. Over 90% of cases with Rocky Mountain spotted fever occur 
during April through September. Approximately 250-2000 cases of Rocky Mountain spotted 
fever have been reported annually in the United States (CDC, 2010).   
Epidemic typhus is transmitted primarily by the human body louse, Pediculus humanus 
corporis. However, the louse is only a vector and not a reservoir because infected lice die 5-7 
days after they become infected with R. prowazekii. Rickettsia prowazekii multiplies in louse 
gut epithelium, which detaches, ruptures and releases rickettsiae into the feces. The louse 
feces containing rickettsiae are scratched into the skin, rubbed into mucous membranes such 
as the conjunctiva, or inhaled. Humans can develop latent infection after acute louse-borne 
typhus and serve as reservoirs of R. prowazekii. R. prowazekii can be reactivated causing 
recrudescent typhus fever (Brill-Zinsser disease) when latently infected persons’ immunity 
wanes.  Rickettsia prowazekii is also maintained in a zoonotic cycle involving flying squirrels 
(Glaucomys volans) and their specific flea and louse in the United States. Sporadic epidemic 
typhus occurring in the United States is transmitted by fleas of flying squirrels (Duma et al., 
1981). Murine typhus is transmitted by fleas including rat fleas and cat fleas. 
3. Virulence determinants of Rickettsia 
Rickettsia has no exotoxin, and rickettsial LPS is not toxic and apparently is not associated 
with the pathogenesis of Rickettsia infections. Since Rickettsia are obligately intracellular 
bacteria, their survival mechanisms involve proteins related to the attachment, to entry into 
and exit from host cells, and enzymes for protein and DNA modification and obtaining 
nutrition from the host.    
Adhesins: The first step for obligately intracellular Rickettsia to establish infection is to adhere 
to and invade the host endothelium. These processes require the interaction of rickettsial 
surface proteins with mammalian host cell receptors. Three outer membrane proteins of 
Rickettsia OmpA, OmpB, and Sca2 have been identified as adhesins of Rickettsia(Li & 
Walker, 1998; Martinez et al., 2005; Cardwell & Martinez, 2009). OmpB has been 
demonstrated to interact with its mammalian receptor, Ku70. However, in Ku70–/– mouse 
embryonic fibroblasts R. conorii invasion is reduced only 50 to 60%, suggesting that Rickettsia 
may use multiple adhesins and receptors.  
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Membranolytic enzymes: Internalized rickettsiae are initially bound within a phagosome 
(Teysseire et al., 1995). Rickettsia quickly (<10 min) lyse the phagosomal membrane to escape 
from phagosomal vacuoles before phagolysosomal fusion occurs, which would result in the 
death of the Rickettsia through the activity of the lysosomal enzymes (Teysseire et al., 
1995;Hackstadt, 1996;Feng & Walker, 2000;Walker et al., 2001a). Rickettsia are also required 
to exit the host cell by lysis of the host cell membrane. The mechanism of lysis of the 
phagosomal membrane and the host cell membrane has been hypothesized to be mediated 
by a phospholipase enzyme (Radulovic et al., 1999;Renesto et al., 2003). The genomic 
sequences of Rickettsia have revealed four proteins with potential membranolytic activities: 
patatin B1 precursor (pat-1 gene), hemolysin A (tlyA), hemolysin C (tlyC), and 
phospholipase D (pld) (Andersson et al., 1998;Ogata et al., 2001;McLeod et al., 2004). TlyC 
has been demonstrated to have hemolytic activity, (Radulovic et al., 1999) and can mediate 
escape by S. enterica serovar Typhimurium from phagosomes (Whitworth et al., 2005). 
Patatin B of R. typhi (RT0522) has been implicated as a phospholipase A2. However, 
knockout of R. prowazekii pld gene does not prevent R. prowazekii escape from the phagosome 
or exit from host cells. Patatin B is truncated by an ISRpe 1 transposon in R. peacockii, which 
apparently does not affect the release of R. peacockii from phagosomes (Felsheim RF). These 
observations suggest that the multiple membranolytic enzymes of Rickettsia may be 
functionally redundant.  
Actin-based mobility: Like other intracytosolic bacteria such as Listeria monocytogenes and 
Shigella flexneri, SFG rickettsiae exploit the host cell actin cytoskeleton to promote 
intracellular mobility and cell-to-cell spread by assembling distinctive 'comet tails' that 
consist of long, unbranched actin filaments(Tilney and Portnoy, 1989;Bernardini et al., 
1989;Teysseire et al., 1992;Heinzen et al., 1993). The molecular mechanisms of actin 
polymerization by L. monocytogenes and S. flexneri primarily involve activation of the Arp2/3 
complex, an actin nucleator that can initiate the polymerization of new actin filaments and 
organize filaments into Y-branched arrays (Mullins et al., 1998;Welch et al., 1998;Blanchoin 
et al., 2000). In host cells, the Arp2/3 complex is activated by nucleation-promoting factors 
including members of the Wiskott–Aldrich syndrome protein (WASP) family of 
proteins(Higgs & Pollard, 2001;Welch & Mullins, 2002). The mechanisms of activation of the 
Arp2/3 complex by intracellular pathogens are that they express surface proteins that 
recruit host WASP family proteins (e.g., S. flexneri IcsA), or they express functional mimics 
of WASPs (e.g., L. monocytogenes ActA) (Goldberg, 2001). It was proposed that actin in 
Rickettsia comet tails is nucleated by the host Arp2/3 complex, and the bacterial protein 
RickA has been shown to assemble branched actin networks in vitro(Jeng et al., 2004;Gouin 
et al., 2004) . Coincidently, RickA is inactivated by an ISRpe1 transposon in R. peacockii, 
which does not have actin-based mobility(Simser et al., 2005). However, a new discovery 
suggests that besides RickA Sca2 is also involved in the actin-based mobility of Rickettsia. 
Knocking out the sca2 gene completely aborts actin-based mobility of R. rickettsii. Sca2 
mimics eukaryotic formins to determine the unique organization of actin filaments in 
Rickettsia tails and to drive bacterial mobility, independently of host nucleators. Actin-based 
mobility is important for the virulence of some rickettsiae such as R. rickettsii, but it is not 
important for the virulence of TG rickettsiae because TG rickettsiae do not have actin-based 
mobility or have only erratic mobility. Even SFG rickettsiae with actin-based mobility are 
not all virulent such as R. bellii, a tick symbiont, which has actin-based mobility but has not 
yet been shown to cause disease in humans or animals.  
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Methyltransferase: The patterns of methylation of lysine in the surface antigens of avirulent 
Madrid E (E) strain, virulent revertant Evir strain, and wild type Breinl strain of R. prowazekii 
are different. The major surface antigen of the virulent Breinl and Evir strains contains more 
Nє-Me3-lysine and less Nє-Me-lysine than the avirulent E strain (Rodionov et al., 1991;Turco 
& Winkler, 1994). Outer membrane protein B (OmpB) is heavily methylated in the virulent 
strains, while OmpB from the attenuated strain is hypomethylated(Ching et al., 1992). The 
methyltransferase gene (Rp028/Rp027) is inactivated by a frameshift mutation in E strain, 
but the mutation reverts to wild type in the virulent revertant Evir strain. A single 
nucleotide mutation in the methyltransferase gene is the only mutation in E strain compared 
to Evir strain (Yu, unpublished data). Taken together our results and the previous discovery 
that E strain is deficient in methylation of OmpB suggests strongly that the reversible 
mutation in the methyltransferase gene determines the virulence state of E strain, i.e., the 
organisms become avirulent when the gene is inactivated in E strain, and the organisms 
become virulent when the gene function is restored in Evir strain.  
3.1 Clinical spectrum/treatment 
Spotted fever: Rocky Mountain spotted fever caused by R. rickettsii is a very severe disease, 
and fatal cases occur in association with delayed or ineffective antibiotic treatment in as 
many as 4% of cases. RMSF occurs 1 -2 weeks after feeding by an infected tick. The disease is 
characterized by acute onset of fever that may be accompanied by headache, malaise, 
myalgia, nausea/vomiting, or neurologic signs. A macular or maculopapular rash appears 
3-5 days following onset in most (~90%) patients, and the rash has a centripetal pattern of 
spread, meaning that it begins on the extremities and spreads towards the trunk. In severe 
disease, petechiae appear in the center of the maculopapules. However, 10% to 15% of 
persons with RMSF never develop a rash, a condition referred to as "Rocky Mountain 
spotless fever"(Sexton & Corey, 1992). The target of Rickettsia is endothelium of blood vessels. 
Inflammation and damage of endothelia of capillary blood vessels by Rickettsia results in 
increased vacular permeability, which causes rash, hypovolemic hypotension, pulmonary 
and cerebral edema and organ failure.   
Other spotted fevers may have similar clinical symptoms as RMSF, but are less severe. Rash 
is less frequent in less severe rickettsioses such as African tick bite fever and R. parkeri 
infection. Focal skin necrosis with a dark scab (an eschar) at the site of tick feeding is a 
common feature of boutonneuse fever, African tick bite fever, North Asian tick typhus, 
Queensland tick typhus, Japanese spotted fever, Flinders Island spotted fever, rickettsialpox, 
tick-borne lymphadenopathy, and the recently described infections in the US caused by R. 
parkeri and a novel strain 364 D, but is rare in Rocky Mountain spotted fever.  
Typhus: Epidemic typhus and murine typhus are caused by R. prowazekii and R. typhi, 
respectively. Historically murine typhus and epidemic typhus were difficult to differentiate 
due to similar clinical symptoms, but epidemic typhus is more severe than murine typhus. 
Murine typhus occurs predominantly in summer and fall, and epidemic typhus usually 
occurs in winter. Symptoms of typhus may include high fever (105 - 106 degrees 
Fahrenheit), which may last up to 2 weeks, severe headache, severe muscle pain (myalgia), 
dry cough, delirium, stupor, and a dull red rash that begins on the trunk and spreads 
peripherally.  
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Tetracyclines are first-line treatment, and doxycycline may be used to avoid tooth staining 
in children. Tetracyclines are rickettsiostatic, not rickettsicidal. Chloramphenicol is a second 
line, less effective treatment that can be used in the rare instance of contraindication to use 
of doxycycline. Ciprofloxacin, other fluoroquinolones, azithromycin, and clarinthromycin 
are effective against certain rickettsiae but are not recommended for the severe rickettsioses. 
Because diagnostic tests can take time and may be insensitive, antibiotics are usually begun 
presumptively to prevent significant deterioration, complications, death, sequelae, and 
prolonged recovery.  
3.2 Immune mechanisms of Rickettsia 
Most of our understanding of the immune response against Rickettsia is derived from in vitro 
studies as well as the murine models of rickettsioses. Proinflammatory cytokines such as 
IFN-γ and TNF-α are essential for primary defense against rickettsial infection. These 
cytokines act in concert to activate endothelial cells, the major target cells of rickettsial 
infections, as well as other minor target cells to kill intracellular organisms via nitric oxide 
synthesis-dependent and indoleamine 2,3-dioxygenase-dependent mechanisms. The sources 
of these protective cytokines are hypothesized to be the T lymphocytes and macrophages 
that infiltrate the perivascular space surrounding the vessels with infected endothelium.  
Cell mediated immunity plays a critical role in host defenses against rickettsial 
infections(Walker et al., 2001b). There are two important effector components of the 
acquired immune response against Rickettsia, namely IFN- γ production by CD4+ and CD8+ 
type-1 cells, which activates intracellular bactericidal mechanisms of endothelial cells and 
macrophages, and the generation of Rickettsia-specific cytotoxic CD8+ T cells that induce 
apoptosis in infected target cells via pathways involving perforin and/or granzymes. CD8+ 
T cells are more important in clearance of rickettsial infection than CD4+ T cells(Walker et 
al., 2001b). Although adoptive transfer of either CD4 or CD8 immune T lymphocytes 
controls the infection and leads to survival, only depletion of CD8 T lymphocytes alters the 
outcome of infection, and depletion of CD4 cells has no observed effect on the course or 
outcome of infection(Walker et al., 2001c).  
The humoral response may play an important role in protection against infection, and 
antibodies against surface protein antigens are very likely critical effectors of vaccine–
associated protective immunity. In animal experiments, antibodies to Rickettsia or rickettsial 
outer membrane proteins can neutralize rickettsia (Anacker et al., 1987;Li et al., 1988). 
However, natural infection does not result in the production of protective antibodies prior 
to clearance of rickettsiae. Thus, humoral immunity may be more important in preventing 
reinfection and in vaccine-induced immunity than in clearance of primary infection.  
4. Experimental vaccines and other potential vaccine prospects 
Currently no commercial vaccine is available for any rickettsial disease. Infection with R. 
rickettsii and R. conorii is believed to confer long lasting immunity against re-infection. Thus, 
it is feasible to develop a vaccine against rickettsial diseases. In theory, a subunit vaccine 
targeting a conserved rickettsial protein such as OmpB may be developed to prevent all 
rickettsial diseases. An attenuated organism that can multiply, but does not cause disease in 
the host, has been proved to be effective in protection against rickettsial infections in 
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Methyltransferase: The patterns of methylation of lysine in the surface antigens of avirulent 
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due to similar clinical symptoms, but epidemic typhus is more severe than murine typhus. 
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outcome of infection, and depletion of CD4 cells has no observed effect on the course or 
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The humoral response may play an important role in protection against infection, and 
antibodies against surface protein antigens are very likely critical effectors of vaccine–
associated protective immunity. In animal experiments, antibodies to Rickettsia or rickettsial 
outer membrane proteins can neutralize rickettsia (Anacker et al., 1987;Li et al., 1988). 
However, natural infection does not result in the production of protective antibodies prior 
to clearance of rickettsiae. Thus, humoral immunity may be more important in preventing 
reinfection and in vaccine-induced immunity than in clearance of primary infection.  
4. Experimental vaccines and other potential vaccine prospects 
Currently no commercial vaccine is available for any rickettsial disease. Infection with R. 
rickettsii and R. conorii is believed to confer long lasting immunity against re-infection. Thus, 
it is feasible to develop a vaccine against rickettsial diseases. In theory, a subunit vaccine 
targeting a conserved rickettsial protein such as OmpB may be developed to prevent all 
rickettsial diseases. An attenuated organism that can multiply, but does not cause disease in 
the host, has been proved to be effective in protection against rickettsial infections in 
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humans and laboratory animals. Attenuated Rickettsia has been selected by passage in 
chicken egg yolk sacs in the past and was recently achieved by gene knockout technology.  
Inactivated vaccine. The history of development of vaccines against rickettsial diseases 
contains numerous failures and limited success in preventing or ameliorating disease. Killed 
rickettsial vaccine was prepared from infected ticks in 1924, in yolk sac of embryonated 
chicken eggs in 1938 (Cox HR, 1939), and from cell culture in the 1970s (Gonder et al., 
1979;Kenyon et al., 1979). The original tick-derived rickettsial vaccine produced severe local 
inoculation site reactions(Spencer RR and Parker RR, 1925). Evaluation of its protective 
effect in field use was impressive by the standards of the day. The fatality rate from Rocky 
Mountain spotted fever among vaccine recipients was reduced dramatically although illness 
and even death occurred in some vaccinated persons. The killed yolk sac-derived rickettsial 
vaccine was never field tested. When tested by challenge of human volunteers, neither the 
yolk sac vaccine nor the tick vaccine prevented the illness, which, of course, was treated to 
prevent severe illness or death. The yolk sac vaccine was withdrawn from the market in 
1978. A subsequent challenge trial of a cell culture killed-R. rickettsii vaccine yielded 
protection of 25% of the volunteers who received it(Gonder et al., 1979).    
Subunit vaccine for Rickettsia. Two surface protein antigens of R. rickettsii, OmpA and OmpB, 
have been identified as major protective antigens and are candidates for use as subunit 
vaccines. The first evidence that OmpA and OmpB contain protective epitopes came from 
the studies of monoclonal antibodies to heat sensitive epitopes of OmpA and OmpB, which 
neutralized R. rickettsii toxicity in mice and infection in guinea pigs (Anacker et al., 1987;Li 
et al., 1988). The E. coli-expressed OmpA N-terminal fragment partially protects guinea pigs 
against a lethal challenge dose of R. rickettsii (McDonald et al., 1988). A fragment from the 
N-terminus of R. conorii OmpA protects guinea pigs against experimental infection with R. 
conorii and partially protects guinea pigs from challenge with the heterologous R. rickettsii 
(Vishwanath et al., 1990). Fragments of the ompA and ompB genes have been tested as DNA 
vaccines. In a regimen of DNA immunization followed by boosters of the corresponding 
peptide, mice immunized with R. rickettsii ompA or ompB fragments are partially protected 
against a lethal challenge with heterologous R. conorii(Diaz-Montero et al., 2001). It is not 
known whether the incomplete protection of OmpA and OmpB against the heterologous 
Rickettsia species challenge in these experiments is caused by the antigenic differences 
between the rickettsial species, the immunization regimen, or the antigen composition. 
Live vaccine. The attenuated Madrid E (E) strain of R. prowazekii was used in humans as an 
experimental vaccine from the 1950s to 1970s. E strain is a spontaneous laboratory variant of 
R. prowazekii that was isolated from a typhus patient in Madrid in 1941 and passed in rapid 
succession in embryonated chicken eggs 255 times. This strain has limited virulence for 
guinea pigs and low virulence for humans. E strain is protective and provides long term 
immunity against louse-borne typhus. Ninety-four percent (170/181) of immunized persons 
were protected from natural infection by epidemic typhus compared to the unvaccinated 
controls in a 14-month period after vaccination. Ninety-six percent (27/28) of volunteers 
who were vaccinated with E strain and subsequently challenged with Breinl strain at 
intervals from 2 months to 36 months remained healthy following challenge, and 83% (5/6) 
of the volunteers who were challenged at 48 to 66 months were protected(FOX et al., 1961). 
However, the E strain vaccine caused a late reaction in up to 14% of vaccinated persons 9-14 
days after inoculation. The late reaction varied from simple malaise and mild headache to 
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modified typhus characterized by fever, headache, malaise and occasionally a rash in a 
small proportion of subjects. The reason for the late reaction was not known at the time. In 
1970s a virulent revertant Evir strain was isolated from guinea pigs by passage of E strain in 
guinea pigs or mice.  
Attenuation of Rickettsia by gene knockout. Because of the difficulty of transforming Rickettsia, 
scientists were unable to knock out rickettsial genes to determine their function and to create 
an attenuated rickettsial vaccine until recently. The phopholipase D (pld) gene was the first 
rickettsial gene that was genetically knocked out. The pld-inactivated Evir strain is avirulent 
for guinea pigs at doses for which the Evir strain is virulent and stimulates protective 
immunity to virulent R. prowazekii (Driskell et al., 2009). Genetic inactivation of sca-2 in R. 
rickettsii results in loss of actin-based mobility in cell culture (Kleba et al., 2010). Sca-2 
deficient R. rickettsii lacks the ability to cause disease in guinea pigs, but stimulates 
protection against challenge with virulent R. rickettsii (Kleba et al., 2010). Thus, Sca-2 and 
phospholipase D-deficient strains should be further evaluated as vaccines for Rocky 
Mountain spotted fever and epidemic typhus. Genetically attenuated Rickettsia are the 
strongest future prospect for developing an effective rickettsial vaccine. 
Differentiation of strains of R. prowazekii and R. rickettsii. R. prowazekii has been isolated 
from humans, flying squirrels, and ticks for more than half century. Due to different sources 
and different passages, R. prowazekii strain can be grouped in to three virulence groups: high 
virulence group represented by Breinl strain, medium virulence group represented by flying 
squirrel isolates and low virulence or non-virulence group represented by Madrid E strain 
and its revertant strains. All strains of R. prowazekii can be differentiated by sequencing 
several loci of the genome of R. prowazekii (Zhu et al., 2008). R. rickettsii strains were not 
genetically typed except for virulent R strain and nonvirulent Iowa strains, whose whole 
genomes were completely sequenced (Ellison et al., 2008).  
5. Conclusion 
There has been progress in molecular biology, cellular biology and immunology and 
pathogenesis of Rickettsia. However, diagnosis of rickettsial diseases is still difficult and is 
usually retrospective. Rapid diagnostic methods are required for diagnosis of rickettsial 
diseases and in response to bioterrorism.  
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